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 “It is far better to predict without certainty, than never to have predicted at all”  
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“Whenever we proceed from the known into the unknown we may hope to understand, but we may 
have to learn at the same time a new meaning of the word ‘understanding’. We know that any 
understanding must be based finally upon the natural language because it is only there that we can 
be certain to touch reality, and hence we must be sceptical about any scepticism with regard to this 
natural language and its essential concepts.” 
 
Heisenberg, 1958 
1.1 MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this dissertation is to explore managerial decision-making in new technology-
based ventures and particularly the uncertainty surrounding such ventures.  The Oxford English 
Dictionary def ines a ‘venture’ as undertaking a risk, a risky enterprise or a commercial speculation. 
Venturing is a typical business firm activity. From this perspective, a venture is inherently 
associated with uncertainty. Uncertainty has also been a central focus for general management 
(Thompson, 1967). However, decision-making under uncertainty is especially evident in ventures 
where new technology-based innovations are exploited (Gold, 1971; Kay, 1997).   
New technologies are prone to uncertainty a propos whether they will work, and if so, whether they 
can be turned into products for which there are markets to generate returns. As future applications 
of a given new technology have yet to be searched and discovered, it is difficult for management to 
make assumptions to base venturing decisions on. In MBA education, the 3M case (Bartlett and 
Mohammed, 1995) is used as an example. Specifically the case of 3M Post-it notes, which are 
based on a technology discovered in 1968: an adhesive that behaves differently to conventional 
glue in that it is less sticky. However it was five years before a successful application was found for 
this new technology and another 15 years before the technology was finally put to market. It was 
only when, rehearsing for the church choir one day and needing a marker in his hymn book, one of 
the 3M directors saw the benefits of an adhesive that could keep a piece of paper in place 
temporarily, leaving no trace. The results are well known and Post-it notes are now considered to 
be one of 3M’s most successful ventures. It would have been impossible to assign probabilities or 
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even anticipate the potential application for the technology during the first years of the 
technology’s existence. It was only thanks to the innovation of one of the directors that the 
technology of the glue was patented and kept in house.  
The topic of uncertainty for managerial decisions in new technology-based ventures (NTBVs) has 
received increasing attention at this time of writing (e.g. Courtney, 2001). Uncertainty-related 
problems for NTBVs are particularly visible and relevant at the present time. Since the market 
crash in April 2000, uncertainty for new technology-based industries has been reflected in the 
volatility and extreme fluctuations of stock prices. These fluctuations are disproportional and 
magnified in comparison to other industries (N. N., 1999a-c, 2001a-c). During a market crash, 
investors rapidly lose confidence in new technology industries as profitability prospects seem 
indefinitely delayed and new technologies face uncertain futures (N. N., 2001a-b). However, from 
a policy perspective, new technologies are essential for the economy. The European Commission 
recognised that technological development and innovation are by their nature uncertain, and it is a 
permanent challenge to assess the effects of new technological developments for future market 
dynamics and competitive conditions (N. N., 2002b).  
Uncertainty as a managerial problem has been extensively researched and various techniques that 
have addressed decision-making under uncertainty are available. A prominent example of such an 
approach is decision theory (e.g. Raiffa, 1968; Markland and Sweigart 1987). Decision theory 
essentially helps decision makers to structure decision problems to the extent that statistical 
calculations can be performed to work out the probable outcomes of various decisions. The most 
common example is a risk-based calculation characterised by the availability of precise 
probabilities assigned to potential events, such as the outcomes of casting a dice. In dealing with 
uncertainty, however, these probabilities are less well known. Decision theory solves this by using 
so-called “subjective probabilities” or “best guesses” (Spencer, 1962; Raiffa, 1968; Dobbs, 1991), 
on which risk-like calculations can be applied. The success of such decisions thus depends on the 
accuracy of the assumptions of the decision maker. 
Other approaches prescribe protection and avoidance techniques to help managers deal with 
uncertainty. Most prominently, Thompson (1967) suggested addressing uncertainty within the 
structure of the organisation and creating departments that shield the operative core of the firm 
from uncertainty. In that sense the marketing department addresses market uncertainties just as the 
Research and Development (R&D) department is a firm’s response to technological uncertainty.  
Another way of structuring the problem of uncertainty is to translate the uncertainty into a plan in 
which decision makers commit their resources to future activities. A decision is a specific 
commitment to action (Mintzberg et al., 1978), mostly in terms of resources. The aim of such 
planning activities, according to Drucker (1959), is not to attempt to eliminate or minimise risk, but 
to commit present resources to future (uncertain) expectations (Drucker, 1959). The central 




These approaches have contributed a great deal to managers and their decision-making capabilities. 
Nevertheless, an added element of uncertainty that managers face when venturing new 
technologies is that it is not always clear if the technology will work, and how  it will work. This 
stage precedes the applicability of the aforementioned methods, where reasonable assumptions on 
future states and their respective probabilities can be predicted by the decision maker.  
An alternative perspective is provided in the literature that deals more with the input of the 
venturing process and the capabilities a firm should have. A prominent example is the proposal that 
a firm should have entrepreneurial capabilities. According to Schumpeter (1943), making the 
decisions related to bring about a unique event, or a venture, is a typical entrepreneurial activity. 
From this perspective, decisions rely on the entrepreneurial judgement (Penrose, 1959) which is 
often associated to the available experience in the firm (Penrose, 1959). Entrepreneurship seems to 
take a more input-oriented perspective to uncertainty. Rather than focusing on estimating the 
potential outcomes of decisions, literature on entrepreneurship describes what a firm requires in 
order to make good judgements.  
In line with this example another input-oriented approach is emerging which is based on the 
capabilities a firm should have to change the resource base of a firm. Derived from this perspective, 
theories are emerging that address the typical turbulence present in new technology-based firms. 
Such firms require the capability to dynamically reconfigure the resource base (Teece et al., 1997; 
Eisenhardt, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002), which is also referred to as a dynamic capability to 
optimally venture new technologies. A dynamic capability is thus the managerial capability to 
reconfigure the resources that make up the venturing organisation.  
If this dynamic capability is prevalent in the firm, the firm is expected to have a competitive 
advantage, and thus arguably reduce some uncertainty.  Such capabilities are ultimately an attempt 
to clarify the causal ambiguity that is apparent in the relation between the actions taken and the 
future outcome of these actions (or the performance) (Zollo and Winter, 2002). The main challenge 
from this resource-oriented perspective seems to relate to revealing potential causalities between 
the input (resources) and outcome (performance) of NTBVs.  
These theories however are still in their early stages and are considered to be abstract (Teece et al., 
1997; Zollo and Winter, 2002). More empirical research and measurable results are called for 
(Teece, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002). The 
measurement of such intangibles requires exploration, and could prove beneficial to further the 
understanding of the impact such capabilities can have on the uncertainty surrounding the 
venturing process of new technology-based firms.   
In this dissertation I will focus on new concepts that can support the measurement of intangible 
concepts and ultimately decision-making under uncertainty. In particular, I will explore new ways 
of dealing with the apparent ambiguity between the input or the output of the venturing process 
(Zollo and Winter, 2002). Within this context, this thesis sets out to use an analogy with 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle that introduced a new conceptual way of understanding 
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uncertainty using duality and probabilities that has been applied with great success in physics 
(Davies, 1989). This thesis will explore if and how this perspective can be adopted to enhance the 
understanding of uncertainty in NTBVs to the extent that it contributes to managerial decisions.  
This thesis intends to adopt the conceptual understanding and implications derived from this 
uncertainty principle, in order to complement existing theories in understanding uncertainty for 
managerial decision-making. Analogous approaches based on concepts from other sciences have 
already provided valuable new insights in looking at organisational phenomena. Examples are 
biological theories, such as Darwin’s theory of evolution to understand organisation development, 
and theories of physics, such as complexity and chaos theory (i.e. Gell-Mann 1995; Prigogine and 
Stengers, 1988) to understand organisational phenomena and the thermodynamics concept of 
synergy for self-organisation (Baltes, 2000).  
The adoption of concepts from physics for social phenomena has received increasing attention (e.g. 
Ganley, 1995; Khalil, 1997; Overman, 1996; Mintzberg and Westley, 2000; Oliver, 1999; Fabian, 
2000; Zohar, 1998; Zohar and Marshall, 1993; Evans, 1996; Barnard, 1996; Wheatley, 1999) and 
thus encourages this research direction. Within this context this thesis is a result of a dedicated 
research program developed at CeTIM that aims to explore such analogous approaches. Other 
examples as part of this program are the adoption of a synergy concept from thermodynamics to 
self-organisation (Baltes, 2000). As the results were encouraging, there seems to be potential to 
further the understanding using such concepts.  
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis addresses the following two research questions: 
• What can a re-conceptualisation of uncertainty contribute to the understanding of 
uncertainty, in particular for managerial decision-making in new technology-based 
ventures? 
• Can such an uncertainty concept be operationalised to complement existing 
pragmatic approaches and support managerial decision-making in new technology-
based ventures?  
The first question aims to explore new ways of thinking about uncertainty by suggesting a re-
conceptualisation of the understanding of uncertainty. Although uncertainty and managerial 
decision-making have been well discussed, the particular uncertainty residing in the venturing 
phases of new technologies still has potential for improvement. To this end, I will focus on the 
adoption of the conceptual understanding and a potential new way of dealing with the apparent 
limits of causality between decisions or actions and the outcome of such decisions. In order to deal 
with the unpredictability of this dichotomy I will adopt some of the ideas on probabilities, duality, 
methods and experiments first introduced by Heisenberg (1958).  
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The second question aims to explore a potential operationalisation of such a concept. This concept 
will predominantly focus on an alternative way of measuring and interpreting uncertainty within 
NTBVs. Similar to Heisenberg, who stressed the importance of experiments, I will operationalise 
and validate the conceptual insights in the context of NTBVs by proposing a candidate solution for 
measuring intangibles such as capabilities and study the impact these intangibles have on future 
outcomes. The subsequent results enable the evaluation of the potential contribution for managerial 
decision-making.  
1.3 EXPECTED RESULTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS  
The main academic contribution of this thesis is to raise the issue of the limits of causality when 
looking at uncertainty. This insight follows an analogous approach from the treatment of 
uncertainty as discovered in quantum theory. Research on this topic is time consuming and thus the 
expectations are not to provide a concrete solution but to initiate and explore this potential new 
research direction. As it took the physics community some three decades to come to terms with the 
unconventional ideas of Heisenberg in the Copenhagen interpretation (Heisenberg, 1958), so it is 
the expectation that research, as presented in this thesis, will need many years to evolve.  
The conclusions are drawn on a conceptual level and aim to evaluate if this new way of looking at 
uncertainty can provide a potential contribution for managerial decision-making in NTBVs. This 
contribution is interdisciplinary as the main focus is in the area of technology and innovation 
management, which is at the confluence of engineering and management sciences (Lannes, 2001). 
This thesis does not claim that there is a new Heisenberg uncertainty principle to be found that 
applies to managerial phenomena. However, this thesis tries to raise awareness of the successful 
inquisitive methods and concepts Heisenberg applied and experimented with in order to explore 
potential pragmatic solutions for uncertainty in managerial phenomena.  
The experiment described in this thesis is expected to provide a first indication of a new way of 
looking at and measuring uncertainty for NTBVs. The expectation is that based on these new 
insights future research streams will unfold from both a pragmatic as well as an academic 
perspective. The development of a measurement instrument in particular is expected to provide a 
fruitful starting point and has the potential to contribute to managerial practice and engineering 
sciences.  
To engineering sciences, the expected contribution is to support system engineers in developing 
new methods and tools for managerial decision-making. The system design fuels the development 
requirements for information systems and provides a first validation of the applied conceptual 
advances made in this work.  
To managerial practice, this thesis is expected to provide new insights on solutions to deal with 
uncertainty for managerial decision-making, especially in the context of NTBVs. The experimental 
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results are expected to provide an increased understanding of the complex problems surrounding 
the uncertainty that managers face when venturing new technologies . This new understanding can 
benefit decision makers, such as board members, venture capitalists and general managers. The 
subsequent development of measurement systems therein is a potential way of dealing with these 
problems, and opens up an array of new ideas for future consideration.  
1.4 RESEARCH PLAN 
“...any concepts or words which have been formed in the past through the interplay between the 
world and ourselves are not really sharply defined with respect to their meaning; that is to say, we 
do not know exactly how far they will help us in finding our way in the world. We often know that 
they can be applied to a wide range of inner or outer experience, but we practically never know 
precisely the limits of their applicability.”  
Heisenberg, 1958: 51 
The research plan reflects specific elements for conventional research approaches in both the social 
sciences and system engineering. Research in technology and decision-making typically crosses 
interdisciplinary barriers (Cheng, 1999). The interdisciplinary nature can be illustrated by 
describing technology as the process that enables a company to know how to apply science and 
engineering, clarifying what the technology does for the business instead of just stating what the 
technology is (Erickson et al., 1990). The research plan thus builds on the coalescence of 
engineering management (Lannes, 2001) and socio-economic perspectives.  
In order to construct an appropriate research plan, the question of how reality can be known has to 
be addressed. This is the central question in the field of epistemology. Epistemology is the study of 
the nature of knowledge and justification (Audi, 1999). Philosophers have contemplated the 
numerous systems of belief by which reality can be known. For example, two prominent beliefs ar e 
the rational belief versus the empirical belief. From a rationalist’s perspective, absolute truths, such 
as mathematics, are known a priori by pure cognition. This view was held by philosophers such as 
Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza (Audi, 2000). In contrast, empiricists believe that the only way to 
know the truth is by experience. This view was predominantly held by philosophers such as Hume, 
Locke, Hobbes and Newton (Audi, 2000). Although both beliefs seem exclusive, a critical view 
emerged, notably by Immanuel Kant (1781), in a plea to align these two views. He suggested that 
these two types of knowledge, empirical and rational, co-exist. Some pieces of knowledge are 
rational and thus known a priori, e.g. that two and two makes four. Other knowledge can only be 
known through experience, e.g. the sun rising every morning (Heisenberg, 1958). 
The epistemological position thus reflects the relation of the researcher to the object under study. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argued that knowledge can be viewed as either objectively or 
subjectively knowable. The first disposition, also referred to as a positivism, in which the 
phenomena under study is clear and an undeniable truth, is expected through a process of 
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verification or falsification (Audi, 2000). The second disposition, the subjective view, is also 
referred to as social constructivism (e.g. Berger and Luckman, 1967; Weick, 1979; Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989). This view claims that knowledge on certain phenomena is the result of a process of 
social interaction, or socially constructed. This last view is appropriate in cases where the 
boundaries of the phenomena under study are unclear and an undeniable truth is not directly 
assumed.  
In this dissertation, the boundaries between the phenomenon of “uncertainty” and the object under 
study, new technology-based firms, are not clear and thus require a constructivist approach.  The 
exploration will thus be based on a research design that allows the researcher to experiment and 
learn from the findings in order to extend the knowledge base on the subject under study in an 
attempt to seek further clarification of the phenomenon rather than claim a new undeniable truth. 
To this end I follow Heisenberg’s view, which advocates a continuous interplay between theory 
and experiment. Heisenberg (1958) built on the Kantian view but argued that what Kant defined as 
a priori knowledge can become obsolete when new empirical findings are made. An example of 
this is the law of causality which Kant viewed as rational and thus a priori knowledge. Heisenberg 
proved that the law of causality was no longer applicable on a quantum level and thus no longer an 
absolute truth. It is his belief that it is not possible to reach the absolute truth by pure reason alone; 
he therefore stressed the importance of listening to the experiment.  
The research design of this thesis takes a constructivist approach in order to analyse and understand 
the phenomena under study. The design incorporates three distinct steps. Firstly, ideas are extracted 
from literature in order to come to an alternative treatment of uncertainty for decision-making in 
new technology-based venturing. Secondly, based on these conceptual ideas, an experiment is 
designed. This experiment takes the form of a set of cases in which the concept will be further 
explored. The experiment design will also incorporate a system engineering module to create an 
appropriate measurement tool. The third step is the actual testing and validation of the concept. The 
results of a critical longitudinal case study, where the concept will be tested in multiple sites, are 
expected to provide new insights into the understanding of uncertainty in new technology-based 
venturing.  
An overview of the research design and its modules are as follows: 
Idea Development 
The idea development phase has three distinct modules that are based on an extensive literature 
analysis.  
The first module addresses the literature on existing solutions for uncertainty and managerial 
decision-making. A vast amount of literature exists, examples of which have already been 
addressed in the introduction, such as decision theory and entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, as the 
introduction has shown, uncertainty is still a major challenge for managerial decision-making in 
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NTBVs in cases where decisions have to be made for which the consequences are not clear, or 
where there is causal ambiguity (Zollo and Winter, 2002).  
In contrast to the existing solutions that regard uncertainty as a result of ambiguous casual 
relationships (e.g. the cause-effect relationship of decision-making and performance) uncertainty 
has been given a different meaning in physics. The second module will subsequently introduce an 
alternative approach adopted from physics where, notably, Heisenberg stood at the forefront of a 
powerful solution for uncertainty on a sub-atomic level. He proved the laws of causality were made 
redundant when dealing with this inherent uncertainty, and shifted the focus from causality to a 
probability approach. Although the subsequent method was highly disputed by the likes of 
Einstein, the application proved very successful in the years to come. The seminal work of Werner 
Heisenberg, ‘Physics and Philosophy’, will form the basis of this review (Heisenberg, 1958) that, in 
conjunction with supporting material on the history of physics, will be used to shed light on an new 
way of thinking about uncertainty.  
In the third module I will propose a new way of looking at uncertainty for NTBVs analogous the 
conceptual approach used by Heisenberg. The re-conceptualisation follows a logical argument 
using an analogous approach adopted from Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, in looking for non 
causal elements that ultimately define uncertainty. This is also referred to as duality. Furthering the 
re-conceptualisation I will suggest a probability function that allows for a better prediction of this 
non-causal relationship. Finally the re-conceptualisation is compared to previous efforts that have 
used the philosophical implications derived from the discoveries in quantum theory as to position 
the results. The evaluation follows an analysis of the most prominent efforts where scholars and 
practitioners have used Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and its implications to study managerial 
phenomena. The evaluation aims to show similarities and gaps in previous works and will position 
the proposed re-conceptualisation within the existing literature.  
The results of modules one and two are described in chapter two; module three is described in 
chapter three. 
Experiment Design 
The experiment design section incorporates two modules in order to effectively construct an 
experiment in which the new conceptual findings can be tested and validated.  
The first module will further the research by developing an experiment that allows for an initial 
empirical validation on the potential contribution of the new insights on uncertainty and how it can 
benefit managerial decision-making in NTBVs.  The experiment is developed using empirical case 
studies resulting in a first application aimed at operationalising the proposed concept. This 
candidate solution has been developed using practical insights on two new technology-based firms. 
More specifically, using case study research, requirements have been distilled in order to create a 
first application that, from a practical perspective, can operationalise the concept to benefit 
managerial decision-making.  
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Following these developments, these ideas are implemented in the second module in a software 
tool, to allow for appropriate measurements of the experiment. As part of the operationalisation, the 
applied concept has been implemented in a prototype measurement system that aims to model the 
new understanding of uncertainty.  In addition, a method is developed that allows for the effective 
testing of the new concept. The section will close with the development of an initial “thought 
experiment”. A thought experiment, or “Gedankenexperiment,” is a device of the imagination used 
to investigate nature (Brown, 2002).  
The case studies module is described in chapter 4; the system engineering module is separately 
described in chapter five. 
Testing and Validating  
In order to test and validate the experiment developed in the previous section, it will be carried out 
in a firm with multiple NTBVs. The concept and prototype system have been explored in a NTBV 
scenario of an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) in the telecommunications industry. Using 
an exploratory longitudinal case study (Leonard-Barton, 1990) with two measurement sites, I aim 
to gain further insights into the potential contribution of the new way of looking at uncertainty in 
venturing new technologies and what it can contribute to understanding managerial decisions.  
Based on this experiment I will discuss the contribution and implications on both a conceptual level 
as well as the lessons learned for future research experiments in this direction. This is illustrated in 
the research plan (figure 1) as a feedback loop to the respective sections.  
The testing is reported in chapter six and the conclusions and implications are reported in chapter 
seven.  
The distinct research methods are described at the beginning of each subsequent chapter; these will 
focus on how the data used has been selected and collected, how this data has been analysed and 
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DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY; A 
MATTER OF UNDERSTANDING CAUSALITY 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Uncertain. (adj.) 1 not certainly knowing or known (uncertain what it means; the result is 
uncertain., 2 unreliable (his aim is uncertain). 3 changeable, erratic (uncertain weather).  
 
Oxford English Dictionary 
 
‘Uncertainty’ is the noun from the adjective ‘uncertain’, which in the Oxford dictionary is related 
to missing knowledge or unreliable and changing circumstances. Uncertain is the negative of 
‘certain’, which stems from the Latin ‘certus’.  ‘Certain’ can also be taken to mean settled or 
determined, therefore the negative reflects a state of being unsettled or undetermined.  
The process of venturing new technologies is often associated with such expressions. Venturing 
new technologies can bring many opportunities, but may also prove fruitless. The outcome of 
NTBVs is often not known at the outset. This has strong implications for managerial decisions and 
is complicated by the fact that the pre-investments needed to venture new technologies are often 
very high.  
Uncertainty makes it difficult for managers to make good decisions and “settle” the technology 
venture, which is often complicated by a turbulent environment. The problem of uncertainty has 
been recognised in the literature and hence has been widely discussed. Examples can be found in 
decision theory and long range planning techniques. However, despite these solutions some 
uncertainty remains that is typically visible in new technology-based ventures.  It is thus 
worthwhile revisiting the existing concept of uncertainty and managerial decisions to find 
complementary approaches to deal with this specific uncertainty.  
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This section will discuss the most prominent approaches in literature regarding managerial 
decisions under uncertainty, and evaluate how these approaches deal with the typical uncertainties 
in new technology-based ventures. I will then analyse an interdisciplinary framework that will form 
the basis of the evaluation of a potential alternative concept of uncertainty, by exploring an analogy 
with Heisenberg’s treatment of uncertainty. This part follows a conventional literature research 
methodology.  The literature study is based on the following steps: 
1. Explorative scientific literature searches in libraries and electronic databanks on the concept of 
uncertainty and related topics. The search considered the title, keywords, abstract and full text, 
and focused on the hits related to the concept of uncertainty for managerial decision-making, 
with a particular focus on new technologies. Additionally the concept of uncertainty and 
analogies to physics has been explored.  
2. Structuring of the hits in three levels:  
A. Managerial decision-making under uncertainty. The results stemmed from a semi-
structured search within the existing body of literature. Specific focus has been given to the 
bodies of knowledge concerning technology and innovation management studies. The 
search continued throughout the duration of the study and was carried out at four university 
libraries1, and also used intermediate electronic databanks2. In addition, a specific 
electronic search was carried out on the database of the Academy of Management. Three 
topics emerged: decision theory, strategy & organisation, a capabilities view of the firm. 
These will be discussed in sections 2.2 to 2.5.  
B. Literature on the evolution and treatment of the problem of uncertainty in physics (with 
emphasis on quantum theory and the conceptual and epistemological consequences). The 
results were predominantly based on a chronological search partly derived from similar 
sources to the first search level.  They incorporated seminal and original works dealing 
with the conceptual and philosophical implications of the uncertainty principle and an 
outline of its history. This will be discussed in section 2.6. 
C. Literature on cross-references of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in social sciences, in 
order to review existing analogies and references. The results stemmed from a direct 
search, using Proquest ABI/INFORM. This will be discussed in section 3.2.  
This formed the basis of the literature review. The structuring of the specific search results has 
been carried out using the endnote database structure. For each search level (A-C) a separate 
database has been used to capture and summarise the articles. The selection criteria were twofold: 
the relevance to the research question and the quality rating of the publication. In the case of 
                                              
1 Searches took place at the following libraries: Universität der Bundeswehr, St. Gallen University, University of  
Cambridge, Cranfield University 
2 Online databank sources: EBSCO’s Business Source Premier, ABI/Inform Databank and the Emerald Databank.  
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journal articles, the articles predominantly stem from journals that have been classified as ‘A,’ 
according to the citation analysis on the technology and innovation management journals by Cheng 
(1999).  
2.2 TO ASSUME AND TO ANALYSE: MAKING CALCULATED DECISIONS 
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
The literature study on managerial decision-making under uncertainty led to the field of decision 
theory. Decision theory reduces decision problems to a quantifiable set of decision outcomes and 
probabilities. By performing calculations on probabilities and outcomes, the most desirable 
decisions can be selected.  
2.2.1 Using quantitative methods for decision-making under 
uncertainty 
Decision theory finds it roots at the beginning of the 20th century when industrial engineers began 
to apply scientific techniques to reduce uncertainty in industrial problems (Markland and Sweigart, 
1987). The first examples go back to the early 1900s when Frederick Taylor studied worker 
capacities and developed time standards for specific job functions, also known as time and motion 
studies (Taylor, 1911). This scientific approach has been furthered in a set of principles for 
scientific management (Fayol, 1949) theorising on all the elements required for a plan of action, 
such as the art of handling men, energy, moral courage, continuity of tenure, professional 
competence, and general business knowledge3.  
However it was not until World War II that these scientific methods for managerial decisions were 
enriched with statistical methods and became known as operational research (or operations research 
as the Americans have termed it). Notably, Thomas Edison had studied antisubmarine warfare 
during World War I and compiled statistics for determining the best methods for detecting and 
evading submarines (Markland and Sweigart, 1987). These ideas were taken up in World War II by 
the British army to scientific study military operations (Markland and Sweigart, 1987).  
The new emerging operational research activities resulted in an improved decision-making 
capability for Winston Churchill and his team under the uncertainty of the war. For example, 
following a request for additional fighter squadrons a study was prepared graphing the daily losses 
and replacement rates (Beasley, 2001). This study indicated that additional fighter squadrons would 
                                              
3 Fourteen general principles of management: division of work; authority; discipline; unity of command; unity of 
direction; subordination of individual interests to the general interests; remuneration; centralisation; scalar chain (line of 
authority); order; equity; stability of tenure of personnel; initiative; esprit de corps. 
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only deplete fighter strength, and thus the decision was made not to send any additional squadrons. 
This particular move has been coined one of the most important strategic contributions to the 
course of the war as a result of using operational research. 
Operational research was found to be highly successful in decision-making in war scenarios where 
the objective was to find the most effective utilisation of limited military resources using 
quantitative techniques (Beasley, 2001). Notable achievements were made in determining how to 
protect a military convey, how to organise radar defences, and how to drop bombs effectively on 
submarines. Beasley (2001) reported the increase in probability of attacking and killing a U-boat 
from 2-3% at the beginning of the war to 40% at the end, which illustrates the relevance and 
importance of this technique.  
The operational research method survived and rapidly expanded to support decision-making in 
post-war civilian practices and the associated uncertainties. Since the war, many different labels 
have been used to describe these practices, including decision theory, management science, 
operations research, decision analysis, decision science, cost-benefit analysis and system analysis 
(Raiffa, 1968). The essential treatment of uncertainty is similar throughout all these. It is thus not 
necessary in the context of this thesis to discuss all the nuances and differences between these 
labels.  Henceforward, I will refer to these scientific approaches of dealing with uncertainty as 
'decision theory'.  
Decision theory is applied in many areas to support managerial decision-making. As a survey about 
Fortune 500 firms in the U.S. (Fabozzi and Valente, 1976) shows, mathematical methods are 
predominantly used in production management (determining product mix, production and 
scheduling), and in financial and investment planning (e.g. capital budgeting, cash-flow analysis, 
portfolio analysis, and cash management).  
However, the specific types of problems that are subject to decision theory are not similar to the 
uncertainty elements in new technology-based ventures. For example, the military decision 
problems are of a different calibre to the decision problems encountered in new technology-based 
ventures. In wartime, the potential outcomes can be reasonably predicted, the extreme example 
being: to kill or to be killed. In addition, the decision options that lead to these outcomes are 
reasonably well known, the extreme example being: to attack or not to attack. As this chapter will 
show, quantitative methods are ideally suited to such decisions. However, such approaches have 
their limitations when it comes to venturing new technologies.  In the typical venturing process the 
outcomes and decision options are neither predictable nor clear cut. For example, it is not always 
clear what outcomes a new technology will have. It may bring a product or something completely 
different. The purpose of a new technology may only be found much later, or even not at all.   
Although many examples are available that illustrate the uncertainties of venturing new 
technologies, a well-known example is the Post-it case at 3M. In 1968 Spencer Silver, a lab 
scientist at 3M, discovered an adhesive that acted in a peculiar way. Instead of forming a film, this 
adhesive turned into clear spheres that “kind of sparkled in the light” (N. N., 2002: 38). Over the 
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next few years, Silver sought a suitable application for the adhesive but to no avail. Five years after 
his discovery, Art Fry, a company director, found an application for the adhesive by coincidence 
whilst rehearsing for the church choir (N. N., 2002). As he turned the pages of his songbook his 
scrap paper bookmark fell on the floor, and he started wondering how he could get the bookmark to 
stay in place (N. N., 2002). It was then that the adhesive found its application, but it was another 15 
years before the application was finally commercialised in the now popular Post-it notes (N. N., 
2002). During this time it could not have been predicted that the technology would ultimately 
transform the firm, nor how the reasonable decision options available could have arrived at these 
unknown outcomes.  
2.2.2 Subjectively assigning probabilities to potential future 
outcomes 
Decision theory uses a method that is primarily based on assigning probabilities to potential 
outcomes. Instead of relying solely on intuition, experience or causal observation, decision theory 
incorporates the basic elements of a scientific method and thus facilitates a rational, systematic way 
of problem solving (Markland and Sweigart, 1987). Without this approach, decisions are believed 
to be unsystematic and highly subjective (Markland and Sweigart 1987). 
In decision theory, four types of decision-making situations can be distinguished (see table 1). In 
cases of uncertainty, a lack of knowledge about potential future states is apparent. The decision-
maker has to accept this limitation, and is required to guess the probabilities of these future states. 
Based on these guesses, decisions can be made using calculations similar to those applied in 
situations of risk.  
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  FOUR TYPES OF DECISIO N-MAKING  
 Type Example 
1 Decision-making under certainty 
The decision maker knows the state for each decision 
alternative with certainty. In other words there is perfect 
information available to the decision maker. 
With a typical investment of €100, where a building society 
guarantees 4% interest and a bank guarantees 7%, it is 
easy to make the decision to put the money in the bank.  
2 Decision-making under risk.  
In this case the decision maker does not have perfect 
information, but knows the probability of an occurrence 
for each state of nature with certainty 
Casting a dice where the state is not certain but each state 
has a 1/6 chance of being reached. 
 
3 Decision-making under conflict . 
Two or more decision makers are competing and thus 
have to make decisions under conflict. In this case the 
decision makers have to consider not only their own 
decision but also the decision of the competitor. This 
type has been discussed by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947) Game theory. 
The prisoner’s dilemma, in which there are two players each 
having two choices: to co-operate or defect. Each player 
gains a little when both co-operate. However, if one of them 
co-operates and the other one defects, the latter will gain 
considerably more, whilst the first will lose (or gain very 
little). If both defect, both lose (or gain very little) but not as 
much as the co-operator whose co-operation is not 
returned.  
4 Decision-making under uncertainty. 
The decision maker does not know the probabilities 
associated with the various states of nature. In this 
case the decision maker has to guess the probabilities, 
before a calculation can be made. Decision theory has 
addressed various criteria which a decision maker can 
use to make his guess. 
Examples of these criteria are: maximax (take the most 
optimistic probability), maximin (take the most pessimistic 
probability), realism (take a compromise), equally likely 
(assume the probabilities are equal), minimax (minimise 
opportunity losses, also known as Savage criterion). 
However, in each case, it is assumed that the decision 
maker can reasonably estimate all future states. The criteria 
then describe the various attitudes the decision maker can 
take in guessing the probability of that state to occur and 
thus make a decision. In other words, rather than looking at 
the expected monetary value of each decision, the decision 
maker chooses a utility criterion and aims to optimise the 
utility rather than the monetary value (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944).      
 
 Table 1: Decision-making under certainty, risk, conflict and uncertainty (Markland and Sweigart, 1987) 
However, it can be difficult to take full advantage of decision theory techniques in the case of 
NTBVs as such guesses are hard, if not impossible, to make. As previously stated, because both the 
outcomes and the decision options of NTBVs are mostly unknown, it is difficult to speculate on 
what the outcome may be and what the probability is that this will occur. In order to optimally 
benefit from decision theory, the problem should have a minimal degree of predictability on 
potential future states and their probabilities in order to make fair assumptions on their values.  
This can be illustrated by examining the method of structuring available data combined with 
subjective assumptions as used in a decision tree. The graphical model of the decision tree 
illustrates where decision theory requires assumption. A decision tree can be used to map each 
stage of the decision-making process by showing its logical progression (Markland and Sweigart, 
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1987). Furthermore, a decision tree facilitates calculations. An example of a decision tree is 
depicted in figure 2. It is obvious that the decision maker should have some information or an idea 
of potential future states (or attitudes towards these future states) and the probabilities that these 
states will occur. In other words, the uncertainty in such models resides ultimately on the accuracy 
of the assumptions and subjective probabilities assigned to the various states.  















































Figure 2: Decision trees: assumptions on decision options, probabilities and expected utilities 
The accuracy of the subjective judgements is thus a very important condition for decision-making 
in decision theory. Raiffa (1968) schematically depicted the judgemental gap between output of the 
models used and the real world (figure 3). However, Raiffa also recognised that this judgemental 
gap might be “…so wide that the analysis does not pass the threshold of relevance; the analysis 
may fall short of furnishing meaningful insights into the problem.” (Raiffa, 1968: 296). So the 
uncertainty shifts from the actual calculation and decision to the assumptions on which the 
decisions are made. 










Figure 3: Decision theory: decision models and judgemental gaps (Raiffa, 1968)  
Decisions regarding new technology-based ventures often have a judgemental gap that is too wide 
and thus renders decision theory obsolete. Decision theory only becomes useful when the outcome 
of a new technology is relatively predictable. As the example in figure 2 shows, the outcome of the 
new technology could be a product. When it is clear that this is the case, decision options can be 
established and decision theory becomes an effective method to reduce the uncertainty surrounding 
this new product. However if the outcome of the new technology is not yet known, a different class 
of uncertainty emerges.   
2.2.2.1 Measuring subjective perceptions on uncertainty 
A stream of literature has attempted to measure subjective perceptions of uncertainty (e.g. Burns 
and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Downey and Slocum, 1975; Downey and 
Hellriegel 1975; Miles and Snow, 1978; Hrebiniak and Snow, 1980; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980; 
Wernerfelt and Karnani, 1984; Buchko, 1994; Koberg, 1987; Milliken, 1987; McMullen and 
DeCastro, 2000).  The literature elaborates on the concept of perceived environmental uncertainty 
and has developed a variety of scales to measure this. The scales are based on the perceptions that a 
firm or individual managers have about uncertainties in the environment (Downey and Slocum, 
1975). 
A seminal example is a study by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), who associated uncertainty with 
specific functions within an organisation, such as marketing, sales and R&D. Based on this 
classification, three sublevels of perceived uncertainty were derived: lack of clarity of information; 
general uncertainty about causal relationships; and time span and feedback about results. The study 
was a single examination of 10 U.S. industrial firms. The researchers accepted the 
operationalisation of uncertainty based upon the face validity of the concept and the instruments. 
However, extended studies into this operationalisation did not provide the replication necessary to 
support their argument (Tosi et al., 1973; Downey and Slocum, 1975).   
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These measurement scales of perceived uncertainty implied that the uncertainty can be understood 
by taking the average of all individually measured perceived uncertainties (Buchko, 1994; 
Milliken, 1987; Miles and Snow, 1978; Downey and Slocum, 1975). However, the literature also 
demonstrates the difficulty in establishing such unanimous measures for perceived uncertainty. In 
particular, replication of these scales in additional studies proved unsatisfactory and the 
conceptualisations of these measures were not used consistently (Buchko, 1994). This illustrates 
the problem with using the subjective perspectives of decision-makers. If the perception of this 
level of uncertainty is already difficult to generalise, this means each decision-maker has a distinct 
view on his or her assumptions towards potential future states and probabilities. 
Downey et al. also noted that there is tremendous inconsistency and confusion about how a 
construct of uncertainty is defined and used; hence the concept of uncertainty itself is surrounded 
by a lot of ambiguity (Downey and Slocum, 1975). However, additional attempts to operationalise 
these uncertainty concepts improved the scales and dimensions. For example Miles and Snow 
(1978) provided scales based on the predictability of the conditions in the environment. This has 
been extended by various other researchers (Milliken, 1987; Buchko, 1994), but the main 
conclusions derived from these studies were not so much on the validation of the 
operationalisation, but on the unstable perceptions of uncertainty itself (Buchko, 1994). Although it 
received a lot of attention from the 1970s through to the 1990s, interest in the topic seems to have 
been lost in the approaches to comprehend environmental uncertainty. 
From this perspective, it would thus be more relevant to study measures on the judgmental 
capabilities available to a firm, rather than taking a normative measure for the apparent uncertainty 
in the environment. The measurement of uncertainty thus remains a challenge.  In cases where 
quantitative research is less applicable (Raiffa, 1967), new approaches to understand the intangible 
aspects of this uncertainty might be useful for increasing the judgmental capabilities of the decision 
maker and ultimately improving decision-making under uncertainty. 
2.2.2.2  Information gathering to make better judgements 
One approach for enhancing the decision-makers judgement is to get more information. 
Information technology systems are typically designed to accommodate this. Based on the belief 
that the uncertainty is based on the level of accuracy of the assumptions that can be made, it thus 
seems important to gather as much information as possible to get a better feeling for the associated 
assumptions.  
Information technology has contributed to the quantitative modelling of problems for decision-
making. Particularly in situations where the problems are too complex for human computation, 
computers systems have been used to better inform and facilitate managers in decision-making 
under uncertainty. Some examples are Management Information Systems (MIS), such as enterprise 
resource planning systems (i.e. SAP, JD Edwards, BAAN etc.) and decision support systems.  
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The interface between MIS and decision theory, in particular, has received increased attention. 
Management information systems are computer-based systems for collecting, analysing and 
reporting information to managers (Markland and Sweigart, 1987) that aim to increase the accuracy 
of the assumptions made by decision-makers. Next to the enhanced computation abilities, MIS 
provide input data to support quantitative modelling efforts (Markland and Sweigart, 1987). 
Another type of information system that evolved from these developments is a Decision Support 
System (DSS). A DSS attempts to provide timely and accurate information to the decision maker 
and allows the decision maker to interact and change the model to ultimately enhance the decision-
making process.  
Although the accumulation of information using sophisticated systems supports decision-making 
under uncertainty, information systems alone do not seem sufficient to deal with uncertainty in 
NTBVs. For example, information overload has also been seen to destroy the creativity necessary 
for innovation (Sethi et al., 2002), and thus might not fit the class of problems associated with 
decision-making under uncertainty for new technology-based ventures, as this is typically based on 
innovation (Drucker, 1959). In addition, whilst information systems are important to decision 
theory for developing a better-informed assessment or judgement on probabilities, they do not 
necessarily add to the knowledge on potential outcomes of new technologies, nor do they 
necessarily contribute to the decision-maker’s capabilities to make good judgements. In the 3M 
case, more information, either from the market, previous business ventures or financial situation, 
would have contributed little to an enhanced understanding of the future outcomes of the new 
technology. In general, information on past data does little to enhance the knowledge on future 
outcomes of new technologies and innovations, as innovations can change the future itself 
(Drucker, 1959). 
2.2.2.3  Using a real options perspective 
A recent and promising development has addressed the relevance of uncertain future outcomes by 
taking a so-called ‘real options’ perspective. Option contracts represent small investments which 
yield the opportunity to purchase an underlying security at a later date (McGrath, 1996). When an 
investor holds an option, the investor can exercise the option and buy the underlying security. In 
essence the investor only carries a limited downward risk (the price paid for the option – which is a 
fraction of the price of the underlying security), without losing access to the opportunity (McGrath 
and MacMillan, 2000).  
Real Option theory is receiving increasing attention, and the application areas are widespread 
(Miller and Park, 2000). Real options provide an essential framework, extending current practices 
in decision theory. Options provide access to opportunities at lower costs, and create an additional 
decision option: waiting (McGrath, 1996).  
However, whilst real options are a promising new direction (Anderson, 2000; McGrath, 1999; 
McGrath and MacMillan 2000; Miller and Park, 2002), the uncertainty classification with respect 
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to new technologies has not changed significantly. For real options to become a valid method, 
some initial idea on the future potential has to be apparent in order to apply the mathematical 
scheme and make calculated decision on these options. There is a difference between the 
uncertainty addressed in real option theory and the uncertainty associated with NTBVs, where 
these options are not readily available.  
Real options thus seem better equipped in the phases when the uncertainty starts to diminish and 
technological applications start emerging (Bollen, 1999), or in other words, when the uncertainty is 
starting to settle. This thesis focuses on understanding the uncertainty before it is settled, and tries 
to identify how it can best cope in the unsettled phases. The Real Option framework will be 
discussed further as part of the entrepreneurship literature (McGrath, 1999), in section 2.3.  
2.2.3 Calculating decisions in NTBVs – a problem of judgement 
In summary, the uncertainty in calculation-based decision models such as decision theory, resides 
in the subjective probabilities assigned to decision-outcome relationships. This implies there is at 
least some knowledge available on the potential decision options and outcomes so that decision 
problems can be solved using risk-based calculations based on the assumptions made stemming 
from this knowledge (Choi, 1993). 
As I have argued throughout this chapter, in the venturing process of new technologies, such 
decision-outcome relations are not known yet. The uncertainty in NTBVs thus resides in the 
outcome not in the probability of a potential outcome. NTBVs thus deal with a different class of 
uncertainty, where these assumptions are difficult, if possible at all. In NTBVs it is not known what 
the future state of the technology might be, if the new technology will actually work, let alone that 
any reasonable probabilities can be calculated.  
Unlike the uncertainty in decision theory, therefore, uncertainty in NTBVs lacks a clear causal 
relationship between decision and outcome. Decision theories reflect systematic methods that 
support the rational structuring of decision problems in potential cause-effect relationships. By 
making assumptions on the probability of each potential relationship happening, the outcome and 
the most optimal decision can be calculated. In NTBVs, however, knowledge on these causal 
relationships is not available.  
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2.3 TO PLAN AND TO PROTECT:  SOLUTIONS AND GUIDING MODELS 
FOR UNCERTAINTY 
New technologies can cause disruptive and discontinuous changes to the firm and the market 
(Drucker, 1959). As shown in the first section, the outcome of new technologies is often not known 
and thus can render quantitative modelling techniques obsolete. To illustrate this, take again the 3M 
case, where the new technology (the glue) subsequently transformed the organisation that started 
out as the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company.  It is obvious that these changes could 
not have been reasonably predicted at the time, and thus decision theory could not have added 
much to the decision-making process at that time.  
In order to better prepare the firm for these uncertain changes other approaches have been 
developed such as planning and organisational design solutions. This section will briefly discuss 
these approaches and evaluate their potential for this specific uncertainty in new technology-based 
ventures.   
2.3.1 Planning for the future: capturing uncertainty 
During the 1960s the realisation emerged that, in uncertain environments, firms require a 
systematic planning system (Ansoff, 1988). Previously, managers applied so-called ad-hoc 
management, or logical incrementalism (Quinn, 1978), in which decisions were made in an 
incremental reactive manner, without having a centrally planned strategy behind it (Ansoff, 1988). 
However, Ansoff (1988) noted that ad-hoc management is appropriate only in situations where the 
demand and technology in a firm’s market continue to evolve incrementally. If the rate of change 
does not exceed the firm’s ability to react then ad-hoc management is appropriate. In other 
environments with a higher level of uncertainty this is not sufficient (Ansoff, 1988). 
Systematic approaches were called for to enable firms to enhance managerial decision-making in 
these uncertain environments of rapid growth. Such environments, where the firm is not always 
able to adapt to the rate of change, are often referred to as turbulent (d’Aveni, 1994; Katzy and 
Schuh, 1997). The solution resides in the fact that managerial decisions depend on the ability of 
managers to create a mental vision of the future. Uncertainty is attributed to managers having 
incomplete knowledge of the future, or bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). Managerial decisions 
thus depend on their ability to create a mental vision of the future (Spencer, 1962). This vision 
cannot be verified in a quantitative manner alone (Spencer, 1962).  
New technology-based firms thus require a strategy in order to prepare for this uncertainty. In the 
words of Ansoff (1965): “In the absence of strategy, there are no rules to guide for the search of 
new opportunities, both inside and outside the firm. Internally, the Research and Development 
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department has no guidelines for its contribution to diversification... Thus the firm as a whole either 
passively waits for opportunities, or pursues a ‘buckshot’ search technique” (Ansoff, 1965: 102).  
Uncertainty in this sense is related to time, as the longer you want to plan the more uncertain the 
future is. A formal or systematic approach of achieving this mental vision is also referred to as the 
plan or strategy (Mintzberg, 1994). The first widely accepted systematic planning system was 
referred to as Long Range Planning (Ansoff, 1988). The name Long Range Planning (LRP) 
includes a time factor, and its initial intent was to enhance a firm’s operations management in 
uncertain environments of rapid growth (Ansoff, 1988). Later on it also developed as a planning 
discipline for R&D (Koontz and O'Donnell, 1955; Drucker, 1959; Salveson, 1959), where the plan 
guides the decision maker in exploiting opportunities created by, for example, new technologies. 
The central problem for good planning remains the accuracy of the planner’s estimate of the future. 
LRP introduced a systematic approach to guide the planner in achieving a better estimate. Drucker 
(1959) suggested that the essence of good planning is to bring about a unique event or innovation 
that changes probabilities, rather than to try to forecast the future. Subsequently this innovation is 
rewarded with a profit. LRP does not eliminate risk or even attempt to minimise it; instead it 
commits present resources to future (uncertain) expectations (Drucker, 1959). Hence LRP takes a 
risk-taking and decision-making perspective and can be seen as a strategy for innovation in 
technical industries (Salveson, 1959; Mintzberg, 1994).  
 The uncertainty is now encapsulated in the plan and depends on the manager’s visionary abilities 
and the quality of the plan. The question remains whether the plan will work. If the quality of the 
plan is good then the subsequent decisions based on the plan will also be good. If the plan is not 
good, the subsequent decisions are doomed to fail.  In this sense, the plan can guide and protect the 
firm from uncertainty, but is itself still very uncertain.  This is because the quality of the plan can 
only be determined in hindsight. In a similar way, great visionaries like Werner von Siemens, Karl 
Benz, Isambard Kingdom Brunel or Henry Ford were only recognised for their brilliance after their 
achievements were visible, not before.  
2.3.2 Protecting the firm from outside uncertainty  
Another approach is to protect the firm from the uncertainty by creating a structure. As the 
innovation or technological core is important for the future existence of the firm, Thompson (1967) 
argued, from an organisational point of view, that it is this core in particular that requires protection 
from uncertainty. Uncertainty is related to the unpredictability of future performance of the 
technological core of the firm, so by protecting this core from uncertainty, the firm effectively 
reduces uncertain elements in the venturing process. This could be done by building administrative 
boundaries that interface with the sources of uncertainty (Thompson, 1967). For example, an R&D 
department can protect the firm from the technological uncertainty; similarly a marketing 
department can offer protection from market uncertainty, and so forth.  
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By this logic, a firm’s capability to deal with uncertainty can thus be measured by the number of 
specialist departments it has. In essence, these structural strategies to design organisations (e.g. 
Selznick, 1957; Thompson, 1966; Galbraith, 1973; Mintzberg, 1979) take a protective stance 
towards uncertainty. The main assumption within these approaches is again that the outcome of the 
new technology is more or less known, and by applying avoidance and blocking strategies the 
outcome is protected. In Thompson’s case, the technological core (or the operational heart) of the 
firm is the product of the new technologies and thus requires this protection.  
However, as previously discussed, in NTBVs the outcome is often not known. During this phase it 
is not yet appropriate to either build an organisation around the new technology, as it is not yet 
known what the threats of the uncertainty are. Such unsettled phases require additional and 
complementary measures and conditions necessary for effective managerial decisions. Unlike 
incremental improvements made on existing products or service, new technologies create 
discontinuous changes and thus a different kind of uncertainty applies. Firms that venture new 
technologies encounter these changes on a routine basis (Moore, 1998) and therefore have to be 
prepared to understand and deal with the associated uncertainty. 
2.3.3 Guiding models for technology, products and markets  
In addition to planning and protection approaches, models have been developed that describe 
typical patterns in the venturing process in order to gain more insight into the behaviour of the 
technology in the market and identify the typical areas where uncertainty is most visible. Such 
models can be useful to shape the decision-maker’s judgement. The limitations of these models 
stem from the manner in which these models have been constructed. The models are derived from 
information collected over long time spans (such as a year) and are therefore useful for 
understanding typical long-term patterns. When venturing new technologies, a long-term 
perspective is obviously important. However, on a firm level the exploitation opportunities often 
occur in short timeframes (months). To demonstrate this, some dominant models will be briefly 
discussed: the technology adoption model, product and technology life cycles and the technology 
S-curve.  
2.3.3.1 Uncertainty in adopting new technologies  
Technology adoption is essential for venturing new technologies. Moore (1998) emphasised this 
problem by adapting the technology adoption model of Rogers (1962), which is essentially set of 
five categories that represent different attitudes towards new technologies. These categories show a 
continuum of attitudes in terms of a willingness to adopt new technologies, and are described in 
table 2.  
Based on Rogers’s categories a normal distribution applies as to which extent an innovation is 
diffused. Basically the model shows that the first 2.5% of people that adopt an innovation have the 
characteristics of the innovator. Early adopter characteristics are observable in the next 13.5%. 
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Early majority and late majority characteristics can be identified in the next consecutive 34% of 
each group. Finally, characteristics conforming to the laggard category are identifiable in the 
remaining 16% of the market.  
CATEGORY  TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION CHARACTERISTICS 
INNOVATORS Venturesome – eager to try out new ideas  
EARLY ADOPTERS Respecting – opinion leadership in trying out new ideas  
EARLY MAJORITY  Deliberate – adoption of new ideas just before the average member of 
society 
LATE MAJORITY Sceptical – new ideas are approached with caution, and adoption only 
after a majority has done so already  
LAGGARDS Traditional – suspicious, adoption when idea is already superseded  
Table 2: Technology adoption characteristics (Rogers, 1962)  
Moore (1998) extended this model by claiming that for NTBVs the uncertainty is most visible 
during the transition in adoption characteristics from early adopters to early majority. He refers to 
this as the problem of crossing the “chasm” (figure 4). Whereas 2.5% of the market is immediately 
prepared to adopt new technologies (and some are even willing to pay a premium to do so), 
followed by the 13.5% of early followers, it is much more difficult to address the early majority. 
The transition is thus a very unsettled phase. The gap also implies a change in market attitude 
towards the innovation. Whereas early adopters are interested in business opportunities, the early 
majority is more conservative and is only interested in improvement from a productivity 
perspective.  





Figure 4: Adapted technology adoption cycle (Moore, 1998)  
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Evidently as new technologies are ventured, new technology-based firms have to be able to change 
their venturing approach from a technologist or innovator perspective (the enthusiast) towards the 
early majority market perspective. According to Moore this is vital for the existence of the venture, 
for the profit margin gains are at the top of the technology adoption cycle. In order for a firm to be 
successful it thus has to be able to change the venturing process in line with the attitudes of the 
potential customer.  
This model provides valuable insights into the behaviour patterns of technology adoption, however 
because it takes a macro-perspective it does little to support firm level decision-making. 
Particularly as outcomes of new technologies are often unknown, and thus can change complete 
market structures and industries (for example, the internet), no predictive power or conclusions can 
be derived from models for venturing new technologies. The foundations of these models are 
grounded in a long-term data analysis (Rogers, 1962) and thus reflect a hindsight pattern of 
technology adoption. New technologies have the potential to change these underlying patterns; thus 
there are limitations in using these models for predicting and decision-making in NTBVs.   
2.3.3.2  Uncertainty in the life cycles of products and technologies 
Uncertainty in NTBVs can also be identified when looking at the behaviour of technologies versus 
products. A model that illustrates the market uncertainty from a product point of view is the 
Product Life Cycle (PLC) (Levitt, 1965). The PLC is a model that is derived from marketing 
literature and focuses on four distinct phases: introduction, growth, maturity and decline. These are 
the stages a product encounters during its life span and each phase has distinct and predictable 
characteristics. The PLC is depicted in figure 5.  
The first stage in the PLC is the product introduction, and commences at the launch of a new 
product (Levitt, 1965). Typical characteristics during this phase are low sales volumes, high costs 
per customer and negative profits.  Following the introduction is the growth stage. During this 
stage the characteristics of the product are rapidly increasing sales volumes with more customer 
numbers. Cost per customer figures are decreasing, profits start rising and more competitors enter 
the market (Levitt, 1965). After growth, the product starts to reach a certain level of maturity. A 
peak in sales and profits, low cost per customer, and a stabilisation of the number of competitors 
characterise this stage (Levitt, 1965; Afuah, 1998). During the final phase the product starts getting 
‘old’ and hence profits start to decline.  Characteristics of this phase are decreasing sales volumes 
and profits, increasing cost per customer, and a decline in the number of competitors (Levitt, 1965; 
Afuah, 1998).  









Figure 5: The product life cycle (Levitt, 1965) 
The introduction and growth phase are the more unsettled phases from a product perspective. 
However, the PLC does not lend itself to effective prediction of future outcomes of new 
technologies. A PLC is only verifiable on hindsight, which means the uncertainty about the 
outcome of new technologies remains unsolved 
Only when it is clear what application of the new technology could potentially become a dominant 
design, does a predictive pattern emerge. This is derived from the dominant design model 
formulated by Abernathy and Utterback (1994). This model extends the life cycle analogy and 
claims that market structures are influenced by the technology life cycles and the accumulated 
product and process knowledge available to the firm (see figure 6). Particularly in the early phases, 
before the dominant design is determined, the situation is unsettled, or to use Utterback’s word, 
“fluid”.  
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Rate of Innovation








Figure 6: Dominant design model (Adapted from Utterback, 1994) 
The dominant design model prescribes strategies in the various phases (Utterback, 1994). Using a 
similar characterisation as the technology adoption model, four innovation strategies emerge from a 
firm perspective. These strategies range from when the technology is unexplored and thus new, to 
when the technology has reached maturity and is fading out. The strategies relate to the 
characteristics of the roles invention leaders, innovation leaders, early followers and late followers. 
It seems that, compared with the technology adoption characterisations and Moore’s chasm, the 
more unsettled phases are again those preceding the dominant design.   After the dominant design, 
the number of firms will decline (Utterback, 1994) and new technologies and dominant designs 
will emerge.    
2.3.3.3 Uncertainty and switches in technologies  
The uncertainty relating to switching dominant designs and new technologies has also been 
referred to as technological uncertainty. This uncertainty is internally oriented and relates to issues 
concerning the level of unpredictability and speed of changing technology (Afuah, 1998). Such 
switches in technologies have been modelled using an S-curve (Foster, 1986). The S-curve (figure 
7) is a forecasting tool that argues that the rate of advance of a technology is a function of the 
amount of effort put into it. Observed over time, the curve takes the shape of an S (Foster, 1986; 
Afuah, 1998). The technological progress has a slow start, but there follows a period of exponential 
increases. As the physical limit of the technology is approached, the progress starts to diminish. As 
the return on the efforts at the end of the curve becomes extremely small, a new technology is 
required that can overcome the physical limitations of the old technology. 








Figure 7: S-curve (Foster, 1986)  
The technological uncertainty resides in the substitution of an older technology with a newer one. 
The S-curve shows patterns of alternating periods of incremental innovation (such as new product 
versions) and periods of radical change, implying a change of underlying technology. Making the 
right decisions in order to accommodate these switches is thus particularly important in order to 
profit from the technology.  
The model implies that firms are required to switch technologies and products at the right time. 
This uncertainty is highly visible, particularly in firms dealing with new technologies that emerge 
and disappear rapidly (Moore, 1998). Such firms are more dependent on making the right decision 
to switch, and have to do this on a more frequent basis, than firms that are based on traditional 
offerings, such as the furniture or clothing industry. In comparison with traditional firms, such new 
technology-based firms are characterised by a high frequency of S-curves. Such firms thus have to 
deal with more unsettled environments, and more unsettled technologies.   
Whilst the importance of switching technologies becomes apparent, the model has limitations on a 
firm level in predicting the potential outcomes of new technologies. As such models can only be 
constructed using longer time spans, prediction and decision-making rests upon the accuracy of the 
extrapolation and expectations derived from these hindsight perspectives; thus judgement remains 
an important factor.  
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2.3.4  An overview on planning and protecting approaches and 
guiding models for uncertainty  
Managerial decision-making is supported by an array of approaches and models. In order to 
illustrate the applicability and limitations of these approaches and models, I have elaborated on 
some of the guiding models that enhance the understanding of how technologies, products and 
market tend to behave and how these models can ultimately serve decision-making by utilising 
planning and protection approaches.   
The guiding models show innovation patterns that help firms in understanding and predicting 
market and technological trends. The patterns also identify the areas where there is more 
uncertainty; hence the firm has to be more alert. These predictions can ultimately help firms to 
understand and direct decisions towards reducing these uncertainties by, for example, instigating 
long-range plans and creating protective structures around the firm.   
The 3M example can again be used to evaluate the application and limitations of these models. As 
previously argued, at 3M a different type of uncertainty still remains visible. When the new type of 
glue was made available, but the application area was not yet clear, the only plan that emerged in 
the mind of one of the directors was to maintain the technology in-house, despite the lack of direct 
application. Also, when the application emerged, it still took some 15 years before exploitation 
commenced.  
During these stages, protection was limited to keeping the technology in-house. No particular 
structural arrangements could be prepared, as the future exploitation potential was simply not 
known. Planning and projecting future product life cycles only became of importance after the 
exact application of Post-it notes was found. Thereafter the structural arrangements can become 
relevant. However, the managerial decisions made before this stage required a different type of 
insight.  
Additionally, planning approaches in the preceding phases could hardly have foreseen the future 
potential of the technology. With planning it is presumed that there are some causal patterns visible 
or that can be envisioned in a plan. However, in the case of 3M (N. N., 2002), this was not the case. 
The uncertainty in 3M stemmed from the fact that it was simply not known what the future was 
going to bring, so no plans or patterns were yet applicable, let alone that any sort of quantitative 
model which supported managerial decision-making could be applied.  
Finally, existing guiding models also show limitations commonly associated to life cycle analogies. 
As Penrose (1959: 154) aptly noted, “Life cycle analogies make no provision for abrupt 
discontinuities and changed identity…Ecological analogies have trouble with unpredictable 
change”. Firstly, these are generalised models. On a more product specific level, the patterns might 
be recognisable but they vary from product to product (Afuah, 1998). Secondly, the time-cycles for 
NTBVs are often very short (Moore, 1998), with the result that such patterns can be created only in 
retrospect. 
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Hence these models have limits to the actual understanding of the uncertainty when making 
decision for NTBVs, especially in cases when limited time is available. Decision-making in 
NTBVs is, on the one hand, a long-term strategic activity, but on the other hand a series of short-
term commitments to concrete actions that have to be made at a certain point in time.  
In the above examples uncertainty seems only interpretable using these models after the unsettled 
events took place. However the firms need to perform in the short run and thus require additional 
capabilities that allow them to take advantage of short-term opportunities, whilst not losing sight of 
the long-term implications and trends.  
One the one side firms require some structure and plans to venture their technologies (e.g. 
Thompson, 1967; Ansoff, 1988), however within these structures a firm needs to be capable of 
acting on short-term opportunities. This concept of capabilities can be found in literature concerned 
with entrepreneurship and takes an inward resource perspective.  
2.4 A CAPABILITIES PERSPECTIVE TO UNCERTAINTY 
“The more I practice, the luckier I get!”  
Gary Player (champion golfer) 
The previous perspective for managerial decisions was predominantly focused on the potential 
outcome of the decision and its probability. Another stream of literature is more concerned with 
what a firm requires, or the input of the venturing process. Two theoretical frameworks stand out 
here: entrepreneurship and the resource-based view of the firm. These approaches prescribe what a 
firm needs to be capable of in order to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage. The 
contribution of these capability perspectives is described below.  
2.4.1 Entrepreneurial capabilities for decision-making under 
uncertainty  
Various definitions of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship exist. Low and MacMillan (1988) 
specifically addressed the creation of new ventures as the essence of entrepreneurship. Schumpeter 
(1934), however, saw innovation as the essence of entrepreneurship and defined it as the creation 
of “new combinations of resources.”  
Venturing innovations, such as new technologies, is seen as a creative response to the 
establishment (Schumpeter, 1950). Schumpeter argued from an economic perspective and noted 
that “...whenever the economy, or an industry or some firms in an industry do something else, 
something that is outside of existing practices, we may speak of creative responses” (Schumpeter, 
1950: 222). The main growth factor of national economies stemmed from entrepreneurs who 
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produce innovations (Schumpeter, 1950). From this perspective, innovations from new 
technologies are one of the main determinants for the growth of the economy (Schumpeter, 1943; 
Sundbo, 1998).   
Entrepreneurship is the driving force behind any successful venturing process. Whereas inventors 
merely create something new, entrepreneurs are concerned with the implementation of these new 
things (Frank, 1998). This is an essential element of new technology venturing. Innovation can 
therefore be seen as an entrepreneurial act essential for economic growth (Schumpeter, 1950). 
From a financial perspective, entrepreneurs are those who undertake uncertain investments for 
which the future returns and probability distributions are unknown (Knight, 1921; Amit et al., 
1993). New technology-based industries are highly uncertain and it is thus the entrepreneur who 
has the highest threshold to act in these uncertain times.  
With reference to entrepreneurs, Knight (1921) referred particularly to uncertainty instead of risk. 
For risk, the probability that something might happen is known; for uncertainty this is not the case. 
A risk-based perspective would be inappropriate for evaluating markets because markets would 
ultimately be organised for contingent claims on these risks (Amit et al., 1993). This notion of risk 
is similar to the risk in decision theory. Knight (1921) argued in his seminal work on uncertainty 
that the major inhibitor of entrepreneurship is not risk aversion but uncertainty aversion. 
Entrepreneurs are more willing and able to handle this ambiguity.  
New technology-based firms thus require entrepreneurial capabilities in order to enhance the 
decision-making judgement. Penrose argued that the problem of judgement “involves more than a 
combination of imagination, ‘good sense ‘, self confidence, and other personal qualities” (Penrose, 
1959: 41). Entrepreneurship “leads to the question of effects of risk and uncertainty on, and the role 
of expectations in the growth of the firm” (Penrose, 1959: 41).  
Entrepreneurial capabilities require an understanding of the actions-reward relationship in order to 
respond to opportunities. As this is often unpredictable, Schumpeter argued that these can only be 
understood ex post (Frank, 1998). Uncertainty thus relates to the fact that it is not known, ex ante, 
why some new technology-based ventures fail whilst others succeed (Amit et al., 1993). 
As previously mentioned, the real option framework has recently received greater attention in the 
context of entrepreneurship, and could potentially enhance entrepreneurial capabilities (McGrath. 
1996; McGrath, 1999; McGrath and MacMillan, 2000). The alignment of options thinking, which 
is output (reward) oriented, with entrepreneurship, which is input (action) oriented, provides a 
potential method from which decision-making techniques could be derived. The essence of real 
options reasoning on an entrepreneurial level is that entrepreneurs should make investment 
decisions with a limited downside and learn whether a future investment is warranted (McGrath 
and McMillan, 2000). This technique is seen to be especially relevant in new product introduction 
where the rewards can be huge but equally so can the losses. Essentially the technique prescribes a 
step-by-step approach of go/ no-go decisions where the uncertainty is settled in a sequential manner 
(McGrath and MacMillan, 2000). 
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However, as previously argued, the real options technique still takes a stance where there is a 
reasonable availability of knowledge on the probable outcomes. Nevertheless, there is still 
uncertainty in the phases preceding the knowledge on this outcome. A venture for a short-term 
opportunity can benefit greatly from real options, as it allows for incremental learning guiding the 
decision-maker’s options. However, on an organisational (firm) level, uncertainty still exists on the 
outcome of the next venture, and uncertainty remains from a long-term perspective. Can the 
technology base provide additional future ventures or is this going to be the last successful venture 
for the firm? 3M is again a good example. The stationery industry was new to 3M, and was opened 
up only by the merits of the new adhesive technology. In their own words, only their tolerance for 
“tinkerers” led them to this new unexpected industry, which became one of the most important 
fields for 3M (N. N., 2002). The development of techniques such as real options is expected to 
contribute to enhancing entrepreneurial capabilities within a firm. However, it has so far failed to 
address the capabilities that are required before options become apparent.  
2.4.2 Exploring capabilities from a resource-based perspective 
A firm can be viewed as a pool of resources that delivers productive services in order to pursue a 
productive opportunity. “Thus a firm is more than an administrative unit; it is also a collection of 
productive resources the disposal of which between different users and over time is determined by 
administrative decision” (Penrose, 1959: 24). A resource can be seen as “a bundle of possible 
services” (Penrose, 1959: 67). Resources consist of the tangible elements (i.e. plant, equipment, 
raw materials, stock etc.) and human resources (unskilled and skilled labour, clerical, 
administrative, financial, legal, technical and managerial staff) (Penrose, 1959). The input of the 
production process, however, “is never resources themselves… but only the services that the 
resources can render.” (Penrose, 1959: 25).  
The motive for providing these services is the desire to increase long-run profits or, “...its general 
purpose is to organise and use of its [the firm’s] ‘own’ resources together with the resources 
acquired from outside the firm for the production and sale of goods and services at a profit” 
(Penrose, 1959: 31). An essential notion, from a Schumpeterian point of view, is that the ambition 
that drives a firm to take advantage of opportunities (or productive opportunities, as Penrose calls 
them) stems from the entrepreneurial services provided by the firm’s entrepreneurs.  
Entrepreneurial services are contributions to the operations of a firm that relate to the introduction 
and acceptance of innovations (both organisationally and technologically) by the firm (Penrose, 
1959). Whereas entrepreneurial services identify and take advantage of the productive 
opportunities available to the firm, managerial competence is “a function of the quality of the 
entrepreneurial services available to it.” (Penrose 1959: 35). 
Entrepreneurial services, from a new technology-based venturing view, are thus the driving force 
behind the necessary changes to venture new technologies as productive opportunities. Uncertainty 
in this respect is addressed by Penrose as the entrepreneur’s subjective judgement on the productive 
Decision Making under Uncertainty 34 
 
opportunities required for predicting the outcome of actions  (Penrose, 1959). The subjectivity is 
determined by the sum of the entrepreneur’s confidence and the information available to him. 
Uncertainty “refers to the entrepreneur’s confidence in his estimates or expectations” (Penrose, 
1959: 56).   
Whereas Penrose provides a lens for viewing the process of growth within a firm, others have 
elaborated further on the internal resources of the firm and introduced conditions that firms should 
meet in order to have a competitive advantage. The ability to reconfigure the available resources in 
a firm is a focal point for managing uncertainty in a proactive dynamic manner. This stream of 
thought produced the resource-based theory of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Barney, 
1994; Barney et al., 2002).  
The resource-based view of the firm is primarily concerned with how firms can secure the factors 
needed to create capabilities that form the basis for establishing and sustaining competitive 
advantage and address the strategic management of organisations (Burgelman and Maidique, 
1988).  The resource-based view is an influential theoretical framework for understanding how 
competitive advantage within firms is achieved and how that advantage might be sustained over 
time (Barney 1991; Barney, 1994; Barney 2002; Nelson 1991; Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000).  
With respect to the venturing process, the resource-based view has provided a set of conditions that 
the firm’s resources should comply with to in order to reduce the uncertainty and achieve a 
sustainable competitive advantage. Sustainable refers to the possibility of the competitive 
advantage being duplicated by competitors (Barney, 1991). Barney (1991) points out that for a firm 
to have this sustainable competitive advantage, the firm’s resources must have ‘VRIN’ attributes. 
The resources (a) must be valuable, by either exploiting opportunities or neutralizing threats from 
the environments, or both, (b) must be rare amongst competitors, (c) can only be imitated 
imperfectly, and finally (d) should be non-substitutable (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney, 1991; 
Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Nelson, 1991; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
Within the context of decision-making, the resource-based view focuses on what managers require 
(input) in order to get the output, often referred to as competitive advantage. Penrose (1959) goes 
one step further by stating that such output ultimately links to a profit motive. Unlike the output-
oriented approaches, such as decision theory, that aimed towards concrete potential outcomes, this 
set of theories focuses on prescribing input variables that could potentially produce a general 
outcome of long-term sustainability. When firms have resources that comply with these 
prescriptions they are better equipped to create a competitive advantage, or in other words are 
likely to be better prepared for uncertainty.  
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2.4.3  Changing the resource-base under uncertainty: dynamic 
capabilities 
The resource-based view of the firm has influenced an additional perspective that focuses on 
markets and technologies which are more dynamic and thus more uncertain. Dynamic markets 
show rapid and unpredictable change (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). These changes are either a 
result of, but also allow for, shifts in the competitive landscape. This is typically the case in new 
technology-based industries which operate in environments of rapid technological change. The 
resource-based view has provided various dynamic concepts which focus on the capabilities a firm 
should possess to approach uncertainty and maintain competitive advantage.  
From this resource perspective it is argued that organisations need to have capabilities that will 
enable them to act and respond to unpredictable changes (Nelson and Winter, 1982). These 
capabilities are described as dynamic capabilities in that they enable a firm to reconfigure its 
resource base and adapt to changing market conditions in order to achieve a competitive advantage 
(Teece et al. 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002).   
The framework of dynamic capabilities that has emerged has received increasing attention over the 
last decade (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Madsen and McKelvey, 1996; Teece et al., 1997; Deeds and 
DeCarolis, 2000; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Luo, 2000; Madhok, 2000; Carpenter et al., 2001; 
Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001; Rindova and Kotha, 2001; Zollo and Winter 1999; Zollo and 
Winter, 2002).  The dynamic capabilities framework can be used to analyse “the sources and 
methods of wealth creation and capture ... private enterprise firms operating in environments of 
rapid technological change” (Teece et al., 1997: 509).  This perspective does not enhance the 
understanding of what uncertainty actually is, but does provide a prescription of the necessary 
capabilities believed to enable a firm to operate in uncertain environments.  
The emerging literature on dynamic capabilities draws on the resource-based view of the firm (e.g., 
Grant, 1996; Iansiti, 1994; Teece, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Nelson, 1991; Eisenhardt, 2000) that 
states that the firm’s resources are an essential structure for innovation. Dynamic capabilities are 
the antecedent organisational and strategic routines by which managers alter their resource base 
(acquire and shed resources, integrate them, and recombine them) to generate new value-creating 
strategies (Grant, 1996; Pisano, 1994). In line with Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997), dynamic 
capabilities in this sense are defined as follows: "Dynamic capabilities are what enable a firm to 
integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly changing 
environments. Dynamic capabilities are the firm’s processes that use resources to match and even 
create market change. Dynamic capabilities thus are the organisational and strategic routines by 
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which firms achieve new resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die” 
(Teece et al., 1997: 515)4. 
Focusing on a firm’s dynamic capabilities can be seen as a condition for a better approach to 
uncertainty. Dynamic capabilities consist of specific organisational and strategic processes that 
create value for firms within dynamic markets. These processes allow for the manipulation of 
resources into new value-creating strategies (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Such capabilities can 
be observed by empirical research.  
2.4.3.1 Dynamic capabilities and changes in the markets  
The dynamic new technology markets are characterised by blurred industry structures and high 
velocity. In these industries, dynamic capabilities are arguably experiential unstable processes. By 
rapid creation of new knowledge and iterative execution, adaptive but unpredictable outcomes are 
produced (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Table 3 shows the distinction between dynamic 
capabilities observed in moderately dynamic markets (low uncertainty) as opposed to high velocity 
markets (high uncertainty) (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  Dynamic capabilities differ according 
to: the nature of the market, the evolutionary patterns, how these capabilities have been executed, 
how stable the capabilities are, what the outcomes are and what the key is to effective evolutions. 




MARKET DEFINITION Linear and predictable change, 
stable industry structure, defined 
boundaries, clear business 
models, identifiable players  
Nonlinear and unpredictable 
change, ambiguous industry 
structure, blurred boundaries, fluid 
business models, ambiguous and 
shifting players 
PATTERN Detailed, analytical routines that 
rely extensively on existing 
knowledge 
Simple, experiential routines that 
rely on newly created knowledge 
specific to the situation 
EXECUTION  Linear Iterative 
STABLE Yes  No 
OUTCOMES Predictable Unpredictable 
KEY TO EFFECTIVE EVOLUTION Frequent, nearby variation Carefully managed selection 
Table 3: Dynamic capabilities and types of dynamic markets (Eisenhardt, 2000)  
The strategic challenge of dynamic capabilities in high velocity markets is again maintaining 
competitive advantage. When the duration of that advantage is inherently unpredictable, time is an 
essential aspect of managerial decision-making and the dynamic capabilities that drive competitive 
                                              
4 The term “dynamic” in this context is not used in the sense of multi-period analyses but refers to situations where there 
is rapid change in technology and market forces, and “feedback” effects on firms (Teece et al. 1997). 
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advantage are themselves arguably unstable processes that are challenging to sustain (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000).  
In order to deal with this uncertainty, new technology-based firms should have the capabilities to 
innovate (Nelson, 1991; Teece, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Iansiti, 1994; Zollo and Winter, 1999).  
Merely having processes for producing certain products or services is not sufficient from a strategic 
perspective. Having the capabilities to innovate requires appropriate organisational and managerial 
routines, which enable these organisations to take economic advantage. Dynamic capabilities, from 
a Schumpeterian perspective, must enable a firm to innovate, and to make that innovation 
profitable over and over again (Nelson, 1991). 
An alternative view on the stability of the dynamic capabilities is proposed by Zollo and Winter 
(2002: 340) who define dynamic capabilities as “...a learned and stable pattern of collective activity 
through which the organisation systematically generates and modifies its operating routines in 
pursuit of improved effectiveness”. Dynamic capabilities arise from a learning process and are the 
systematic methods available to the firm for modifying the operational routines (Zollo and Winter, 
2002). Similar to Penrose, the learning mechanism makes a distinction between the operating 
routines (or productive base) of the firm and the dynamic capabilities that allow for the effective 
modification of the operational routines (the changes induced by the entrepreneurial function and 
managed by the administrative control).  
In contrast to the view that dynamic capabilities are unstable processes (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000) that are emergent and evolving (Rindova and Kotha, 2001) in turbulent and volatile 
environments, Zollo and Winter (2002) argue that dynamic capabilities are actually structured and 
learned patterns. Zollo and Winter argue that in such turbulent environments, where uncertainty 
emerges because changes are rapid and unpredictable and variable in direction, “...dynamic 
capabilities and even the higher order learning approaches will themselves need to be updated 
repeatedly”. Leonard-Barton (1992) adds to this view that in absence of the regular updating, or 
second order dynamic capabilities, the firm will turn the core competencies into core rigidities”. 
The need for fast responses in dynamic markets brings its own particular challenges. As Leonard-
Barton (1992) explains, firms have the pitfall of core rigidities to avoid. Core rigidities are defined 
as the flip side of core capabilities. They are thought to emerge when firms become insular, due to 
sustained periods of success, or when they fall prey to extremes by overshooting the optimal levels 
of best practice. They can be avoided by the regular evaluation and deconstruction of a firm’s 
business systems in order to overcome static processes. 
From an organisational perspective, dynamic capabilities can be seen as tools that manipulate 
resource configurations (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). In dynamic markets such as the high tech 
industry these capabilities rely heavily on new knowledge created for specific situations 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). This knowledge should  be rapidly gained by experimental activities 
– such as prototyping, real-time information, multiple options and experimenting – that generate 
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immediate knowledge for rapid replacement of the outdated knowledge (Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000).  
This means that managers can focus on these tools to increase their decision-making capabilities 
when venturing new technologies. The formalisation and systematisation of the concept of dynamic 
capabilities implies that dynamic capabilities can ultimately be acquired or developed by a firm. 
The effect of having dynamic capabilities is assumed to be an enhanced competitive advantage, and 
thus a reduction in the uncertainties associated with dynamic markets.  
2.4.3.2 Dynamic capabilities and changes in technological architectures 
The dynamic capabilities framework has also been addressed through the lens of the uncertainty 
associated with the changes in technology. Traditionally, changes in technologies have been 
categorised as either incremental innovation, such as the introduction of new product versions, or 
radical innovation, such as changing to a new underlying technological base. Categorisations of 
uncertainty in terms of incremental and radical innovation are well established (Henderson and 
Cockburn, 2000; Baldwin and Clark,  1997). Incremental innovation introduces relatively minor 
changes to the existing product, exploiting and reinforcing the potential of the established dominant 
design (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Radical innovation introduces new technologies based on a 
different set of engineering and scientific principles and often opens up whole new markets and 
potential applications (Henderson and Clark, 1990). An example of a radical innovation is the shift 
from record players to CD players.  
In terms of uncertainty, radical innovation often creates greater difficulties for established firms but 
can provide the basis for the successful entry of new ventures, firms or even the redefinition of an 
industry (Henderson and Clark, 1990). NTBVs are in principle concerned with such radical 
innovations. The uncertainty thus relates to questions of if  the new technology will work, when it 
will work and how potential problems can be solved. A combination of both internal and external 
perspectives provides a better picture for understanding this.  
This perspective has been sharpened by Henderson and Clark (1990), who introduced two 
additional categories by breaking technological innovations down to a component level. These 
additional insights focus on the relation of the component interfaces of the technology as well as 
the newness of the technology itself (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Henderson and Clark, 1990). New 
technologies are often a combination of individually linked components (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; 
Baldwin and Clark, 1997). A component is defined as a physically distinct portion of the product 
that performs a well-defined function (Henderson and Clark, 1990) and embodies a core design 
concept (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Baldwin and Clark, 2000). This implies that two types of 
knowledge are important: knowledge of the component and knowledge about how the component 
interfaces with the overall system. The latter is also referred to as architectural knowledge 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). Four kinds of innovation can now be distinguished (figure 8). 
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Figure 8: A framework for defining innovation (Henderson, 1990)  
The two additional kinds of innovation refer to the changes in the linkages between components. 
Modular innovations are innovations where the components change (the core concept is 
overturned), but where the linkages or interfaces of the components with the core design remain 
unchanged (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Architectural innovations are innovations where the core 
concepts of the technologies used in the system remain the same, but the linkages or architecture of 
the system change (Henderson and Clark, 1990).  
These additional perspectives provide a sharper view of where uncertainty arises. Uncertainty in 
modular innovation resides in the knowledge, or rather the lack of knowledge, about the 
components (Baldwin and Clark, 1997; Henderson and Clark, 1990). Uncertainty in architectural 
innovation resides in the unsettled architecture between components and is related to changes in the 
architecture. Hence, specific knowledge about the architectural level of the system is important 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990). As the architecture of, for example, new products changes, it is 
essential to redesign the architecture of the components and thus the linkages or interfaces between 
the components. This requires knowledge on the coordination of these interfaces (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990). 
The uncertainty of architectural innovations is not only visible on a technological level but also on 
an organisational level (Gulanic and Eisenhardt, 2001). As the architectural innovation resides in 
the changing links and coordination on the product or technological level, several studies have 
extended the concept of architectural innovations by examining on which level the innovation 
occurs (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Galunic and Eisenhardt, 2001; Baldwin and Clark, 1997). At 
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the core of this research is the notion that, while firms may possess or could develop the 
competencies required to develop new product architecture, they often fail to recognise the way in 
which organisational competencies must be reconfigured to successfully sustain it on a business 
level. Existing organisational structures and routines operate to preserve current component 
linkages and thus raise cognitive barriers to the development of new architectures (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Katzy et al., 2001). 
From this perspective, dynamic capabilities are suited to deal with architectural innovations more 
effectively, or in other words to create architectural competencies (Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1995). Dynamic capabilities typically address the reconfiguration of the 
organisational processes in order to allow for architectural innovations (Galunic and Eisenhardt, 
2001). 
2.4.4 Dynamic capabilities: reducing causal ambiguity in action-
performance relationships  
The dynamic capabilities framework provides a relevant conceptual lens to evaluate some 
necessary conditions for the input of the venturing process, which subsequently sets expectations, 
albeit ambiguous, on the outcome. Within the dynamic capabilities framework, uncertainty is 
associated with causal ambiguity (Zollo and Winter, 2002). Causal ambiguity is the ambiguity 
concerning causal relationships between actions and outcome (Lipman and Rumelt, 1982; 
Mosakowski, 1990; Reed and DeFillippi, 1990; Coff, 1999; Zollo and Winter 2002). Zollo and 
Winter (2002) have integrated the concept of causal ambiguity as a major concern for dynamic 
capabilities.  
Zollo and Winter (2002) address the causal ambiguity of action-performance linkages and make a 
distinction between the short and long-term rewards from respectively operating routines and 
dynamic capabilities. Operating routines involve “...the execution of known procedures for the 
purpose of generating current revenue and profit” (Zollo and Winter, 2002: 341). Dynamic 
capabilities, on the other hand, seek to “...bring about desirable changes in the existing set of 
operating routines... for the purpose of enhancing profit in the future” (Zollo and Winter, 2002: 
341). 
The dynamic capabilities framework provides a mechanism that can potentially clarify the 
ambiguous, or uncertain, causal nature of action-performance relationships. This is especially 
important in high-level change environments, such as NTBVs. Zollo and Winter (2002) argue that 
in such cases, dynamic capabilities should focus on the articulation and codification of lessons 
learned in previous experiences.  
The concept of dynamic  capabilities is relatively new and not yet operationalised. Some also 
consider the concept idiosyncratic in their details (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000) and abstract 
(Teece, et al., 1997). This may well be as currently dynamic capabilities are predominantly 
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observed by academia (Zollo and Winter, 1999; Teece et al., 1997; Teece, 1994; Nelson, 1991; 
Deeds, 2000; Iansiti, 1994; Majumdar, 2000).  
However, in a similar sense to Penrose’s notion (1958) that a firm is an ambiguous entity, dynamic 
capabilities are also ambiguous. Subsequently so are the potential measurements that relate to the 
outcome of dynamic capabilities as competitive advantage. Penrose already noted that the “profit 
motives” of firms are ambiguous and interpretable in many forms (Penrose, 1959:27-28). This does 
not mean, however, that it would not be valuable to create a measure that approximates this 
competitive advantage. This is also true for the dynamic capability (Teece, 1998). The lack of a 
uniform measure does not mean that it is not worthwhile attempting to create an approximation of 
the dynamic capabilities residing in the firm. 
In summary, whilst dynamic capabilities are believed to be indirectly linked to firm performance 
(Zott, 2000) and thus increase the probability of a firm achieving a sustainable competitive 
advantage, dynamic capabilities themselves are still intangible constructs for which no uniform 
measurement exists (Teece, 1998). The framework can be seen as a potentially effective approach 
to the specific uncertainties prevailing in this venturing process, from an input perspective. The 
ability to recognise such dynamic capabilities in a firm, albeit subjectively, therefore provides the 
potential for enhancing the predictability of uncertain events. It is essential to evaluate the 
implications of action-performance links in a process of experience accumulation, knowledge 
articulation and codification.  
2.5 AN OVERVIEW – BETTER ASSUMPTIONS, INFORMATION OR 
JUDGEMENTS TO DEAL WITH UNCERTAIN CAUSALITY 
When examining the current literature streams that deal with managerial decisions for NTBVs, it 
becomes apparent that the underlying nature of uncertainty is derived from a lack of knowledge 
about the assumed causal relationships between the actions/decisions and their future 
outcomes/rewards (see table 4). The main assumption is that in the real world, causal relations do 
exist, but there are apparent limits (or boundaries) in human rationality to comprehend them 
(Simon, 1957).   
The solutions described show various ways of dealing with these boundaries. Decision theory sees 
its limits in the judgemental gap (Raiffa, 1968). In cases of uncertainty, the calculations are based 
predominantly on assumptions and best guesses on the probabilities and future states. Based on 
these assumptions, risk-like quantitative modelling techniques can then be used to identify the best 
possible option, and thus recommend a decision. The uncertainty however remains visible in the 
quality of the assumptions.   
In order to achieve better assumptions, management information systems have been introduced to 
better inform managers. Such systems typically support managers in either gaining more data or 
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enabling complex computations following mathematical programming and decision theory 
techniques. Nevertheless, within the context of new technology-based firms, a specific class of 
uncertainty remains visible, as more information does not necessarily lead to better assumptions in 
this field. Uncertainty can even emerge in the overload of information fed to managers.  
Planning and protection solutions have been also been elaborated which focus on protecting the 
firm from outside uncertainty. These solutions have been particularly valuable in traditional 
industries, where changes are continuous. However, new technology-based ventures typically deal 
with rapid environments of discontinuous change. In these cases it is relatively difficult to protect 
or to plan the future potential of a new technology, as the 3M case has shown.  
These perspectives all have in common that they are focused towards a potential outcome. In order 
to apply decision theory it is essential to have some idea about potential or desirable future states. 
The essence however with new technology-based ventures is that, especially in the earlier stages, 
these outcomes are often unknown.  
In contrast, input-oriented approaches exist focusing on the essential capabilities an organisation 
requires to reduce uncertainty and create a competitive advantage. This perspective advocates the 
utilisation of uncertainty by responding creatively and reconfiguring the resources that are available 
to the firm. Technology-based ventures are typically situated in this field of opportunities. This 
field generally focuses on the characteristics of entrepreneurship and especially the judgemental 
capabilities that enhance decision-making under uncertainty. This typical entrepreneurial mindset is 
especially equipped to judge potential causalities in future, and hence makes decisions by taking on 
the uncertainty rather than avoiding it.  
Examples of such capabilities can be found in literature on entrepreneurship and notably the work 
of Penrose (1958). Penrose provides a new way of conceptualising the firm by looking at the 
resources available to it. This has resulted in the formulation of the resource-based view of the firm 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). Example contributions of this view are prescriptions for firms regarding the 
nature of the firm’s resources (Barney, 1991). The assumptions can then be that having such 
resources would increase the chances of an enhanced competitive advantage, and thus reduce 
uncertainty.  
Based on this resource-based view, a specific condition has been addressed that specifically 
benefits new technology-based firms. Such firms require dynamic capabilities to deal with the 
uncertain and rapidly changing technologies and environments. These dynamic capabilities are said 
to reduce the causal ambiguity of the action-performance relationships (Zollo and Winter, 2002), 
and thus improve managerial decisions under uncer tainty.   
Both input and outcome oriented perspectives on new technology-based venturing seem to imply 
the existence of a causal relationship, albeit ambiguous, between the two. The existing theories 
predominantly focus on ways to reduce the ambiguity in these causal relationships in order to 
improve managerial decisions. The reason why this is not so easy is often attributed to the limited 
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knowledge managers have about the complexity of the situation. Simon (1957) coined the term 
‘bounded rationality’, which implied the limits of human rationality. The efforts described above 
all seem to focus on improving this rationality aspect by proposing the use of input-oriented 
conditions or output-oriented assumptions. 
This complexity is furthered by the dilemma of the timeframe of the prescribed conditions that are 
assumed to provide long-term competitive advantages, whilst maintaining short-term operative 
returns. In essence, decision makers who invest in building long-term capabilities can only do so if 
capital is generated from short-term operative returns.  
When reviewing the literature it appears that the treatment of the relationship between decisions 
and outcomes always strives towards a certain degree of causality. However, measures to establish 
this causality do not exist, as the concepts are predominantly of an intangible nature. Although 
concepts such as dynamic capabilities are recognisable when carrying out longitudinal studies, no 
measures yet exist for such intangible assets of the firm. Measures for these intangible capabilities 
are thus required in order to better understand the uncertainty residing in the underlying 
relationships between the input and outcome of the venturing process in new technology-based 
firms.  
This thesis will propose alternative measures for treating this uncertainty by losing the argument of 
causality. A problem that also concerned the lack of knowledge on assumed causal relationships 
occurred in quantum physics at the beginning of the 20th century. Quantum physics and the findings 
of prominent scientists such as Werner Heisenberg rendered the law of causality obsolete when 
measuring on a sub-atomic level. Although these developments shook the very foundations on 
which traditional physics was built, it has been applied with astonishing success.  
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QUANTUM THEORY Quantum Mechanics Uncertainty 
Relation 
Heisenberg Probability function 
however causality is 
lost 
Table 4: Uncertainty approaches and causality  
The next section will elaborate on the demise of the law of causality from a physics perspective and 
explore analogous approaches that are potentially beneficial for the treatment of uncertainty in 
NTBVs. 
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2.6 TREATING UNCERTAINTY BY LOSING THE CAUSALITY 
ARGUMENT 
2.6.1 Introducing an analogy 
This section will elaborate on the changing perspective on causality within physics to explore the 
adoption of the concept of treating uncertainty by losing the causality argument for managerial 
decisions and uncertainty.  
2.6.1.1 Causality and Newtonian physics  
In order to establish a conceptual basis for uncertainty in physics, the well-known ‘arrow of Zeno’ 
paradox can be used5 as an illustration. In the 5th century B.C., the Greek philosopher Zeno of Elea 
introduced one of the first notions of uncertainty by elaborating on the paradox that emerged when 
attempting to explain an arrow in flight (figure 9). When observing an arrow in flight (or motion) 
the arrow seems to be moving continuously through space. However, Zeno discovered a paradox 
when he wanted to determine the position of the arrow at one instant in time. In this instant, an 
arrow can only occupy a region of space exactly equal to its size. The arrow cannot occupy a larger 
or a smaller space. In other words the arrow is not moving at that instant. However, if the arrow is 
not moving at one instant and the arrow cannot exist in two different places at the same time, how 
can the arrow have moved at all? Zeno challenged this concept of time and motion by elaborating 
that if the arrow moves, the next instant or position follows immediately and there is no time 
between one instant and the next. He argued that it appeared as though that if the arrow is at some 
particular position at one instant, it is impossible for the arrow to arrive at a new position at the 
next instant.  
This paradox between position and time can be seen as one of the earliest traces of the 
understanding of the concept of uncertainty. Physics is the study of matter. It encompasses all 
levels of analysis from the smallest particles, such as electrons and quarks, to the largest bodies, 
such as galaxies (Ohanian, 1989). Physics is concerned with the measurement of space, time and 
mass of this matter. Phenomena happen at points in space and at points in time (Ohanian, 1989). As 
illustrated in Zeno’s arrow, uncertainty can relate to the inability to measure and thus understand 
the arrow’s position (in other words its point in space) at a specific point in time.  
                                              
5 Source: Physics department, Trinity College Dublin,h 
Http://www.tcd.ie/Physics/Schools/what/atoms/quantum/uncertainty.html 
 




Momentum p = (mass)(velocity) 
 
Figure 9: Zeno’s arrow  
The understanding of the uncertainty related to the arrow paradox of Zeno was solved three 
centuries ago, with the introduction of Newtonian physics. Using causal relationships and 
infinitesimal numbers, Newton developed laws that could exactly explain and predict the flight of 
the arrow. Newton introduced three laws of motion (the law of inertia, the law of action and 
reaction, and the law of acceleration proliferation – table 5) that led to the foundation of physics. 
By applying infinitesimal calculus, developed simultaneously by Leibniz and Newton in the 17th 
century, the arrow paradox could now be solved. The laws of motion explain uncertainty in areas 
such the behaviour of objects on the surface of the earth as well as the orbits of the planets around 
the sun, and the moon around the earth. These laws form the basics of mechanics (Gribbin, 1991). 
Newton’s method for understanding uncertainty was thus based on exploring causal relationships. 
The behaviour of a particle could be exactly predicted on the basis of its interactions with other 
particles and the forces acting on it. This has also been referred to as Laplace causality laws. “If an 
intellect were to know, for a given instant, all the forces that animate nature and the condition of all 
objects that compose her, and were also capable of subjecting these data to analysis, then this 
intellect would encompass in a single formula the motions of the largest bodies in the universe as 
well as those of the smallest atom; nothing would be uncertain for this intellect, and the future as 
well as the past would be present before its eyes.” (Laplace, P.S. in Ohanian, 1989: 123). If the 
exact position and velocity of a particle at a given point in time is known, it is possible to calculate 
its position and velocity at any future moment (Cassidy, 1991).  
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NEWTON’S LAWS OF  MOTION 
The first law of motion is the law of inertia that states that every body will stay in a state 
of rest or uniform motion in a straight line unless that state is changed by forces impressed 
upon it, whereby all motion is composed of two parts: speed and direction. The 
combination of speed and direction is velocity, and a change in motion is acceleration.  
The second law of motion states that the size of acceleration is directly proportional to 
the force applied, and inversely proportional to the mass of the body. Further, the 
acceleration will take place in the same direction as the force applied (F= m*a, where F= 
force applied to the body, m= mass of the body, and a= acceleration the body experiences 
in response to the force applied). An example of the second law is the force of gravity.  
The third law of motion brings together the first and second laws and states that for every 
force applied to a body, there is an equal and oppositely directed force exerted in 
response. Or in other words: to every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.    
Table 5: The foundation of physics: 3 laws of motion (Ohanian, 1989) 
2.6.1.2 Challenging causality  
A notable shift in the approach to uncertainty in physics stemmed from the concept of time. 
Whereas Newton’s laws were completely reversible as far as time is concerned, experiments 
showed this is not always the case. For example, when a falling brick hits the floor the energy of its 
motion is converted into heat. However, if one heated the stone on the floor the stone would not 
move back up into the air (Gribbin, 1991). This problem could be explained using 
thermodynamics. The second law of thermodynamics states that in all energy exchanges, if no 
energy enters or leaves the system, the potential energy of the state will always be less than that of 
the initial state (Hawking et al., 1996). This has also been referred to as entropy.  Entropy is a 
measure of disorder.  Because natural processes always move towards a state of disorder, entropy is 
always increasing.  
The concept of entropy led to a statistical approach for understanding uncertainty.  Using the 
example of the falling brick, Boltzmann’s addition to the second law was that it could happen that 
the stone would go up again whilst heated, although this was very unlikely (Gribbin, 1991). The 
introduction of the possibility of a particular random movement means that, whilst it was very 
probable that entropy always increases, it is not an absolute certainty (Gribbin, 1991). 
“Boltzmann’s statistical approach involved cutting energy up into mathematical chunks and 
treating these chunks as real quantities that can be handled by probability equations” (Gribbin, 
1991: 40). This is also known as the statistical interpretation of the second law of thermodynamics.  
In physics, the idea of statistical interpretations for the explanation of phenomena such as entropy 
was received with great reluctance (Gribbin, 1991). Nevertheless, this idea eventually led to the 
Decision Making under Uncertainty 48 
 
introduction of “quanta”. Max Planck, a German scientist, though strongly disagreeing with the use 
of statistics in physics, eventually derived his theory by applying a similar concept to Boltzmann’s 
to understand the uncertainty related to the smallest particles.  Planck discovered that the only way 
to explain the behaviour of light was to assume that the atoms and molecules in materials could 
only change energy in discrete units or “quanta”6 (Heisenberg, 1958; Davies, 1989; Cassidy, 1991).   
The idea that energy could be emitted or absorbed only in discrete energy quanta could not be fitted 
into the traditional framework of physics. Planck, renowned to dislike the conclusions of his own 
findings, endeavoured several times to reconcile his hypothesis with the older laws of radiation but 
his experiments all had similar results (Heisenberg, 1958). New ways of understanding this 
uncertainty were required.  
2.6.1.3 Discovering the limits of causality: a duality   
The existence of complete causality was disproved by the emergence of a contradiction. Einstein 
(1938) explained the observations by suggesting that the behaviour of light consists of quanta (or 
photons) of energy travelling through space. Light could either be interpreted as consisting of light 
quanta (particles), or as consisting of electromagnetic waves (Heisenberg, 1958). According to 
Einstein the apparent duality that emerged would be understood only much later.  
The implications of the uncertainty surrounding this paradox emerged on the level of the observer 
(Cassidy, 1991). Only prescriptions of reality, in for example mathematical interpretations, could 
enable the development of concepts on the behaviour of the atomic world. Understanding 
observation and measurement became of central concern to quantum phys ics (Cassidy, 1991). 
Prediction becomes limited as only by observation is it possible to know either the position or 
momentum of an atom, and the act of observation itself might affect what is being measured. A 
seminal example has illustrated this idea, by levitating the microscopic problem into a macroscopic 
setting. It is based on a thought experiment developed by Schrödinger, so-called Schrödinger’s Cat 
(Gribbin, 1991). The thought experiment describes the situation of a cat in a steel chamber. In the 
chamber is a device that includes a Geiger counter and a tiny bit of radioactive substance. This 
portion is so small that, according to quantum theory, in the course of one hour one of the atoms 
might decay. But there is also an equal probability that this does not occur. If one of these atoms 
decays, the counter tube discharges and, through a relay, releases a hammer that breaks a flask of 
hydrocyanic acid. This would poison and kill the cat. If this system was left alone for an hour, the 
cat could be alive or dead depending on whether one of the atoms had decayed. Before opening the 
                                              
6 As the metal is heated, the object loses energy in the form of light. Planck suggested that the colour of light emitted is 
determined by the size of the quanta of energy lost by the material. The measurement used for the colour of the light is 
“frequency”, v. The constant of proportionality between the energy of the quantum, E, and the frequency of the light is a 
new physical constant – Planck’s constant. The formula is E=hv where E= Radiation (energy) related to v= frequency h  
is Planck’s constant, the denominator of quanta 6.6 ∗  10-35 Joule seconds.  (source: Physics department, Trinity College 
Dublin). 
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box, the state of the cat is represented by a probability function and it is impossible to determine 
with certainty the state of the cat. Only opening the box will prove if one of the atoms has decayed 
or not. This sub-atomic indeterminacy is now reflected in a macroscopic indeterminacy. This can 
only be resolved by direct observation.  The superposition of possible outcomes (the cat is dead, 
alive or dying) exists simultaneously at a microscopic and at a macroscopic level (Gribbin, 1991). 
The paradox is also observed in particle-wave duality. In essence it seems that particles show 
wave-like behaviour and waves show particle behaviour. The example of Zeno’s arrow7 can again 
be used as an illustration, but the uncertainty is now apparent on a sub-atomic level. In Zeno’s 
arrow, the uncertainty emerged from the comprehension that the arrow could not be in two places 
at one point in time, so two options emerge. The first is to study the motion of the arrow through 
space, concentrating on the rate at which it passes a point (measured by its momentum). The 
second option is to study the position of the arrow at some instant during the flight. However, these 
two perspectives are mutually exclusive.  
This is the essence of what is known as Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Heisenberg’s seminal 
paper on uncertainty stated that, “The more precisely the position is determined, the less precisely 
the momentum is known in this instant, and vice versa” (Heisenberg, 1927). If the position (q) of a 
particle is measured precisely, no information is given about its momentum (p). Alternatively if the 
momentum is measured precisely, no information is available about its position8 (Heisenberg, 
1930). The relationship between these two variables is uncertain. Furthermore, Heisenberg stated 
that not one or the other variable is uncontrolled alone, but both are uncontrolled in a reciprocal 
way (Cassidy, 1991).  
Moreover, Heisenberg showed that these uncertainty relations are not just mathematical 
abstractions, but that the relations are consistent with actual experiments. He dubbed this 
uncertainty relationship as anschaulich. The German word anschaulich defies an unambiguous 
translation into other languages; however is possibly best described as ‘intelligible’ or ‘intuitive’ 
(Hilgevoord and Uffink, 2001).  
Due to this uncertainty, determinism or the mechanical causality of physical systems is equally lost 
(Heisenberg, 1958).  This has also been referred to as the principle of indeterminacy, showing that 
the old concepts fit nature only inaccurately (Heisenberg, 1958).  The uncertainty between particle 
and waves could not be solved with traditional theories. Despite numerous experiments, the 
paradox in quantum theory did not disappear. In fact, the physicists got more used to this 
phenomenon (Heisenberg, 1958).   
                                              
7 Source: Physics department, Trinity College Dublin, 
http://www.tcd.ie/Physics/Schools/what/atoms/quantum/uncertainty.html 
8  The mathematical expression of the uncertainty relation is: ∆p∆q ≥h/4π, where ∆p is the uncertainty in measurement of 
the position and ∆q is the uncertainty in the measurement of the momentum. h/4π relates to Planck’s constant divided by 
4π. If for example the position is measured, and hence has a very small uncertainty, the uncertainty in the momentum 
becomes greater and vice versa. A similar version of this formula incorporates energy (E) and time (t).    
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2.6.1.4  A new method to understand the uncertain duality 
The uncertainty seemed undeniable and could not be explained with classical methods – a new 
method was required. Based on a number of consecutive developments and experiments, a solution 
was developed that enabled physicists to deal with this uncertain duality in the form of quantum 
mechanics. Quantum mechanics provided a mathematical solution through transformation of the 
physical problem in space and time into a mathematical configuration space.  
In other words it established a mathematical link between the symbols of the familiar classical 
world and the symbols of the quantum world of the atom (Heisenberg, 1958).  
The dualism between particles and waves was not solved, but merely hidden in mathematical 
schemes (Heisenberg, 1958) by using probabilities.  The introduction of probability implies the 
existence of a degree of knowledge of the actual situation (Heisenberg, 1958). Heisenberg noted 
this was a quantitative version of the old concept of ‘potentia’ in Aristotelian philosophy. “It 
introduced something standing in the middle between the idea and the event, a strange kind of 
physical reality just in the middle of possibility and reality.” (Heisenberg, 1958: 11). 
The concept considers the particle and wave duality as two complementary descriptions of the 
same reality (Heisenberg, 1958). There is a limitation to both perspectives, which leads to 
contradictions. However, taking these limitations into account, which in this case can be expressed 
by the uncertainty relations, these contradictions lose significance.  
The uncertainty principle denies the strict formulation of the causal law (see figure 10). As soon as 
the phenomena are explained in terms of causal relationships (expressed by mathematical laws), a 
physical description of the phenomena in space-time is impossible (Heisenberg, 1930). The only 
calculation that can be made is a range of possibilities for the position and velocities of the electron 
in any future time. The laws and predictions of quantum mechanics are in general only of a 
statistical type. Uncertainty and indeterminacy can only be reversed by statistical approximations. 
This means a balance should be struck between the abstract mathematical accuracy of measuring 
and the correct interpretation in space and time. The quantum theory stands out in that it renders the 
possibility of a consistent mathematical representation obsolete, by the uncertainty relation 
imposed on the object under study. The strength of the quantum approach to this uncertainty is the 
use of contradicting concepts (e.g. classical physics and probability waves) that ultimately explain 
the uncertainty relation (Heisenberg, 1958). This approach isolates and idealises the object under 
study in order to clarify the uncertainty (Heisenberg, 1958). However “…even if complete clarity 
has been achieved in this way, it is not known how accurately the set of concepts describes reality” 
(Heisenberg, 1958: 64).  Idealisations form part of the human language. In this respect Heisenberg 
even compares these idealisations with different styles of art (architecture, music). The rules 
defined in art “can perhaps not be represented in a strict sense of mathematical concepts and 
equations, but their fundamental elements are very closely related to the essential elements of 
mathematics” (Heisenberg, 1958: 65). 
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Figure 10: Classical versus quantum theory 
(Heisenberg, 1930) 
This led Heisenberg to elaborate on the theoretical interpretation of an experiment (Heisenberg, 
1958), and identify three distinct steps required to merge probability with classical physics: 
CONSTRUCTING AN EXPERIMENT 
STEP 1. The translation of the initial experimental situation into a probability function. A 
necessary condition here is the fulfilment of the uncertainty relations. 
STEP 2. The following up of this function in the course of time. This step cannot be described 
in terms of classical concepts; there is no description of what happens to the system 
between the initial observation and the next measurement. 
STEP 3. The statements of new measurement to be made to the system, the result of which 
can be calculated from the probability function. This step allows the change over 
again from the possible, to the actual (determinism) situation. 
Table 6: Theoretical interpretation of an experiment (Heisenberg, 1958) 
By adopting these three steps a potential probability function can be explored and evaluated on its 
potential to contribute to the understanding of the uncertainty in new technology-based ventures.  
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2.6.2 An analogous approach for managerial decisions in NTBVs  
In Heisenberg’s seminal essay on uncertainty, he suggested that the content of a physical theory 
may be recognised not by its mathematical formulation but by the new concepts it gives rise to.  To 
take the example of quantum mechanics, the motion of an electron could previously be described 
by noting its position and velocity at any given moment. However, as Heisenberg noted in his 
essay, such concepts are meaningful only when they are referred to or defined by the actual 
experimental operations used to measure them. The physicist cannot know any more than what he 
or she can actually measure. The transition from the possible to the actual takes place during the act 
of observation. In quantum mechanics this implies that what happens in an atomic event can only 
be described with reference to the observation, not the state of affairs between observations.  
The above synopsis on the evolution of the concept of uncertainty in physics showed that the focus 
on causality has been abandoned at the beginning of the 20th century, notably based on discoveries 
by Werner Heisenberg. Heisenberg showed that the law of causality, as it had prevailed for three 
centuries in classical physics, did not apply on a quantum level. Despite numerous attempts to 
falsify this insight, his uncertainty principle remained valid, and usable.  
Heisenberg (1958) realised that the uncertainty was hidden in paradox relations. This has been 
formulated in the Copenhagen interpretation, which is considered to be the first complete 
description of quantum theory. The Copenhagen interpretation commences with a paradox: any 
experiment (from phenomena in daily life to atomic events), is to be described in the terms of 
classical physics (Heisenberg, 1958). Classical physics forms a common language, by which a 
description can be made of the arrangement of our experiments and results (Heisenberg, 1958). 
These classical concepts do not have to be replaced nor improved. However the uncertainty relation 
limits the application of these concepts (Heisenberg, 1958). This limitation has to be acknowledged 
when applying classical concepts.  
The limitations placed on classical concepts had severe consequences for theoretical physics. 
Critics of the quantum theory from a mathematical and physical perspective have always existed. A 
prominent example is Einstein’s comment, “God does not play dice” implicitly assuming that new 
developments will prove to be just a step towards an even better understanding of the physical world. 
Others, such as Bohm, regarded physics as an ongoing development with no end since new 
dimensions will be discovered (Bohm and Hiley, 1993). Another more recent example is a dialogue 
between Hawking and Penrose on quantum theory, in which they have a similar debate on the 
implications of the uncertainty principle (Hawking et al., 1996). These illustrations show that there is 
no consensus amongst physicists about the epistemological implications of the loss of causality 
following the uncertainty principle on a sub-atomic level, although nobody has yet proven 
Heisenberg wrong.  
The new workable solutions of quantum mechanics for understanding and managing uncertainty 
proved very successful. The Copenhagen interpretation formed the basis for many successful 
developments. Quantum theory has yielded a range of technological advances based on research in 
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areas such as: sub-atomic particles (the evolution of the universe); nuclear physics (bombs, medical 
uses and power); atoms and molecules (materials and technology); and quantum optics (quantum 
computing, semiconductors, lasers, communications, quantum cryptography)9. Applying quantum 
mechanical mathematical transformation and abstraction can therefore be seen as ambiguous in its 
theoretical formulation but highly successful for its application in atomic research.  
As for the philosophical implications of the Copenhagen interpretation, I quote Heisenberg on the 
potential of its applicability: “These new results (- the concept of matter and the inapplicability of 
classical physics to describe the smaller parts -) had first of all to be considered as a serious 
warning against the somewhat forced application of scientific concepts in domains where they did 
not belong. The application of classical physics, e.g. in chemistry had been a mistake. Therefore 
one will nowadays be less inclined to assume that the concepts of physics, even those of quantum 
theory, can certainly be applied everywhere in biology or other sciences. We will, on the contrary, 
try to keep the doors open for the entrance of new concepts even in those parts of science where the 
older concepts have been very useful for the understanding of the phenomena. Especially at those 
points where the application of the older concepts seems somewhat forced or appears not quite 
adequate to the problem we will try to avoid rash conclusions.” (Heisenberg, 1958: 138-139)  
With respect to the research question and the potential contributions that can be derived from the 
Heisenberg approach, great care should be taken in applying quantum theoretical concepts in other 
sciences. Nevertheless, this does not advocate complete ignorance and neglect of concepts from 
other sciences. As the evolution of quantum theory itself shows, many other concepts have been 
applied to enhance the understanding of the phenomenon under study. Others already have 
advocated actively pursuing investigations into managerial phenomena using principles that follow 
this new quantum way of understanding the world (Zohar, 1998; Zohar and Marshall, 1993; 
Wheatley, 1999; Katz and Gartner, 1988). Where current concepts on uncertainty remain 
ambiguous (Buchko, 1994), the conceptual advances and appreciation of uncertainty relations 
might prove useful as an alternative approach.  
Even though the current state of affairs in social sciences is not as refined and clear in terms of 
understanding uncertainty as in physics (Parkhe, 1993), embarking on a thorough exploration in a 
similar fashion to the way physics evolved appears appropriate. No advanced mathematical 
uncertainty relations have been established in social sciences and the abstract language that guides 
social sciences is not as unequivocal as in mathematics. However the new conceptual findings and 
approach to uncertainty in quantum theory does provide alternative new ways of looking at the 
concept of uncertainty, which may prove beneficial in other areas. 
                                              
9 Source: Physics department, Trinity College Dublin, 
http://www.tcd.ie/Physics/Schools/what/atoms/quantum/uncertainty.html 
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A necessary condition that has to be satisfied is the fulfilment of an uncertainty relation. Obviously, 
the current state of social sciences is not yet ready to come to a sophisticated uncertainty relation as 
that formulated by Heisenberg, since social science is not at such an advanced stage (Parkhe, 
1993). Nevertheless, by treating the input-outcome relationships of new technology-based ventures 
as a non-causality, initial dualities can be proposed. Following this duality, the initial situation, or 
current state of affairs, can be translated in a probability function. This will form the starting point 
of the experiment which follows in the remainder of this thesis.  
The next chapters will address three main issues. The first step is to explore potential uncertain 
relationships, relevant for new technology-based ventures. Such dualities ought to reflect a 
potential uncertainty relationship between two existing perspectives on the new technology-based 
firms. Secondly, a first attempt is made to suggest how a potential probability function can be 
formulated to understand this duality. The potential probability function will form the basis for the 
development and execution of an experiment (section 4.6), to test and gain insight into the potential 
contribution such an approach can provide for managerial decision-making. The third step 
evaluates previous efforts to adopt or refer to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in social sciences 
in order to position the contribution presented here.  





UNCERTAINTY AND VENTURING NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES: TOWARDS A PROBABILITY 
FUNCTION  
“In effect, we have redefined the task of science to be the discovery of laws that will enable us to 
predict events up to the limits set by the uncertainty principle.” 
 
Stephen Hawking, 1988 
3.1 TOWARDS A PROBABILIT Y FUNCTION FOR UNCERTAINTY IN 
NTBVS 
When looking at the existing approaches for dealing with uncertainty in managerial decision-
making, it appears that an underlying causal relationship is always assumed to exist. For example, 
even though statistics are an effective tool for supporting the decision-making process, the 
underlying assumptions (or subjective data) necessary to fuel the calculations under uncertainty 
always seem directed to the best causal interpretation available to the decision maker. For new 
technology-based ventures this approach has its limitations.  
Uncertainty in NTBVs emerges on the confluence of the building of long-term capabilities, which 
should give a competitive advantage, and short-term business opportunities, which provide 
concrete returns. In these cases the assumptions necessary to make decisions become very 
important as new technologies have neither clear -cut potential future states nor clear-cut 
probabilities that can be assigned to a suggested future state. The literature on entrepreneurship in 
particular has argued that the quality of such assumptions and the resulting decisions depend on the 
quality of the entrepreneurial judgement.  
Based on the conceptualisation of the firm as a bundle of resources (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 
1991; Eisenhardt, 2000), it becomes apparent that on a firm level, dynamic capabilities (Teece et 
al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002) are essential in cases of venturing new 
technologies and in dealing with the associated turbulence. Dynamic capabilities enable the firm to 
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reconfigure their resource base to improve performance and dynamically adapt to new productive 
opportunities in the market. Essentially, Zollo and Winter (2002) argue that these dynamic 
capabilities are a learning process that aims to enhance the causal ambiguity in the action-
performance relationships.  
However even though the relationships are clearly ambiguous, they are treated as though an 
underlying causality, that can be known, is still present. These solutions are geared towards the 
notion that increasing clarity on this relationship will benefit the company. From a managerial 
decision point of view, it thus appears that firms that have such dynamic capabilities are better 
equipped to make the correct and timely decisions (actions) that should result in a better outcome 
(performance). 
However if you no longer look at this concept in terms of causality, a process model emerges 
(figure 11). Instead of treating the input and the output as a causal relationship – or a contingent 





































Figure 11: Causality, contingency or process models 
The use of statistics in this case differs from decision theory approaches, as the essential new 
understanding is that the relationship is not causally related. Decision theory, for example, uses 
subjective probabilities to calculate the most appropriate decision that would lead to the desired 
future states. The underlying relationship between decision options and resultant future states are 
assumed to be casually related, but as there is a lack of knowledge, probabilities are distributed 
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subjectively over the various options, compensating for the causal ambiguity. The process model, 
on the other hand, does not assume this underlying causal relationship nor does it describe decision 
options. Instead it aims to evaluate if a certain condition is apparent and if there is an increased 
chance of reaching the desired outcome. In some cases it will be, in others it won’t. This remains a 
matter of observation. However, knowing there is a significant probability can influence the 
process of decision-making and thus enhancing the decision maker’s judgement.  
Measuring the intangible aspects of this relationship can thus be regarded as a useful starting point 
in for gaining understanding.  The previous chapter has shown that we are able to describe 
managerial phenomena related to venturing new technologies. An example is the capabilities view 
of the firm, which takes an input-oriented approach to venturing, and conceptualises firms as 
bundles of resources that form the basis of any venturing process (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984) 
However, it became clear that the relation between the input and the eventual outcome of the 
venturing process is far from apparent, and concepts such as dynamic capabilities remain abstract.  
By applying the experimental method to uncover such potential probabilities between two dual 
uncertain perspectives, a re-conceptualisation can be achieved that potentially forms the basis of a 
new understanding about the relationship between intangible capabilities and potential outcomes.  
3.1.1 Duality for new technology based venturing – capabilities 
versus performance  
Venturing new technologies is distinctly uncertain, as the future outcome is not known. However, 
as literature shows, the input can be conceptualised as committed resources. The effective 
reconfiguration of the resources is seen as the entrepreneurial act necessary for venturing new 
technologies. Nevertheless, the ability to conceptualise the input of the venturing process as 
resources still provides little insights into the outcome. This is the starting point for a potential 
duality in NTBVs.  
Although the outcome of venturing new technologies is often not known, the main aim of venturing 
is creating value for the firm. Penrose’s profit motive shows that a decision maker’s ultimate goal 
is to create value out of resources, such as new technologies (Penrose, 1958). Therefore, business 
performance can ultimately be seen as the driver for the venturing process of new technologies. 
However, how new technologies come to create value (the outcome) is not known. New technology 
alone does not lead automatically to business performance.  
Necessary conditions have been formulated, such as the dynamic capabilities framework, which 
should have a positive effect on the input-outcome relationship. Scholars believe that the effective 
allocation of resources has a positive impact on the corporate performance, for example by 
diversification (i.e. Rumelt, 1982; Harrison et al., 1993). By applying diversifying strategies the 
risk return ratio of the business is lowered (Amit and Livnat, 1988) and this reduced business risk 
has a positive effect on profitability (Amit and Wernerfelt, 1990). It is also argued that such a 
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resource perspective on diversification can help determine the direction of the firm’s future 
expansion (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991). However, such studies take a wide time-span and do 
not consider the immediate uncertainty of new technologies. It is not yet known what the outcome 
is and thus it is not yet known if business risk can be reduced via diversification. Only after 3M 
found an application for the new adhesive, and it was proven to be successful, did diversification 
become a decision option.  
When the relationship between the capabilities, by which a firm controls its resources, and the 
performance or profits they create, are imperfectly understood this is often attributed to causal 
ambiguity (Barney, 1991). However, contrary to Barney, I propose taking a non causal approach in 
the case of new technology-based venturing. As I have argued, in the case of new technology-based 
ventures it is simply not known what the outcome will be and thus a non causal approach seems 
more appropriate.  
A duality emerges with a capabilities-based perspective on the one hand and a performance 
perspective on the other (figure 12). The capabilities perspective is input oriented. The performance 
perspective is outcome oriented. Venturing new technologies sees an uncertainty on the confluence 
of this relationship, where it is impossible to determine with certainty the outcome of any resource 
commitment to a certain technology venturing process.  Whereas the dynamic capability of 
reconfiguring resources implies an enhanced chance of long-term competitive advantage, short-
term performance is not necessarily granted. Vice versa, creating extraordinary performance or 
value from one new technology-based venture does not imply that the firm can repeat this action 
and have a long-term competitive advantage.  
Capabilities Perspective Performance Perspective
Uncertainty
Losing causal relationship
In venturing new technologies
Input-orientated Managerial Decisions Output -oriented
 
Figure 12: Duality: capability versus performance perspectives 
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Although literature has pointed towards arguing for a potential probability relationship between 
such capabilities and outcomes, no measures yet exist to explore such a relationship. In order to 
explore potential measures it is important to understand these two perspectives.   
3.1.2 A performance perspective  
The outcome of the process of venturing new technologies is ambiguous. On the one hand, it has 
been argued that having a distinct competitive advantage over competitors is important in order to 
survive. This is often seen as a long-term perspective for a firm’s survival for which no measures 
exists. Competitive advantage is important for firms, especially how this competitive advantage can 
be created ex ante (Cockburn et al., 2000).  However, how competitive advantage can be achieved 
is still ambiguous. Coff (1999) argued for a distinction between rent creation and the appropriation 
of the rent created. Another perspective on this outcome, for which some measures are available, is 
performance or profit. Penrose (1958) argued that this profit motive can be seen as the ultimate 
driver to venture new technologies.  
Business performance is traditionally measured using financial accounting standards, and becomes 
visible when looking, for example, at a firm’s profit and loss account, balance sheet and cash flow 
statement (Tracy, 1996). These financial statements present the achievements of the company in 
monetary terms. The main financial imperatives of any business are: making profit (reported in the 
income statement), generating cash flow (reported in the cash flow statement), and maintaining 
financial health (reported in the balance sheet) (Tracy, 1996).  
However, as this thesis shows, in NTBVs it is difficult to predict future performance. The existing 
models that help understand and predict future growth returns from this perspective, such as net 
present value, discounted cash-flows, and more recently, real options, are predominantly based on 
decision theory. However, these models all depend on the availability of reasonable assumptions 
about the return ratio.  In the absence of such reasonable assumptions other perspectives are 
required.  
The information that becomes available through conventional financial reporting systems always 
reflects a hindsight perspective of the business venture. Although such projections are helpful in 
conventional industries with stable business patterns, the dynamism of new technology industries 
means that these figures alone do not suffice for effective managerial decision-making. For 
example, 3M’s existing financial reports contributed little to the managerial decisions regarding the 
new technology of the glue (N. N., 2002).  The key to venturing new technology, as discussed in 
the previous chapter, is attributable to the entrepreneurship that can produce a creative response 
within conventional industries.  
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3.1.3 A capabilities perspective 
Capabilities are an important input in the decision-making process when venturing new 
technologies. As seen in the literature review, from an entrepreneurship perspective the motor for 
growth and improved business performance rests on the decision-making capabilities of the 
entrepreneur. Decisions in this sense relate to committing resources to certain ventures. Resources 
are seen to have the ability to provide productive services (Penrose, 1959). Managerial decisions 
are thus focused towards the effective configuration of these resources so as to create on the one 
hand innovation (entrepreneurial contribution), by focusing on reconfiguring the existing pool of 
resources, whilst on the other hand managing the existing resources (what Penrose calls operations) 
that already produce output (Penrose, 1959).  
As noted by Penrose (1959), an essential question about the entrepreneurial func tion of the firm 
addresses the “effects of risk and uncertainty on, and the role of expectations in the growth of the 
firm” (Penrose, 1959: 41). This suggests that for firms to create superior business performance, 
they need to understand the effects of risk and uncertainty on the potential outputs rendered by the 
productive services. Furthermore, based on the resource-based view of the firm, conditions emerge 
that are appropriate to NTBVs. A prominent description for these conditions that apply to NTBVs 
has been conceptualised in the dynamic capabilities framework (Teece et al., 1997; Zollo and 
Winter, 2002).  
The framework of dynamic capabilities (Zollo and Winter, 2002) focuses on understanding the 
relationship between the actions taken in a firm and the performance rendered through these 
actions. Dynamic capabilities can thus be understood as a necessary condition when venturing new 
technologies, as they potentially reduce the causal ambiguity within action-performance 
relationships (Zollo and Winter, 2002).  
In order to determine whether a firm has such dynamic capabilities, the evolution of these 
capabilities needs to be addressed. Currently the evolution of dynamic capabilities has been 
observed via empirical research (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Teece and Pisano (1994) identified 
three classes of factors that determine how a firm’s dynamic capabilities evolve: 
• processes: managerial, technological and organisational routines  
• positions: current endowments of technology, customer bases and suppliers 
• paths: available strategic alternatives.  
The paths and positions shape the processes of the firm (through for example projects) and 
ultimately build the dynamic capabilities. Competitive advantages and competitive disadvantages 
(Moss-Kanter, 1994) of firms are seen as resting on distinctive managerial and organisational 
processes (ways of coordinating and combining), “shaped by the firm’s specific asset positions 
(internal and market) and moulded by the evolutionary and co-evolutionary path(s) it has adopted 
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or inherited” (Teece et al., 1997). Managerial and organisational routines are referred to as a firm’s 
routines or patterns of current practice and learning. Positions are defined as current specific 
endowments of technology, intellectual property, complementary assets, customer base, and the 
external relations with suppliers and complementary partners. Paths are the strategic alternatives 
available to the firm, and the presence or absence of increasing returns and attendant path 
dependencies. The firm’s processes and positions collectively encompass its competencies and 
capabilities. The competitive advantage of the firm is seen to be sustainable at firm level through 
repeatedly creating short-term business. 
Dynamic capabilities are the result of the co-evolution of a learning mechanism. “Dynamic 
capabilities arise from learning, they constitute the firm’s systematic methods for modifying 
operating routines” (Zollo and Winter, 2002: 340). The operating (or organisational) routines relate 
to the “execution of known procedures for the purpose of generating current revenue and profit” 
(Zollo and Winter, 2002: 341), and thus can be seen as the company’s productive base. However, 
in high velocity environments these routines require regular updating, which can be done by 
reconfiguring the resources that form the basis of the productive services rendered in the operating 
routines. The second order routine of updating the operating routines is the dynamic capability and 
“…seeks to bring about desirable changes in the existing set of operating routines for the purpose 
of enhancing profit in the future.” (Zollo and Winter, 2002: 341).  
This suggests that dynamic capabilities can be observed. Adapting the operating routines in an 
organisation is a systematic process, and can for example be seen in R&D processes, restructuring 
and re-engineering efforts and post-acquisition integration processes. Such dynamic capabilities are 
believed to stem from three main learning mechanisms.  
Firstly, the process of experience accumulation. This is the central learning process by which 
operating routines have been thought to develop (Zollo and Winter, 2002).  
Secondly, the articulation of knowledge derived from these experiences. “…articulation efforts can 
produce an improved understanding of the new and changing action-performance links, and 
therefore result in adaptive adjustments to the existing set of routines or in enhanced recognition of 
the need for more fundamental change” (Zollo and Winter, 2002: 342). The articulation of 
experiences is said to be limited compared to the amount of available articulated knowledge (Zollo 
and Winter, 2002). Examples of articulated knowledge can be found in discussions among 
employees, debriefing sessions and performance evaluation mechanisms (Zollo and Winter 2002).  
The third mechanism identified is that of knowledge codification. Codified knowledge relates to 
the formal capturing of the articulated knowledge in, for example, manuals and process specific 
tools (Zollo and Winter, 2002). Codified knowledge provides a potential supporting mechanism for 
the knowledge evolution process and facilitates the generation and development of project 
proposals to change the operating routines (Zollo and Winter, 2002). These three mechanisms form 
the basis of the evolution of dynamic capabilities and the operating routines (figure 13). 


















Evolution of Operating RoutinesEvolution of Operating Routines
 
Figure 13: Learning, dynamic capabilities, and operating routines (Zollo and Winter, 2002: 340)  
It thus seems possible to observe and perhaps even deliberately implement dynamic capabilities by 
focusing on the learning mechanisms and underlying change efforts undertaken by the 
organisation.  However, little empirical research exists on the observation and measurement of the 
intangible concept of dynamic capabilities (Teece, 1998).  
3.1.4  Complementary perspectives – a duality  
Both the capability and the performance perspective provide a relevant picture of the firm. 
Performance, and especially financial performance, has always been of major concern to 
managerial decisions. However, complementary to this financial perspective, the rise in literature 
that relates to a firm’s capabilities has received increasing interest.  Especially in the last decade, 
literature has addressed such concepts as competences, capabilities, routines and a resource-based 
view of firms, which has provided a new perspective on managerial decisions.  
Nevertheless, how these two perspectives relate remains uncertain. A causal relationship between 
the two cannot be determined due to a lack of measures.  This is further complicated by the varying 
time spans of the above perspectives. On a venture level, the decisions relating to the commitment 
of specific resources to one new venture, and the following reconfigurations (changes) in these 
resource allocations can be seen as an input. These decisions are specifically designed to create a 
return, which often can be considered as a short-term return, and can typically be measured on 
hindsight using some form of monetary indicator (e.g. profit). However, from a long-term firm 
level perspective, new technology-based firms require the necessary capabilities to be able to 
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venture new technologies on a continuous basis. These dynamic capabilities, however, do not 
directly create a short-term profit, but are believed to contribute to the long-term competitive 
advantage of a firm. The specific decisions that lead to the stimulation and creation of such 
dynamic capabilities are not yet clear, nor are the measures to evaluate them. 
As dynamic capabilities refer to the manner by which a firm is able to make changes in the 
resource configuration, measuring these changes over time would potentially provide a picture of 
these capabilities. This would entail measuring the changes in the resource base for a particular 
new venture. Nevertheless, even if such a measure was apparent, it is not yet clear if this would 
imply the existence of future returns, or even contribute to predictions on future returns.  
In contrast, the performance perspective only gives a description of the (financial) achievements of 
the venture. Such measures thus provide historical information that relates to decisions made in the 
past. The uncertainty between them becomes especially apparent when both perspectives are taken 
at one point in time (figure 14).  
It thus seems that managerial decisions can be based on both the complementary information from 
the input-oriented capability perspective and the outcome-oriented performance perspective. 
Nevertheless, how these two perspectives relate is unclear. Whereas performance can be measured 
using arbitrary monetary values such as profit, no measures for dynamic capabilities exist. Even if 
these measures existed, and were executed at the same time, the capabilities indicator would relate 
to performance in the future, whereas the financial parameter typically reflects decisions made in 
the past. Uncertainty remains therefore, but it is perhaps possible to interpret this relationship in a 
probability function.      
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Figure 14: Uncertainty and the dual perspectives for the new technology -based venturing process 
 
3.1.5 Dynamic capabilities for improved performance – towards a 
probability function for NTBVs 
An initial exploratory probabilistic process model can now be modelled (figure 15). The main 
assumption is that if new technology-based ventures have dynamic capabilities, the likelihood of a 
positive business performance increases. Obviously this is a premature statement which opens up 
many different research avenues. However, in the spirit of Heisenberg, this thesis will provide a 
first experiment to evaluate the potential of such an approach.   
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Figure 15: A process model for uncertainty in NTBVs 
As a starting point, in its most simplistic form, it can be assumed that new technology-based 
ventures will have a higher probability of an increase in performance under the condition that 
dynamic capabilities exist, than they would  if dynamic capabilities do not exist. Dynamic 
capabilities in this case would have a settling effect on the typical uncertainty in new technology-
based ventures. 
A probability function is a function that specifies the probability that a random variable takes on a 
specific value. Based on the dual perspectives between performance and capabilities, the outcome 
state of an improved performance can be interpreted as a random variable. In this assumption the 
dynamic capability can be seen as a variable that can be controlled.  
This potential conditional probabilistic process (1) can be expressed in statistical terms for new 
technology-based ventures: 
             __ 




Where:    X  = Increase in Performance 
   DC = Dynamic Capabilities  
 
 
In order to test this condition, an experiment is required in which the controlled variable of 
dynamic capability can be varied. This will enable exploration of how and whether dynamic 
capabilities relate to increases in business performance. Ultimately this may lead to a probability 
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function that creates better visibility on predicting the likelihood of future performance based on 
the existing dynamic capabilities. The dynamic capability can become a requirement for new 
technology-based firms that should be deliberately stimulated and implemented in a firm to reduce 
this uncertainty.  Managerial decisions are in this sense not only directed towards the action-
performance relation, but also focus on the underlying dynamic capabilities that a firm requires in 
order to enhance this process. These can be influenced by, for example, introducing process 
engineering methodologies and rapid prototyping (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
Nevertheless, it is very early days and a complete probability function is not the anticipated result 
of this thesis.  Developing and verifying such a probability function would be extremely time 
consuming and require a vast amount of further research and experimentation.  
In line with the research question of this thesis, at the outset of the experiment is the question of 
whether there is a contribution to be gained at all from such efforts. The experiment following this 
chapter should thus be regarded as a first trial of an exploratory nature. The intention is not to 
conclude with a universal probability function that satisfies the expected condition presented in this 
chapter, but to learn lessons on potential ways to explore this probability function. To this extent 
the Heisenberg method will be followed.  
The first hurdle to cross is to translate the abstract theoretical underpinnings of dynamic 
capabilities in a workable measure. Such a measure is not expected to be universal or applicable in 
any industry, as dynamic capabilities can take many forms (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).  
Being intangible, these dynamic capabilities are difficult to measure (Teece et al., 1997; Teece 
1998). Dynamic capabilities are explained using qualitative research and no mathematical 
formulation is currently available to measure them in numerical form.  
Nevertheless, Teece (1998), who initiated the term ‘dynamic capability’, argued that the challenge 
is to measure these intangible dynamic capabilities quantitatively. The key is to find a proxy that 
represents the dynamic capabilities.  
In chapter 4, using a qualitative developmental case, I will propose a potential proxy for dynamic 
capabilities. Based on this proxy an experiment will be designed for which a specific measurement 
tool has been engineered. The system engineering process has been described in chapter 5. In 
chapter 6, an initial experiment will be carried out in a setting where all variables are relatively 
stable, and where the controlled variable of dynamic capabilities is changed. By triangulating (Jick, 
1979) both qualitative data from an extensive set of interviews, and quantitative data from the 
measurement tool, I will draw conclusions on the proposed process model and provide an initial 
validation of the proxy, and a preliminary evaluation of the probabilistic process.  
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3.2 A NEW WAY OF LOOKING AT UNCERTAINTY  
In order to position the contribution of this thesis, a literature analysis has been carried out to 
determine how Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle has been used so far in social sciences. Two 
electronic database searches on the keyword “Heisenberg” have been performed in order to 
evaluate the field. The first search was done on EBSCO’s10 Business Source® Premier database. 
This resulted in a total of 479 hits on articles that used the keyword “Heisenberg” in both the title 
and full text. From this search 74 hits were filtered for their relevance and appropriateness to social 
sciences. Relevance in this sense related to the respective status of the journal (predominantly 
scholarly journals) and the nature of the journal (obviously the greater number of hits consisted of 
journals in physics and related fields). The second search using ABI/Inform11 resulted in an 
additional 12 articles that were found to be relevant, but not included in EBSCO. In total 86 articles 
have been analysed on their specific reference to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in social 
sciences.  
The articles have been categorised in their respective fields of interest. Six dominant fields have 
been distinguished. These fields are: economics, organisation & management, public 
administration, statistics & decision theory, sociology, and psychology. The majority of the articles 
could be categorised into the first two fields: economics and organisation & management. An 











Figure 16: Pie chart distribution of search results on analogy in social sciences 
                                              
10 EBSCO Business Source Premier is a full-text online database containing 2828 relevant full-text scholarly journals and 
business periodicals. The URL is http://www.epnet.com 
11 ABI/Inform is similar to EBSCO, with approximately 1200 periodicals. 
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The analysis showed that there is already a strong appreciation for Heisenberg’s findings in social 
sciences and a variety of different usages of the underpinnings of the Heisenberg principle exist. 
Only one article explicitly rejected the notion of comparing the uncertainty discovered by 
Heisenberg with uncertainty visible in financial markets (Beed and Kane, 1991). The remaining 85 
articles all deemed a potential analogy as appropriate or at least worthwhile for exploration.  
Nevertheless, the majority of these articles were unsubstantiated efforts to adopt Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle. Of the 86 articles, 68 made reference to the Heisenberg principle and 
established a comparison, but did not provide additional substantiation on the underlying 
conceptual or mathematical implications. The main aim of these articles was not to establish a 
comprehensive analogy of the Heisenberg principle, as laid out in this thesis, but merely to 
compare certain phenomenon to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. However, the main aim 
(albeit not necessarily the only aim) of the remaining 18 articles was to directly adopt ideas from 
Heisenberg.  
Furthermore, the majority of the articles do not provide a workable solution based on the 
assessment of Heisenberg principle. The majority (73) of the articles only emphasised the 
philosophical implications of the Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Only a few (11) take the 
underlying mathematical statistics into consideration, and even less (2) adopt a combined effort. 
Particularly in the field of organisation & management, in which this thesis finds its centre of 
gravity, no mathematical considerations were apparent.  
Various aspects of the works of Heisenberg have been addressed. The main point of Heisenberg’s 
work can be seen as the loss of causality. This indeterminacy can be attributed to two features 
(Audi, 2000: 766). Firstly, the irreducibly statistical nature of quantum theory seems to be a feature 
of the apparent breakdown of determinism. I will refer to this as indeterminacy. Secondly, the 
apparent breakdown of observer-independence and the fundamental role of measurement is seen as 
a feature of the loss of causality. I will refer to this second feature as observer-interference.  
Most prominently, in 36 articles, a link has been drawn from the observer -interference dilemma. 
One of the considerations that can be derived from Heisenberg’s findings is that the observer 
interferes with the object under study and thus changes the results. In other words, observation 
means influencing and changing the observed, and therefore the results are never fully objective. 
This has been attributed to Heisenberg (1958), with the implication that one cannot observe nature 
itself, only nature exposed to the methods of observation. Some even compared the observer -
interference with the Hawthorne effect – the effect that people change their behaviour when being 
observed – as its social science equivalent (Rosser, 1993; Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998). However, 
the notion of observation-interference has also been regarded as a simplified, albeit useful, 
representation of the underlying implications of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (e.g. Capon, 
2001).  
The other main feature of Heisenberg’s findings, referred to in 25 articles, is indeterminacy. 
Although the observer-interference dilemma holds its ground when examining Heisenberg’s work, 
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it is not the only lesson that can be learned from it. Heisenberg showed that the relationship 
between position and momentum was inherently uncertain, and could not be understood without 
appreciation for this uncertain relation. This indeterminacy has been compared to a variety of social 
and managerial phenomena, and was found to provide potential insight into these. 
This thesis has so far argued that the uncertainty faced by NTBVs can be considered in the 
existence of non causal relationships. This is similar to the indeterminacy principle. Indeterminacy 
has led Heisenberg to accept the loss of the laws of causality, and find an alternative, probabilistic 
approach to solve this. This indeterminacy on a venture or firm level has an impact on managerial 
decisions, but has also been recognised on a market level.   
Additional references to Heisenberg were made in articles that related the observer-interference 
argument to the indeterminacy argument (seven articles). Based on my own analysis of 
Heisenberg’s work I am of the opinion that this is a more complete interpretation of the concept. 
Interestingly enough, only three (Khalil, 1997; Dreschler, 2000; Szira, 2000) elaborated on this as 
an analogy; all are in the field of economics.  The remaining four articles merely made reference to 
this (i.e. O’Hara, 1995; Smith and Smith, 1996; Khalil, 1997/98; Bergmann Liechtenstein, 2000).  
The remainder of the articles used the Heisenberg principle in a variety of ways. Some used it as 
either a token of appreciation towards a new way of thinking (i.e. Katz and Gartner, 1988; Barnard, 
1996; Evans, 1996; Kober, 1997; Fabian, 2000; Gleisler, 2000; Mackenzie, 2000; Bogason, 2001). 
Others, which I will elaborate on later in this chapter, focus on dualities and paradoxes in order to 
understand social and managerial phenomena (i.e. McLarty, 1990; Bygrave and Hofer, 1991; 
Frosch, 1996). Some articles have compared the evolution of the developments in physics to the 
evolution of theories in economics, or organisation & management (i.e. Karsten, 1990; Ganley, 
1995; Calkins and Vezina, 1996; Chia, 1997). Israel (1999) referred to Heisenberg to stress the 
importance of language from a sociology perspective, and finally, Leonard (1995) aligned statistics 
and the influences of Heisenberg probabilities on game theory. An overview of the articles and the 
respective classifications is provided in table 7.  
In order to provide a concise overview of the use of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and to 
position this  thesis, each area in which references to Heisenberg have been found will be discussed 
in brief.  





MNGT. PSYCH. SOCIO. 
PUBL.  
ADMIN. STATS. TOTAL 
ANALOGY  7 7  1 2 1 18 
REFERENCE 23 23 10 6 3 3 68 
TOTAL       86 
OBSERVER- 
INTERFERENCE 
11 14 6 4 1  36 
INDETERMINACY 10 7 2 2 1 3 25 
BOTH FEATURES 5 1 1    7 
EVOLUTION 3 1     4 
CRITICS 1      1 
APPRECIATION  5   3  8 
DUALITY  2 1    3 
LANGUAGE    1   1 
PROBABILITY      1 1 
TOTAL       86 
PHILOSOPHICAL 24 30 9 6 4  73 
MATHEMATICAL 4  1 1 1 4 11 
BOTH 2      2 
TOTAL 30 30 10 7 5 4 86 
 
Table 7: Overview literature analysis on uncertainty-analogy in social sciences 
3.2.1 Analogy in economics 
Uncertainty has been a central topic in economics and financial markets. Within this broad field, 
comparisons have been made between the uncertainty residing in these markets and the uncertainty 
in quantum physics. Investors in financial markets deal with uncertainty and demand a so-called 
risk premium for the uncertainty associated with the investment.  
George Soros notably addressed the “uncertainty principle” in the financial field (N. N., 1993/94; 
Cross and Strachan, 1997). Soros is considered to be one of the most influential and successful 
investors and an acclaimed guru in the investment world (Nicolas, 1999). His financial strategy is 
based on an insight, borrowed from Heisenberg, about the distinction between appearance and 
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reality – and thus falls into my category of observer -interference. His alternative investment vehicle 
is aptly named after Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle : “the Quantum fund”12.   
The basis of his reference to Heisenberg and financial markets is the principle of market 
equilibrium. He refuted the existence of market equilibrium by arguing that it is “inherent in the 
imperfect understanding of the participants. Financial markets are inherently unstable, and the idea 
of a theoretical equilibrium …is itself a product of our imperfect understanding.” (Soros, in 
Nicolas, 1999: 10).  He argues that beliefs about reality alter reality itself, which in turn alters 
beliefs held by investors. 
This is in Soros’ view equivalent to the apparent observer-interference. The analysis shows that this 
view of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is popular in economics, as a total of 11 articles refer to 
this (i.e. Jordan, 1992; Rosser, 1993; N. N., 1993/94; O’Hara, 1995; Carter, 1996; Wagner, 1996; 
Strachan, 1997; Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998; Stanley, 2000; Capon, 2001; Cross and Strachan, 
1997; Phillips and Kaplan, 2001). Nevertheless, as the analysis shows, all the articles that mention 
observer-interference only use it as a side reference, which highlights the need for a more refined 
interpretation (Khalil, 1997) 
Others recognise the similarities between the uncertainty in the financial markets and the 
uncertainty in quantum physics, but highlight indeterminacy as the most pertinent result of 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (i.e. Buchmiller, 1993; Benhabib and Farmer, 1994; Benhabib 
and Perli, 1994; Benhabib and Rustichini, 1994; Kaas, 2001; Ravetz, 1994/95; N. N., 1997; 
Raftery, 1998; Bazard, 2000; Singh and Dey, 2002). Again, however, it is in most cases used 
merely as a side reference. Raftery (1998) however shows a similar appreciation of the Heisenberg 
principle as presented in this thesis, and elaborates that causality seems to be replaced by 
indeterminacy, which has implications for the methodologies used in economics. His view is that 
this impacts the precision in prediction. A notable difference with the uncertainty in this thesis is 
that whereas he describes a loss of precision in prediction, I attribute Heisenberg-like 
characteristics to complete uncertainty in the outcome of new technology-based ventures, and 
hence in cases where no prediction can be made at all.  
Recognition of similarities between economics and natural sciences have also been expressed and 
point especially to the notion that complexity and chaos perspectives may apply to financial 
markets as well (Ravetz, 1994/95; Singh and Dey, 2002). In these articles, chaos and complexity 
theory are seen as most beneficial for improving the understanding of how markets work. Ravetz 
(1994/95) in particular argues that economists should focus on chaos theory as an extension of 
Heisenberg’s principle, implying that Heisenberg’s considerations are a mere step towards the 
                                              
12 The Quantum Fund is a so-called Hedge Fund. A Hedge Fund is an alternative investment vehicle that seeks to create 
an absolute return, independent of market trends. The vehicle, by its structure, is enabled to utilise a variety of techniques 
(amongst which is hedging) to reduce the underlying risks of a security (Nicolas, 1999). Hedge funds can thus be 
considered as a vehicle that ultimately wants to eliminate virtually all uncertainty whilst creating an absolute return.  
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powerful framework of complexity and chaos, developed by the likes of Prigogine (1988) and Gell-
mann (1995).  
Khalil (1997) argues that there is a distinct difference between the uncertainty residing in the chaos 
in the market equilibrium and the uncertainty that stems from evolutionary, developmental 
activities. He argues that the two are irreconcilable, because they do not deal with the same aspect 
of the phenomenon (Khalil, 1997). According to Khalil there is a fundamental difference between 
two kinds of changes: developmental processes and dynamical fluctuations. Changes that refer to 
developmental activities refer to developmental processes and are expressed in the evolution of 
division of labour, technology and institutions, exemplified by, amongst others, Nelson and Winter 
(Khalil, 1997). Changes as dynamic fluctuations in markets are of a different order. Dynamical 
fluctuations in market equilibrium stem from market oscillations arising from “autofeeding 
expectations exemplified in the application of theories focusing on chaos” (Khalil, 1997).   
Khalil (1997) advocates a similar notion of uncertainty to that proposed in this thesis in the 
entrepreneurial developmental processes of NTBVs. The indeterminacy of developmental 
processes stems from the inherent uncertainty (i.e. Knight, 1921; Keynes, 1973) of what can be 
known through experience and our senses and hence is arguably analogous to Heisenberg’s 
principle of uncertainty.  
This uncertainty is of a different order than the indeterminacy of dynamic fluctuations, which 
according to Khalil (1998/1999) is based on a limited computational ability and thus follows a 
similar methodology as scientists who use chaos theory to model weather patterns. Khalil compares 
this with the laws of thermodynamics. According to Khalil the laws of thermodynamics are not 
fundamental laws as they do not apply to single molecules – similar to how the laws of market 
equilibrium only apply to collective activities of agents (Khalil, 1997). This has itself even been 
seen as a duality – between stable equilibrium and development (N. N. 1997).  
New technologies typically fall into the category of developmental processes and entrepreneurship 
(Khalil, 1997). Within this class, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle can be seen as potentially 
useful. Such developmental processes are non linear, and thus the past is not enough to predict the 
future (Boulding, 1966; O’Hara, 1995)  
Finally the development of economic theory itself has been compared to the radical developments 
in physics. At the beginning of the twentieth century, neoclassical economics was driven by 
outdated physics. Ganley (1995) argues that institutional economics should be re-examined as it is 
clearly independent of the neoclassical paradigm (which followed the outdated physics model). 
Institutional economics followed both natural and social sciences. Ganley concludes that new 
efforts by modern institutionalists should provide a more productive path to travel in the history of 
economic thought (Ganley, 1995). In addition to Ganley, Calkins and Vezina (1996) argued of a 
similar shift in paradigm in economic theory. Whilst both perspectives do not provide new 
workable solutions to economic theory, a strong appreciation for the developments in physics, in 
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comparison to developments in other fields (in this case economics), is apparent. I propose similar 
treatment for theories on innovation. 
3.2.2 Analogy in organisation & management  
General appreciation of influences from quantum physics has been expressed within the field of 
organisation & management (Katz and Gartner, 1988; Barnard, 1996; Fabian, 2000; Gleisler, 2000; 
Mackenzie, 2000). These articles argue for future research that should be directed to applying new 
ways of exploring phenomena in the field of organisation & management and thus confirm that it is 
worthwhile exploring the potential applicability proposed in this thesis.  
In organisation & management four categories can be distinguished where references and analogies 
emerge. Firstly quantum theory, where Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is explained as an 
observer-interference issue, the measurement problem has been addressed on a general level, but 
also more specifically on the level of research methodologies.  Secondly, from an indeterminacy 
perspective, the uncertainty principle has been referred to in cases of general appreciation and also 
links to chaos theory. The third perspective shows how quantum theory relates to the 
epistemological understanding of social construction. Finally quantum theory is used as a general 
reference to research confronted with uncertainty and paradoxes. 
3.2.2.1  Uncertainty: measuring, methodology and observer- interference 
Within the field of organisation & management, references to Heisenberg predominately concerned 
observer-interference and were used to explain how the act of measurement itself directly affects 
the results (i.e. Lingle and Schiemann, 1996; Thomson and Hunt, 1996; Glazer, 1998; Dove, 1998; 
Webster, 1998; Kogan et al., 1998; Oliver, 1999; Mintzberg and Westley, 2000; Holbrook, 2001). 
Hence this interpretation highlights the limitations in the techniques available for making 
measurements. These studies attribute Heisenberg-like characteristics to the notion that an observer 
interferes with the subject under study. Although this was an implication of quantum theory, it was 
not the essential point. Heisenberg showed the relationship between position and momentum was 
inherently uncertain, and could not be understood without appreciation for this uncertain relation. 
For example, as Schrödinger’s Cat demonstrated, it was not the observer who causes the 
uncertainty, but the notion that only after an observation can the state of a cat be determined, not 
before. As in the field of economics, the fundamental principle of this indeterminacy is not fully 
absorbed by the theories outlined above.  
Although this notion of observer-interference contributed to the respective fields, it does not 
convey a full understanding of the implications of quantum physics. Such works are characterised 
by a limited explanation of the quantum theory itself. The full potential of the findings in quantum 
physics have not been applied. 
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Within the context of the observer-interference interpretation, a notable reference has been made in 
the resource-based view of the firm (Scarbrough, 1998). However, the only point that Scarbrough 
makes relating to the Heisenberg principle is that observing means change. As this is the only 
article that directly expounds one of the main perspectives of this thesis, it confirms the relative 
newness of the contribution made in this thesis. A similar assumption on observation and change 
has been made by Kleiner and Roth (1997)  
A more concise elaboration of quantum theory relates to fundamental methodologies in social 
sciences. For example, Ledford relates Heisenberg’s principle to action research13 (Ledford and 
Mohrman, 1993). He refers to Reason who points out that action research abolishes the separation 
between the knower and the known that is central to the practice of conventional science. Subjects 
become co-researchers who not only know the purpose of the research, but also help to shape the 
research. Reason argues that since conventional objectivity is lost, the old quality standards are lost 
as well (Ledford and Mohrman, 1993). Ledford in reply argues that because the methods of social 
science are not truly objective this does not mean that such methods are now meaningless 
standards. By analogy he uses quantum theory of sub-atomic particles, in that the particles as 
subjects react to attempts to measure them (Ledford and Mohrman, 1993).  He further points out 
that physicists continue to make progress without abandoning methodological standards and 
without adopting a new epistemology (Ledford and Mohrman, 1993). A similar notion has also 
been expressed by Bradbury and Bergmann-Liechtenstein (2000).  
Ledford argues that qualitative research methodologies, such as action research, should be 
followed, thus embracing rather than rejecting the notion that an observer influences the situation. 
This interpretation follows the observer -interference argument, but provides new methodologies for 
dealing with it, without changing the epistemological underpinnings.   
In organisation & management it has been argued that research should be more flexible in its 
choice of technologies (methods) (Parkhe, 1993). Unlike natural sciences, which are more mature14 
and where theory outpaces practice, organisation and management science is still in its infancy and 
theory is struggling to catch up with practice (Parkhe, 1993).  
                                              
13 Action research is a methodology for participatory research. Within an action research cycle four phases can be 
identified: (1) Diagnosis and problem analysis, (2) Action Planning, (3) Action Intervention, (4) Learning (Warmington, 
1980). 
14 A chronology of commencement dates of leading journals in management exposes the discipline's infancy: 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 1956: Academy of Management Journal, 1958; Journal of International Business 
Studies, 1970: Academy of Management Review, 1976: Strategic Management Journal, 1979; Organisation Science, 
1990. These dates may be contrasted, for example, with leading journals in medicine (e.g., New England Journal of 
Medicine, 1812) and science (e.g., Scientific American, 1845; Science, 1880) (Parkhe, 1993).  
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Hence, Parkhe argues for more empirical methodologies and a greater emphasis on qualitative 
(what he refers to as “soft") issues; this is still very rare, as studies have shown15.  He illustrates his 
point by suggesting that Heisenberg’s principle of uncertainty attained a precondition for physics. 
Nevertheless such preconditions seem to rest on a deep understanding of central phenomena which 
he considers may be distant in social science (Parkhe, 1993).  His carefulness in attaining such 
limits however does not rule out a more flexible stance in organisation & management.  
These methodological implications seem to confirm the potential value of research that is not 
purely based on outside observation. As the remainder of this thesis will show, the proposed 
experiment deals with similar problems of accuracy and subjectivity, both from the methodological 
point of view in designing the experiment (merging case study research and a process approach in 
system engineering), as well as with regard to the experiment itself.  
3.2.2.2 Uncertainty: chaos, complexity and indeterminacy 
Within the analysis, most notably McKelvey (1999) has addressed the potential of stochastic 
processes. However, he emphasises the use of complexity theory rather than Heisenberg alone. 
Heisenberg is seen as one step in the evolution of the physics. “During the twentieth century the 
uniformity assumption gave way to a stochastic idiosyncrasy assumption in natural sciences, in 
which particle or microstate behavior is assumed to consist of idiosyncratic microstates which have 
some probability of occurrence” (McKelvey, 1999: 297, referring to Prigogine, 1962). McKelvey 
continues by noting that all sciences are slow in switching to stochastic assumptions, and refers 
back to Boltzmann’s suicide caused by the lack of acceptance of his statistical theory in 
thermodynamics.  
Whilst chaos theory can also be seen as a potentially relevant avenue to use for social phenomena, 
for uncertainty in  NTBVs I follow Khalil (1997) who states that entrepreneurial uncertainty is a 
developmental evolutionary process and thus is of a more quantum theory oriented nature. Whereas 
the statistical approaches of thermodynamics are ideally equipped for areas such as self-
organisation and management (Baltes, 2000; Bergmann Liechtenstein, 2000), Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle provides the additional notion of inherent uncertainty, and the fact that we 
simply do not know what the outcome will be, not just because everything is so complex.  
Within this context, Bygrave and Hofer (1991) make an interesting distinction regarding how chaos 
theory and quantum theory can contribute to entrepreneurship. “Chaos theory produces models in 
which outcomes are incredibly sensitive to changes in the initial conditions. As such it has the feel 
of entrepreneurship…  As an example: If Fred Terman had not fallen ill with tuberculosis when 
                                              
15 Parallel statistics were cited in recent papers addressing other areas of Academy of Management as well. Schwenk and 
Dalton (1991) found that over 72% of research in strategy relied on archival and questionnaire data. Noting that “One 
category may be notable by its near absence,” they concluded, “We recommend greater use of qualitative methods” 
(1991: 297). Quoted from Parkhe (1993).  
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vacationing in Palo Alto, there might not be a Silicon Valley today.” (Bygrave and Hofer, 1991: 
20). This elaboration implies that causal relationships are still the underlying reason for future 
states. On quantum mechanics they take a more observer -interference perspective and state, 
“Quantum mechanics is able to deal with systems that make sudden transitions. Among other 
things, it is able to predict the appearance of particles, and explain how particles tunnel through 
seemingly impenetrable barriers. Again, it has charming parallels to entrepreneurship. Recently, 
Baumol (1991) suggested that rather as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle imposes limits on 
observing quantum events, so too there are limits on observing mega-entrepreneurial events of the 
kind that create new industries. Each one is unique. If you could describe it completely, you could 
replicate it and it would become management instead of entrepreneurship.” (Bygrave and Hofer, 
1991: 20). Whilst the observer-interference explanation of quantum mechanics, as previously 
discussed, has its weaknesses, the duality that emerges between management and entrepreneurship 
becomes apparent. From this perspective it seems that the equilibrium oriented chaos theory  
(Khalil, 1997) seems more oriented towards managerial activities in the sense of Penrose (1959), 
whereas the entrepreneurial activities , such as venturing new technologies, seems to bear stronger 
comparison with the inherent uncertainty in quantum mechanics. Frosch (1996) stressed a similar 
duality between operations and development and referred to Heisenberg to point out that 
coordination is an important factor. In other words, for new technology-based ventures, as soon as 
the relationships between action and performance are clear, managerial activities seem to apply, 
however if the causality does not exist yet, the entrepreneurial function is paramount.  
From an indeterminacy point of view, a general appreciation of the use of quantum theoretical 
concepts is apparent. This stems not only from the short references (i.e. DeTienne, 1994; Coates, 
1995; Barnard, 1996; Grint 1997; Mutch, 2000), but also from more refined elaborations which 
advocate this kind of research (Parkhe, 1993; McDaniel and Walls, 1997; McKelvey, 1999). This 
appreciation supports the efforts laid out in this thesis.  
However, taking the existing references and analogies together, they all seem to argue from a 
philosophical perspective and stop at the point where they promote looking into these areas. 
Nevertheless, in physics Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle proved particularly valuable as a 
workable solution, despite the philosophical debates, which can be seen in numerous applications 
such as materials, bombs and quantum computing.  
On the philosophical side, questioning the nature and existence of true uncertainty, the debate is 
still ongoing. The literature analysis shows that this is indeed the first thesis that aims to take the 
Heisenberg principle a step further and explore a potential and workable solution for uncertainty 
associated with NTBVs. 
3.2.2.3 Uncertainty: emerging new perspectives 
One of the essential differences between classical physics and quantum theory is the denial of the 
objective reality of the external world by the Copenhagen interpretation (Davies, 1989). Or as 
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Heisenberg puts it: “In the experiments about atomic events we have to do with things and facts, 
with phenomena that are just as real as any other phenomena in daily life. But the atoms or 
elementary particles themselves are not as real; they form a world of potentialities or possibilities 
rather than one of things or facts” (Heisenberg, 1958). This is in contrast with the classical 
scientists who believe their investigations refer to something real ‘out there’. 
In contrast to the social constructivist view, the positivist view in organisation science aims to 
study organisations as a reality ‘out there’. Pugh stated that the “universe is replete with regularities 
and ultimately, the appeal to empirical ‘data’ is fundamental to the enterprise of organisational 
analysis.” He makes the ontological assumption that people and organisations exist as relatively 
concrete entities (Pugh 1983, quoted in Chia, 1997: 694). He argues that, in comparison to nuclear 
physics, this meta-debate does not add to the functionalist aspects of theory development. Pugh 
compares it to the situation of a nuclear physicist telling a materials engineer that a steel bar is just 
a series of pulsating energy waves when the latter just wanted to calculate the stresses and strains to 
see how it holds up the roof (Chia, 1997). The most significant product of these initiatives in 
organisational analysis has been the development and articulation of the contingency approach 
(Chia, 1997).   
Chia, who compares the evolution of physics to a paradigmatic shift in social sciences, disagrees 
with this view. He argues that as a consequence of the challenges posed by quantum theory to our 
understanding of particle physics, the positivist way of thinking fell out of favour in the natural 
sciences with the introduction of Einstein’s relativity and more pointedly with Heisenberg's 
principle of indeterminacy and Bohr's quantum postulate. Chia refers to Bohr, who writes: “...the 
quantum postulate implies that any observation of … phenomena will involve an interaction with 
the agency of observation not to be neglected. Accordingly, an independent reality in the ordinary 
physical sense can neither be ascribed to the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation … an 
unambiguous definition of the state of the system is naturally no longer possible, and there can be 
no question of causality in the ordinary sense of the word.” (Bohr, in Chia, 1997: 696).  
For new technology-based ventures, this implies that they should not deal with new technologies 
when it is absolutely uncertain what the outcomes of such technologies are. I follow Chia, that this 
comparison between nuclear physicist and mechanical engineer can be disputed as having no 
functionality. Pugh’s assumption taken to the extreme would seriously hamper creativity and 
radical innovation from new technologies, as he seems to advocate only considering technologies 
that already have a reasonably predictive outcome and thus a functionality.    
Bohr’s statement above shows similarities with the social constructivist perspective and its 
underlying ontology. Since the state cannot be described, there is no state.  The only state that exists 
is the state that is socially constructed in experiments. Miller and King (1998) point out a similarity 
between the uncertainty principle and the work of Giddens on social construction. In addition, 
DeTienne (1994) argues that the next generation of organisation study scholars show an increasing 
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appreciation for concepts taken from  physics, for instance, as a number of researchers are 
embracing theories such as chaos theory and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.  
DeTienne relates this to an increase in support for contingency-like theories in other physical 
sciences (DeTienne, 1994). The natural scientists seem to be moving further and further away from 
an agreement on a paradigmatic theory. He concludes that time will tell whether these will be short 
revolutions into less-functionalist paradigms or if physical scientists will turn to a less paradigmatic 
approach (DeTienne, 1994).  However, as previously discussed, contingency theories still assume 
underlying causal relationships. To fully adopt the Heisenberg uncertainty principle is to lose this 
causality, which results in probabilistic processes.  
Another view that elaborates on the emergence and potential of a new paradigm based on a 
comparison to quantum theory has been expressed by Zohar and Marshall (1993). Their work 
comprises a comprehensive explanation of quantum theory, on which they build principles for the 
new science of society (Zohar and Marshall, 1993; Zohar, 1998). They intend to open up 
possibilities for developing a true democratic community, securely grounded in the quantum theory 
understanding of matter and potential that arose from those same experiments (Evans, 1996). Zohar 
and Marshall present their concept of the quantum society as a fundamentally new social reality to 
replace the mechanistic model.  
These works show an initial appreciation for perspectives taken from quantum theory and for 
further exploratory research. Though reviewed as not being utopian (Evans, 1996) but thought 
provoking, the contents of the work and analogies made between physics and society lack the 
strength of direct application. Quantum theory and the fundamental implications became successful 
by the quantum mechanic applications. Zohar and Marshall do not provide concrete applications to 
implement their quantum society vision.  
3.2.2.4 Uncertainty: paradoxes and duality 
An interesting example of increased similarities between quantum theory and organisation & 
management approaches is the emerging appreciation of paradoxical relationships. The 
acknowledgement of contradicting perspectives and bridge building has also been compared to 
Heisenberg’s concept. This was noted in the discussion on relating quantum theory to other natural 
sciences (Fabian, 2000). Discomfited by the realisation of contradictory assumptions about the 
nature of the world, Fabian argues for more debates on understanding these models and paradoxes 
for managerial phenomena (Fabian, 2000).  
The appreciation for paradoxes in social sciences has strongly increased over the past decades. A 
paradox was also the starting point for the Copenhagen interpretation (Heisenberg, 1958). 
Paradoxes occur in the simultaneous existence of two inconsistent states, such as innovation versus 
efficiency, collaboration versus competition, or new versus old (Eisenhardt, 2000).  
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Organisation and management sciences show a shift away from compromising between the two 
(i.e. contingency theories) towards the acceptance of simultaneously holding the two states 
(Eisenhardt, 2000).  As Eisenhardt argues, “This duality of coexisting tensions creates an edge of 
chaos, not a bland halfway point between one extreme and the other. The management of this 
duality hinges on exploring the tension in a creative way that captures both extremes, thereby 
capitalizing on the inherent pluralism within the duality”  (Eisenhardt, 2000: 703).  
Cameron and Quinn claimed that by exploring paradoxes, researchers might move beyond 
oversimplified and polarised notions to recognise the complexity, diversity, and ambiguity of 
organisational life (Quinn, 1988; Quinn and Cameron, 1988). They argue for thinking in paradoxes 
as this offers a potentially powerful framework for examining the impacts of plurality and change, 
aiding understandings of divergent perspectives and disruptive experiences (Lewis, 2000). Such 
paradox perspectives favour conceptions of change and pluralism that are more consistent with 
non-linear notions like chaos and complexity, as opposed to a more Newtonian view of the world 
(Eisenhardt, 2000). The use of paradoxes appears increasingly in organisation studies, often to 
describe conflicting demands, opposing perspectives, or seemingly illogical findings (Lewis, 
2000)16.  
This stream of research complements what the Copenhagen interpretation did for quantum theory. 
However the acceptance and appreciation of paradoxes in organisation and management sciences 
has not yet explored the potential of the successful conceptual contribution of quantum mechanics 
within the context of enhancing the understanding of uncertainty. Nevertheless, a first attempt has 
been noted on a potential duality that has similarities to the Heisenberg principle, from an R&D 
perspective on vision and operations (Frosch, 1996). Although he mentioned it as a mere reference 
and potentiality, it indicates an increasing appreciation for the use of dualities in understanding 
phenomena in social sciences. 
3.2.3 Analogy in other fields  
The remainder of the literature reveals references and analogies to Heisenberg in the fields of 
sociology, psychology, public administration and statistics. Most of these articles showed similar 
considerations to those discussed in the field of economics and organisation & management. For 
example, in psychology the dominant interpretation of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle stems 
from the observer-interference dilemma (i.e. Bleedorn, 1993; Montgomery et al., 1993; Vinten, 
1994; Hayes, 1997).  
Notably, Johnson and Cassell (2001) and Lawson (1994) elaborate on the methodological and 
epistemological implications of this observer-interference dilemma. For example, in organisational 
                                              
16 This appreciation in the community of organisation and management sciences is also highlighted by the prestigious 
Academy of Management ‘Best paper’ award given to Lewis for her comprehensive guide in exploring paradoxes. 
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psychology, Johnson claimed it would seem that social constructivism has a longer history in the 
natural sciences. He suggests social constructivist ideas were already expressed by Heisenberg’s 
(1958) uncertainty principle – that it is impossible to study something without influencing what is 
seen. What a scientist observes is not independent of the process of observing but is an outcome of 
the scientists’ methodological interaction with, and conceptual constitution of, objects of 
knowledge (Johnson and Cassell, 2001). Smith and Smith (1996) extend this notion and relate it to 
Lewis’s (1963) well known field theory, but deny an analogy, because “...the interbehavioral field 
provides for objective observation which may or may not involve self-reference whereas the 
quantum field, which uses the interbehavioral field for its framework, insists on experimental 
procedures involving self -reference exclusively” (Smith and Smith, 1996: 18). Nevertheless, they 
do point out that the field approach in psychology requires some unconventional thinking, similar 
to relativity and quantum mechanics in physics. An example of a recurrent methodology in 
psychology that shows similarities with quantum theory is the so-called Q-methodology (Knight, 
1994; Goldman, 1999), which “...attempts to cultivate a science of subjectivity where self-reference 
became a locus for understanding the human condition” (Goldman, 1999: 589). Based on these 
methodological efforts, statistical approaches have been applied in the field of psychology to 
understand this subjectivity.  
Similarly, the analysis shows that in the field of sociology the observer -interference dilemma reigns 
as the ultimate interpretation of Heisenberg, although it has only been expressed as a side reference 
(King and Suford, 1996; Miller and Fox, 2001; Roberts, 2000). Smith (1995) extended this to 
propagate chaos theory rather than Heisenberg, as we have seen in economics and organisation & 
management. The more extensive interpretation of Heisenberg in indeterminacy has only found 
ground in works by Boulding (1996) and Mueser (1990), but these references are simply an 
appreciation rather than an attempt to application.   
In public administration, the emphasis is on the appreciation of the conceptual ideas of Heisenberg, 
and seems to rest in a comparison to post-modernism philosophy and (i.e. Overman, 1996; 
Bogason, 2001; Evans, 1996). In addition Miller and King (1998) compare it to Giddens’ social 
construction theory, and Kober’s (1997) interpretation leans towards a principle of tolerance for the 
unknown. 
Finally, in the field of decision theory and statistics, Bordley examined a link between Heisenberg 
and the human violations of the probabilities. The influences of Heisenberg have also been 
discussed within the qualitative versus quantitative research debate. It is illustrated that both 
quantum physics and behavioural decision theory appear to have similarities in the manner in 
which an uncertain event cannot be decomposed into sub-events without changing the overall 
probability assigned to that uncertain event (Bordley, 1998). “These results suggest that the 
structuring phase of decision analysis - which specifies how various events are decomposed - helps 
share the subjective probabilities which will ultimately be assigned to those events” (Bordley, 
1998). However, as we have seen, the uncertainty residing in new technology-based ventures does 
not yet have these subjective probabilities on expected outcomes. This implies that tolerance 
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towards approximations and accuracy has to be taken into account in understanding new 
technology-based ventures.  
The remaining articles that address statistics merely refer to Heisenberg, showing appreciation but 
no direct application. On the confluence of economics and statistics, Lo (2000) elaborates on the 
randomness of financial markets and suggests a duality between the limits of future price changes 
if the forces of self -interest are at work. Leonard (1995) discussed the work of von Neumann on 
game theories and stated that von Neumann drew an implicit parallel between the probabilistic 
nature of social interaction and probabilities in physics. “A substantial part of von Neumann's work 
at the time, culminating in his 1932 Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, involved 
constructing a mathematical basis for Heisenberg’s theory. Now, with the minimax theorem, the 
prevailing probabilistic view of the world in physics was being reflected in von Neumann’s theory 
of human interaction. This is our first hint of the extent to which von Neumann’s view of the 
application of mathematics to the social domain was conditioned by the philosophy and standards 
of physical science.” (Leonard, 1995: 734).  
It seems as though the discussion on uncertainty has come full circle, where the decision theory 
approach is able to integrate the sophisticated quantum mathematical approaches to enable better 
prediction of social phenomena. However, as I have argued in chapter 2, decision theory and 
subjective probabilities such as minimax do not yet apply for new technology-based ventures, as 
the outcome itself is still uncertain. The references made here seem to provide a fruitful alignment 
of probabilistic processes for understanding social phenomena, and thus this work can be 
positioned as an initial step towards a potential new mathematical scheme.  
3.2.4  Implications and critics  
Despite the increasing appreciation for using quantum theory perspectives in social sciences, 
implications emerge on the level of analysis. The epistemological implications derived from the 
uncertainty principle in physics only apply to the micro-world and the sub-atomic level. It does not 
work in the macro-world, nor does it dispute classical physics. Hofstadter noted, “It is a total 
misinterpretation of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle to suppose that it applies to macroscopic 
observers making macroscopic measurements” (Hofstadter, 1985). Similarly, the notion has been 
expressed that the implications of the uncertainty principle “do not justify the attribution of post-
hoc meanings to measurements” (Korunonda, 1996).  
Nevertheless, from the perspective of a concept for uncertainty, it appears that physics has a much 
stronger foundation to sustain the division of the micro and macro level. Newtonian physics still 
applies on a macro level, and allows for many predictions concerning macro-events in the 
dimensions of time, space and motion. However, as Parkhe pointed out, social sciences do not have 
such a strong traditional framework as the classical physic s laws that sustained over 300 years 
(Parkhe, 1993). This becomes more apparent in the existing notions of uncertainty, which are still 
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ambiguous (Buchko, 1994). To assume that the physical macro-world is similar to the social 
macro-world is thus not appropriate.  
The level of analysis also becomes significant in the economics debate on equilibrium versus 
evolution. The uncertainty residing in fluctuations on the equilibrium in macro economy is based 
on statistical probabilities that only apply to a collective set of agents, but not to individuals 
(Khalil, 1997). Similarly, in thermodynamics, the patterns are arguably not fundamental as they do 
not apply to single molecules (Khalil, 1997). However, thermodynamics was the first area in which 
physicists introduced a statistical concept (Gribbin, 1991). Furthermore, the use of statistics in 
physics proved the key to resolving indeterminacy on a micro-level.  
Nonetheless, physicists themselves expressed their discomfort at applying the conceptual 
underpinnings of the uncertainty principle with the uncertainty residing in markets (Davies, 1989). 
There is an ongoing debate in physics regarding whether uncertainty is as real as Heisenberg and 
the Copenhagen interpretation imply. A similar debate surrounds the evolution of physics and 
economics. Knight noted, without reference to Heisenberg, that there is a distinct difference 
between risk and uncertainty (Knight, 1921). This however is not necessarily a general rule held by 
other economists. The evolution of the two fields thus seems to have parallels (Ganley, 1995). 
3.2.5 Positioning of proposed uncertainty concept 
The articles studied in the analysis show a tendency towards an increased appreciation for the use 
of concepts from physics, and more specifically quantum theory, in social sciences. With respect to 
the research question of this dissertation, a foundation exists with initial notions and ideas 
concerning the use of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, and the increasing appreciation shows 
potential future research directions.  
However, the analysis does not show any works addressing the specific uncertainty related to 
NTBVs. In fact, most articles did not go as far as to propose a workable solution and explore how a 
potential contribution might appear, but rather stopped by elegantly quoting Heisenberg and 
pointing out some philosophical similarities. Many works take a philosophical interpretation of 
Heisenberg’s propositions. This thesis on the other hand attempts to duplicate some of the success 
Heisenberg’s method had in making predictions under uncertainty. As mentioned, it is not the aim 
of this work to create a fully comprehensive mathematical scheme to uncover the specific 
uncertainties in new technology-based ventures, but rather to open up the field of workable 
solutions based on his work.  





CONSTRUCTING AN EXPERIMENT USING 
MULTIPLE CASE STUDIES  
“We have to remember that what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our 
method of questioning.” 
Werner Heisenberg, 1958  
4.1 EXPERIMENTAL MEASUREMENT REQUIREMENTS  
This chapter aims to evaluate uncertainty in technology venturing from an empirical perspective in 
order to construct a first experiment to explore a potential probability function. The experiment 
should follow the probabilistic process, proposed in the previous chapter, as a function of time. For 
new technology-based firms, the expectation is that, ceteris paribus, having dynamic capabilities 
increases the likelihood of improved firm performance.  
Performance can be relatively easily measured in terms of a certain chosen value indicator such as 
money. In line with the profit motive, the chosen indicator can be any relevant outcome that can be 
expressed using financial valuations. Examples are net profit, earnings and cash flow, but it can 
also be expressed in terms of other strategic expectations that a firm wishes to achieve. Based on 
case studies in the telecommunications industry this chapter will propose a particular financial 
parameter which can be used to develop and explore the probability function for uncertainty set out 
in chapter 3.  
It is however more difficult to establish equivalent numerical expressions for the abstract concepts 
of resources and dynamic capabilities (Teece, 1998). These concepts, by their nature, stem from the 
qualitative observations or subjective lens through which a firm can be conceptualised (i.e. 
Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and 
Winter, 2002). This means that any numerical expression of such concepts would imply a 
concession to the very nature and objectivity of the concepts themselves. Nevertheless, in line with 
Parkhe (1993), by using approximations based on empirical investigations this chapter aims to 
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approach such numerical expressions, with the recognition that these expressions are not unilateral 
but limited to the context within which they have been created.   
This chapter aims to sharpen the probabilistic process based on a multiple case study, and suggest a 
first potential measurement for the qualitative concept of dynamic capabilities. As the process 
model aims to study the effects on financial performance when this control variable is changed, it is 
necessary to ensure that the indicators used to measure dynamic capabilities are closely monitored 
against the current qualitative interpretations of this concept.    
4.2 CASE STUDY DESIGN 
The research design requires empirical data that supports the exploratory nature of the topic. 
Compared to other methodologies, case study research is better equipped to deal with the form of 
the research question as well as the limited control of the behavioural events and the focus on 
contemporary events (Yin, 1989). Case study allows the investigation of real-life events such as 
individual life cycles, organisation and managerial processes, and change (Yin, 1989). Case studies 
are defined as empirical inquiries where (Yin, 1989:23): 
• Contemporary phenomena are investigated 
• The boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident 
• Multiple sources of evidence are used.  
In order to come to a workable solution for this measurement problem, a multiple case study 
methodology has been applied in two comparable settings where new technologies are ventured 
(figure 17). I follow Yin (1989), who has established an accepted multiple case study design. The 
multiple case study design follows a replication-logic in order to provide convincing evidence. In 
this case the replication is focused on the development of a suitable measure for dynamic 
capabilities, by investigating the venturing process of new technologies in two independent firm 
settings. The cases are conducted independently, using data such as interviews, observations and 
internal documents that apply to the context of each case. Following a comparison of these studies, 
cross-case conclusions can be drawn.   
The cases are developmental in nature. Based on these cases, the next chapter (5) will develop a 
system that supports the proposed measurement. Finally, a first validation case (chapter 6) will be 
conducted. Yin stated that “…a major insight is to consider multiple cases as one would consider 
multiple experiments” (Yin, 1989: 53); thus these case studies can already be regarded as a first 
qualitative exploration of a potential probability function.   




































































Figure 17: Case study design (adapted from Yin, 1989: 56)  
4.2.1 Case selection 
Within multiple case study design it is vital to select comparable cases. Two large electronics 
manufacturing firms in the telecommunications industry were selected to provide requirements for 
the system development: Siemens and Company XYZ 17.  The cases chosen are both divisions of 
these multinational telecommunications firms. Both divisions encompass the complete venturing 
process, from introduction and exploitation to phase-out of innovations.  
The divisional level was chosen because a division represents a stand-alone firm with all the basic 
functionalities, within a larger conglomerate. Furthermore, following Penrose (1959), a productive 
opportunity requires a productive base which can provide that opportunity. The two divisions 
chosen already have an established productive base. The ideal experiment takes a case where the 
dependent variable dynamic capability changes ceteris paribus. In order to develop such an 
approximation, it is more appropriate to take a more established new technology-based venture 
                                              
17 For confidentiality, one of the companies will remain anonymous. 
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instead of a start up firm. This is not to deny, however, that for such ventures this uncertainty is 
equally or perhaps even more important; this remains an area for future research.  
The following selection criteria were applied: 
• The cases operate in comparable new technology-based industries 
Both firms operate in the telecommunications industry. 
• The cases have similar innovation characteristics 
Both companies use new technologies in their output, such as telephone equipment, data 
equipment, satellites and underlying components. The character of the innovations of the 
two firms are comparable, and of an architectural nature. The (uncertain) outcomes of these 
new architectural configurations can be classified as products, services and solutions. In 
both cases these new configurations often result in changing business models, which can be 
innovations in their own right. 
• The cases have similar environmental conditions 
The firms are comparable as they both have a high market share in their respective 
operating environments (Switzerland and Greece). Despite potential cultural differences, 
both firms operate in comparable environment. Both Switzerland and Greece recently 
liberalised their telecommunications markets. Previously, both divisions were the main 
electronic suppliers to the respective national telephone operators (Swisscom and OTE). 
Liberalisation allowed new entrants into the market, which opened new opportunities but 
also imposed new threats on the divisions. As a consequence both divisions had to become 
more competitive.  
• Adequate access is granted to the researcher and a sufficient quantity of external data is 
available  
This is true for both cases, as described in the data collection section (4.2.2). 
4.2.2 Data collection 
Having selected the cases, relevant data sources need to be identified that are required for gaining 
in-depth insight in the phenomenon of uncertainty. There were six sources of evidence used here; 
these are listed in table 8 together with examples. The use of multiple sources of evidence, such as 
these, is a necessary condition for the effective execution of case study research (Yin, 1989). 
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SOURCES OF DATA EXAMPLES 
DOCUMENTATION  Internal memoranda, intranet and internet publications, internal and 
external presentations, agenda and minutes of meetings, internal and 
external reports, press releases and administrative documents (proposals, 
progress reports, administrative forms).  
ARCHIVAL RECORDS Service records, organisational records (charts, budgets, HR 
documentation), lists of names, records on previously documented 
projects, personal records. 
INTERVIEWS Semi-structured interviews, informal interviews, open ended interviews.  
DIRECT OBSERVATION  Site observation including workshops, meetings, corporate conferences. 
PARTICIPANT-OBSERVATION Workshop attendance, dedicated workshop facilitation. 
PHYSICAL ARTEFACTS Technologies, products as well as operational support devices. 
Table 8: Multiple data sources and examples 
To ensure replication, data was collected using a variety of sources and methods for each individual 
case (Yin, 1989). An overview is provided in table 9.  
    DATA SOURCES 




Oct 00 - 
Jan 02 













N = 2 
 
N = 1 
N = 2 
N = 1 
N = 1 
N = 2 










Oct 00 - 
Jan 02 















N = 2  
 
N = 2 
N = 2 
N = 2 
N = 2 






Table 9: Description of methods used: timeline and data sources18 
                                              
18 The data collection phase of this study took place in the context of the EU -funded Genesis Project.  
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4.2.3 Data analysis: validity, reliability and generalisability  
The qualitative data has been analysed in order to derive an initial measurement procedure for 
dynamic capabilities. The results are “grounded” in the data analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989; 1991; 
Glaser, 1967), which is characterised by a continuous comparison of the data collected against the 
existing theories. Given the early stages of theory development on dynamic capabilities, the logic 
of this comparative approach is best suited to support an exploratory study. This method has 
already been successfully used in the emergent field of continuous innovation (e.g. Burgelman, 
1991; Leonard-Barton, 1995; Brown, 1997), and it is consistent with the challenges of theory 
development in the field of organisational capabilities (Verona, 1999). It can be hard to develop 
normative prescriptions on capabilities from cross-sectional studies (Henderson, 1990). 
Organisational capabilities are the result of complex processes involving the accumulation of small 
decisions and actions undertaken over many years in a situation of great uncertainty. 
The purpose of case studies is to provide rich contextual evidence that, in combination with the 
theoretical constructs, can create conceptual advances for enhancing our understanding of 
uncertainty and managerial decision-making in NTBVs. The nature of this research is exploratory, 
and follows an instrumental approach where the cases play a secondary and supportive role to the 
concept building process (Stake, 1998). Nevertheless it is important to have sufficient quality 
criteria to ensure that validity can be achieved. Yin defines the quality criteria for case study 
research on four levels: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability.  
The construct validity relates to the establishment of “correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied” (Yin, 1989: 40). Yin specified two distinct steps that have to be met in order to 
satisfy the construct validity: (1) “select the specific types of changes that are to be studied”, and 
(2) “demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific types of 
changes that have been selected.” The literature review reported in chapter 2 and the conceptual 
advances derived from this study (chapter 3) specify the critical changes in new technology-based 
venturing where uncertainty is observed. In addition to this review, this chapter will follow the 
tactics set out by Yin in using multiple sources of evidence to further develop these ideas. The 
construct validity of the developments prepared in this chapter will be evaluated using a 
longitudinal case study in chapter 6. 
Internal validity relates to the establishment of causal relationships. Yin argues that internal validity 
does not apply to exploratory research, as such studies do not involve making causal statements. 
Nevertheless, Leonard-Barton, who advocates the longitudinal case study with multiple sites as an 
effective methodology for exploratory research, does address the issue of internal validity 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990). The specific methodological combination of a longitudinal single site, and 
retrospective multiple sites (used in chapter 6) provides an additional advantage derived from the 
ability to move back and forth between the two settings and thus “formulating theory in one setting 
and then immediately placing the embryonic ideas in the context of the other kind of study for 
potential disconfirmation” (Leonard-Barton, 1990: 259). This research project applies an adapted 
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logic, and the designated technique of pattern matching (Yin, 1989) by engaging in the exploration 
of potential probability relationships rather than confirming or rejecting a proposed causal 
relationship.   
External validity establishes the domain to which the findings can be generalised (Yin, 1989). Case 
study research is a qualitative methodology as opposed to quantitative methodology using 
statistical techniques.  Case studies therefore produce only limited generalisation opportunities 
(Yin, 1989). Case studies are similar to experiments in that they are “generalisable to theoretical 
propositions and not to populations or universes” (Yin, 1989: 21). The generalisation thus takes an 
analytical rather than a statistical generalisation (Yin, 1989).  
The generalisation or external validity of this research project relates to the multiple case studies 
executed on the topic of uncertainty. Nevertheless, as the theory is in an embryonic state (Leonard-
Barton, 1990), the exploratory nature of the study does not aim to create a general theory. Instead 
this research project sets out to explore conceptual contributions to the understanding of 
uncertainty within the framework of dynamic capabilities, for which the contribution at this initial 
stage can be attributed to local theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus the replication logic, albeit existing, 
has no priority over the evidence required to explore the research question.  
Finally, the reliability of the study relates to the extent to which the study design demonstrates that 
the operations of the study can be repeated with the same results (Yin, 1989). Yin advocates two 
tactics for increasing reliability: using a case study protocol, and using a case study database. As 
previously mentioned, the exploratory nature implicitly led to a more reflexive and hence less 
systematic approach to data analysis (Tesch, 1990). Nevertheless, this research project has 
introduced more systematic data collection mechanisms such as the establishment of process 
models according to a specified methodology (N. N., 2000a) to allow for the effective capturing of 
data that is essentially repeatable. More details on this approach are provided in chapter 4. 
Furthermore, the conceptual developments preceding the case studies are based on a systematic 
literature review and are thus also repeatable. Furthermore, numerous reports have been written 
throughout the length of the study, leaving a paper trail that allows for effective auditing (Yin, 
1989). Finally, most interviews have been transcribed and maintained in a database.   
The validity, reliability and generalisability arguments will be further addressed in chapter 6, which 
reports on the validation. 
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4.3 BACKGROUND OF THE CASES 
4.3.1 Case 1: Siemens Enterprise Networks division Switzerland 
Siemens is a multinational electrical engineering and electronics company employing over 440,000 
employees in over 190 countries. Siemens qualifies as an innovative firm as 80 % of their offerings 
have been developed over the past five years. Furthermore the investments made in R&D exceed 
€5 billion and approximately 49,000 employees are engaged in R&D. The revenues stem from six 
business segments: energy, industry, healthcare, transportation, lightning, and information & 
communications.  
The case specifically focuses on one of the high tech subsidiaries of Siemens, namely Siemens 
Enterprise Networks in Switzerland. Enterprise Networks is part of the Information & 
Communications (I&C) business unit. Siemens Switzerland head office is located in Zurich and 
employs 3900 people. The annual turnover of Siemens Switzerland was €1.1 billion in 1999, with 
the Enterprise Networks department accounting for an annual turnover of €160 million. The 
turnover rose 69% in the accounting period from September 1998 to September 1999. During this 
time, the Enterprise Networks department employed approximately 500 people. The department 
provides tailor-made information and communication solutions in five major areas: Voice 
Networks, Data Networks, Application (Hardware and Software) Services, and recently Converged 
Networks (Voice over Data Networks).  
Traditionally the national subsidiaries of Siemens are sales outlets of Siemens Group. However, the 
I&C division in Switzerland is different in that it also strongly engages in R&D activities: 
• The R&D budget is €51 million  
• €8 million is allocated to the Information and Communication Enterprise Networks division 
(ICE) at Siemens Switzerland, especially in the Voice-over Internet Protocol (VoIP) section.  
4.3.2 Case 2: Company XYZ 
The second company that took part in the case study for system design will be referred to as 
company XYZ.  XYZ is the largest manufacturer of telecommunications equipment and 
information systems in Greece. In co-operation with its business partners, consisting of 
manufacturers, suppliers, sub-contractors and engineering offices around the world, the company 
provides products and services to the Greek public and private sectors, while developing a 
significant international presence. The company currently employs 2300 people.  
XYZ’s activities are mainly focused on three business sectors: Telecommunications, Energy 
Management and Defence Electronics. Within this framework, the company provides products as 
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well as integrated services for design, manufacture, turn-key project implementation and support in 
the areas of Public Telecommunication Networks, Public Telephony Systems, Telecommunication 
Systems Software, Integrated Business Networks, Operations Support Systems, Digital Satellite 
Technology, Terminal Equipment, Telematic Applications and Defence Systems. 
In the Greek market, XYZ is the main telecommunications hardware and software supplier of the 
Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation (OTE). Internationally, XYZ concluded various 
agreements in 1999 with established organisations in Romania, Moldova and Armenia and 
undertook the construction of telecommunications infrastructure networks in Ukraine and Bulgaria. 
Additionally, by establishing joint ventures and subsidiaries, the company has strengthened its 
presence in Russia, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Albania, Cyprus, the USA and Middle East.  
The company’s sales during the period 1995-1999 came to €1.05 billion and are expected to reach 
€3.8 billion in the period 2000-2004. At the same time, the 1995-1999 exports amounted to €300 
million (29% of sales in 1999). At present, XYZ’s products are sold in over 40 countries. The 
company’s objective is to boost exports to €1.5 billion or 40% of its sales in the next five years. 
XYZ’s local and global business activities are conducted in co-operation with its business partners, 
consisting of customers, suppliers, contractors and engineering offices around the world. Its 
business processes related to these activities cross local enterprise boundaries to interact with other 
related activities of organisations within XYZ’s Global Partners Network. Operating within such an 
enterprise network means facing an increasingly changing environment, as well as managing a 
large variety of products and processes and a vast amount of information spread across the different 
business units.  
4.4 CROSS CASE ANALYSIS: A RESOURCE-BASED PERSPECTIVE TO 
NEW TECHNOLOGY-BASED VENTURING  
This section describes the integrated findings of the case studies. Both case studies were carried out 
simultaneously, and some joint development workshops have been carried out, which provided 
additional data that is not classifiable to either one case. Therefore the joint findings are directly 
reported and the individual findings have been integrated as illustrations where relevant. 
4.4.1  Main phases of the new technology-based venturing process 
The venturing process in both cases is characterised by three main phases (figure 18). Based on an 
extensive process analysis in both cases it appeared that the venturing process can be split up into 
three distinct phases. The first phase represents the conversion of new technologies into business 
ventures. In both cases, the technological innovations can be regarded as architectural innovations. 
The second phase represents the insertion of the new technology-based venture into the main 
operational system of the division (i.e. the operations and sales processes). The third phase 
Constructing an experiment 92 
 
represents the exit of the venture from the operational process, which instigates either a spin-off, or 
the end of the venture’s life cycle. 
4.4.1.1 Phases of new technology-based venturing at Siemens 
For Siemens these phases became apparent when analysing the new technologies in the field of 
voice and data components. A dedicated VoIP competence centre existed in which the new 
technologies were developed alongside R&D facilities in Palo Alto and Munich.  
Within the division, potential innovations were explored in conjunction with the new business 
development department. These innovations are characterised by the new business models they 
gave rise to. For example, an innovation that could be used as a highly efficient tool for call centres 
allowed a direct interface between the phone calls being made, and the underlying database 
containing customer details. Such solutions typically required their own specific venturing process, 
which was tested in phase one. The early customers for such architectural innovations can be 
compared with the innovators category from Rogers (1962). During this phase the development 
centre worked in close co-operation with the client in order to develop the new architecture.  
Following these tests, and in a relatively short time these architectural innovations had to be 
expanded and adopted by the operational processes of the organisations. The innovations followed 
one another in quick succession and their average life cycle was not more than 9-12 months, 
according to internal documents. This fast turnaround was essential if any margin was to be gained 
on these products at all. This integration process was thus highly important for the success of the 
venture but also for the overall performance of the division.  
The final phase represented the phase-out of such innovations from operational processes. In 
Siemens’ case this usually meant the end of the innovation’s life cycle.  
4.4.1.2 Phases of new technology-based venturing at XYZ 
At company XYZ a similar pattern emerged. One example is the development of an innovation that 
provided internet access over satellite (IoS). Again, the nature of the innovation rests in the 
architecture, rather than the individual components. Both satellite technology and internet 
technology already exist, but advances in the individual technologies allowed for a new 
architecture to exploit these technologies in a new innovation. The venturing process of IoS can be 
conceptualised in similar phases.  
The development was instigated by an entrepreneur within the firm, who was also referred to as 
“the professor”. Similar to the 3M case, the innovation of IoS in the first phase was predominantly 
technology oriented and, in a large R&D project, developed together with potential user firms.  
This resulted in a typical business venturing process, which was subsequently taken up for 
exploitation by the large sales and marketing division. It soon became apparent that the innovation 
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was successful enough and ready for scalability. A separate new division was created to establish 
the innovation in its own right. During the interviews it emerged that this process was a typical 
innovation pattern at XYZ. 
4.4.1.3 New technology-based venturing from a resource perspective 
When analysing these three phases from a resource-based perspective the following characteristics 
emerge (figure 18): 
Phase 1 represents the development phase where new technologies are applied in new products, 
services or solutions (henceforward called innovations). Within this phase resources are allocated 
to develop processes that support the effective exploitation of newly developed innovations. This 
phase typically reflects the entrepreneurial services to the firm, where the creative response rests in 
new architectural configurations of advanced technologies. This results in a diverse range of new 
potential ventures.  The outcome at this stage is not a certainty as the potential configurations are 
unknown, as is the value that can be created out of these new ventures. Investments are typically 
very high during this phase. 
Phase 2 represents the integration phase, where the new ventures are introduced to the operational 
processes. From a Penrosian perspective this represents the phase where the entrepreneurial 
services contribute new ventures to the operations of the firm, or what Penrose calls the productive 
base (Penrose, 1959). The ventures potentially address a new productive opportunity. Whereas the 
operations of the firm typically require managerial competences, the entrepreneurial services 
require changes in the operations. These changes are frequent and thus the uncertainty is high. This 
uncertainty resides predominantly in the transfer of the architectural knowledge of the new 
innovations to the operational processes. Examples of problems found in the case studies relate to 
the restricted knowledge about new innovations. This knowledge is difficult to transfer to the 
people working in the operational processes as it is based on the complexity of the new 
architectural structures of the innovations. The operational side of the business remains reluctant to 
use these new innovations as the existing offerings are easier to sell and often more profitable in 
the short term.  
Phase 3 represents the “phase-out” of an innovation, were the critical interface resides in the 
effective resource reconfiguration in order to support the phase-out. In the phase-out two dominant 
options exist: 1) the innovation reaches the end of its life cycle and is replaced, or 2) the innovation 
gives birth to a long-term strategic opportunity and resources are allocated to build a new main 
operational process. Examples of the latter situation are apparent in the creation of new 
departments (for ventures such as IoS) or innovations in the service and consulting area.  


















Figure 18: Three distinct phases in the new technology venturing process 
In both the firms in the case study, it is shown that the uncertainty regarding the outcome of new 
technologies plays an important role within the divisions. A typical dilemma in both divisions is 
that although long-term competence development is important for the sustainability of the division, 
on the other hand the business opportunities arise in very short cycles and thus need to be dealt 
with appropriately and dynamically to prevent jeopardising the division’s existence. The venturing 
of a new technology typically relates to these short-term business opportunities. 
Both firms are engineering driven and the technological side of the innovations was not usually the 
main cause of failure. The uncertainty often resided in the architectural reconfiguration of the 
technologies (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson, 1993; Christensen et al., 1995), which was 
reflected in the new business models it gave rise to. The interviews confirmed that the uncertainty 
of these new technologies-based ventures rested in the changes required for integrating these 
business ventures into the mainstream business, and thus developing new business architectures. 
The divisions required to integrate these ventures time and again in the existing operating processes 
are similar to what Penrose (1959) referred to as the operating routines. Changes in these routines 
were essential if the venture was to have a chance of succeeding.  
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4.4.2 Dynamically reconfiguring the resource-base as a requirement 
The three phases from the case studies show that resource reconfigurations across functional 
boundaries are essential. The organisational structure is mainly split up into two areas: the 
operating side that effectively sells and implements innovations at customer sites, and the 
development side, responsible for producing new innovations. Resource reconfiguration and the 
effective transfer of knowledge about new innovations are hindered by these functional separations. 
The most important reconfigurations are those associated with the intellectual capital of the firm. 
This knowledge is mostly embodied in the individual employees. It was seen as essential to 
reconfigure the resources in new more efficient constellations in order to create an organisational 
advantage. Hence the managerial decisions on reconfiguring this intellectual capital are essential 
for the commercialisation of new technology-based ventures (Kogut and Zander, 1992; Kogut and 
Zander, 1996; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Teece, 2000).  
The interviews show that the challenge for the management is to effectively shift these resources 
between the various functional areas in a continuous manner in order to optimise the exploitation 
potential. In cases of architectural innovation a firm has to continuously redeploy its existing 
knowledge (Itami and Roehl, 1987). However the nature of these firms, as divisions of larger 
multinational firms, did not allow for ongoing and rapid shifts in function and formal positions. 
Despite this restriction employees did informally work in all parts of the processes and on various 
innovations, even though this was often unsupported by the formal processes and generally 
inefficient. The organisational structure alone is not a sufficient vehicle to capture information 
about which resources operate in which processes, since the processes cut right across these 
organisational boundaries. 
From a managerial decision perspective the uncertainty arises from the challenges in the effective 
and continuous resource (re-) configurations. This can be interpreted from a dynamic capabilities 
perspective. Dynamic capabilities are seen as the processes by which a firm can achieve new 
resource configurations (Teece et al., 1997). Interviews with the decision makers confirmed the 
importance of the existence of such processes, as this is seen as essential to not only the short-term, 
but also long-term sustainability to the firm.  
In order to arrive at a better understanding of the changes in the venturing process, a more in -depth 
analysis of the operating processes has been prepared. Three main sub-processes and their 
respective resource distribution (R) have been distinguished as follows: 
• Sales and customer oriented processes  – R1(T) 
• Specific innovation related processes  – R2(T) 
• Installation and after-sales processes   – R3(T) 
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The total resource distribution of these processes is the sum of the individual resources allocated to 
these sub-processes. 
1. Sales and customer-oriented processes 
The first part of the process represents the activities that concern the customer, such as 
sales, customer relations and lead creation. These processes are mainly concerned with 
motivating existing customers as well as getting new customers interested in the firm’s 
offerings.  
In comparison to the pilot activities in the development phase, which address technology 
enthusiasts such as the innovators and early technology adopters, these processes are 
concerned with scaling the technology adoption to a wider market, and exploiting the 
opportunity productively. Typically these processes depend on the customer base the firm 
already possesses. The study revealed that, for one firm, only 5% of the volume of sales 
came from new customers, whilst 95% were from existing customers. 
2. Specific innovation -related processes 
The second set of sub-processes of the specific venture activities are those representing the 
new business model. These sub-processes are integrated into the operational process. 
Functions that are active in these processes are typically characterised by a high knowledge 
on architectural and component level, and often have been involved in the development 
phase. Employees working in such functions include system engineers, sales engineers, 
consultants, project managers and bid managers.  
3. Installation and after-sales processes 
The third set of sub-processes relates to the actual installation of the new innovation at 
customers’ sites, and the after  sales and service processes. Employees typically involved in 
these sub-processes are technicians, after-sales agents, project managers, logistics 
personnel and consultants.  
Inefficiencies that arose from the process analysis in this part of the operational process were often 
a legacy from interface problems earlier in the process. For example, feedback loops (identifying 
that a certain process has to be repeated), which generally cost the firm a lot of money, were found 
in these sub-processes, but led back to interface mistakes earlier on in the process.  
The first interface problem emerges between the interface of these customer oriented processes and 
the actual innovation knowledge. The interviews confirmed that individual sales targets, rather than 
the effective exploitation of new innovations, generally drive these customer-oriented processes. 
Obviously the targets were more easily met by replicating sales pitches for existing offerings than 
indulging in time consuming learning processes to gain new knowledge about new products.  








Figure 19: Operational process – interface problems between three main sub-processes  
The sub-processes were seen as unsettled as the division’s offerings (i.e. new products or services) 
changed continuously. Both cases showed that the routine implementation of their new innovations 
and subsequent processes (developed in phase one) formed the main hurdle in successful 
exploitation of these innovations (figure 19).  
The case studies revealed that the main source of this unsettledness related back to the managerial 
decisions regarding the resource distribution in these sub-processes. The interviewees were asked 
to estimate how much time they each spent on each sub-process. With particular regard to the 
resource distribution over the three processes, the interface problem emerged on the confluence of 
functional positions (i.e. sales, presales, system engineers, technicians, etc.) and their actual 
resource distribution over the processes. The many feedback loops between these functional 
elements showed that the individual competencies were not optimally co-ordinated, and a lot of 
time was spent ‘fire fighting’ and in communication at other than the designated sub-process. For 
example, sales people were found to be unintentionally involved in the back-end of the process 
(system implementation at customer site), due to miscommunication throughout the process. Also 
technical expertise was often not utilised early on in the process, which led to poor judgements on 
the offers made to customers and resulted in high resource allocation in the correctional activities. 
As a consequence, technicians and engineers found themselves heavily involved in unnecessary 
administrative procedures, which in some cases took up more than 40% of their time. 
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These problems are reflected in poor productivity. The transfer of knowledge from the 
developmental phase into the operational phase left much to be desired, with the sales side of the 
operational processes reluctant to accept new ways of working, and development staff and project 
managers not having the means or resources to effectively integrate these processes. 
The speed of innovation and new product introduction made matters worse. The interface problems 
were not seen as temporary but structural, as new innovations entered the system on a continuous 
basis. Learning processes were not in place in order to allow for an effective knowledge transfer 
given the limited time-span of these innovations.  
Since integrating ventures into the operational processes is a routine effort (figure 20), the 
monitoring of changes in the resource distribution on a routine basis was seen as an essential 
measurement for this productivity problem. The decision to go ahead with either a sale or the 
integration of a new product into the sales process was dominated by the sales force and often non 
negotiable with the other participants in the process. Project leaders, identifying themselves as 
“customer care” employees, were quoted as saying, “…we cannot make a go/no-go decision; we 
just simply receive the project and have to deal with it, even if we know up front it will not be 
profitable.”  
This led to a great number of inefficient projects for a variety of reasons. Concrete examples of the 
problems were a lack of feasibility studies and a lack of communication with technicians before a 
proposal was sent out to a customer (resulting in a high rate of inappropriate equipment being 
found when the technicians went on site for installation). Many projects faced difficulties and often 
did not create a satisfying return.  
As the sales force was dominating the input of the venturing process, little pressure was imposed 
on them to venture innovative products and services, as the existing “older” products were easier to 
sell. This meant little incentives were available to make the necessary process changes to integrate 
new ventures into the operating system. 
 

















Figure 20: Continuous flow of new technology-based ventures in the productive base of the divisions 
This illustrates from a pragmatic perspective the need for dynamic capabilities. New ventures of 
innovative products should be continuously introduced and subsequently phased-out of the firm’s 
main operating processes. The development processes (phase one) build and provide the venture 
groups which are successively integrated into the operations department. The operational process 
should exemplify a single source of competence in, for example, marketing and selling towards the 
customer. The subsequent processes should then be continuously updated to allow the integration 
of new innovations.  
A coordination mechanism was required to make such integration decisions more effectively.  This 
coordination mechanism should allow for a negotiation between the technological and the sales 
competence of the firm in order to determine what combination of technologies would suit the 
customer best. The venturing process should support this negotiation and decision-making 
procedure. 
This can be seen as a confirmation that dynamic capabilities are required and thus supports the 
probabilistic process, albeit from a qualitative perspective. Based on this analysis it appears that 
managerial decisions should be geared towards building dynamic capabilities. Although the 
outcome of new technology-based ventures remains unknown, building dynamic capabilities seems 
to enhance the hit rate of commercialising these ventures successfully.  
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4.4.3 Venturing for performance: effective exploitation of the short-
term business opportunities 
Although the management of the divisions often regarded the outcome of the venturing process of 
new technologies as uncertain, it was clear what the owners (the holding company) wanted to see: a 
profitable division. Because of the frequency with which new technology-based ventures are 
integrated into the operating processes, it was important to have as many ventures as possible to 
create a profit margin that was satisfactory to the owners.  
In order to realise this ongoing stream of short-term profitable ventures, managerial decisions 
should revolve around coordinating the integration of new ventures into the operational system, 
also known as new business development. However as the interviews showed, managerial 
decisions were often based on prior experiences in integrating new technologies into the operating 
processes. Before liberalisation this was generally considered to be a stable, well-organised 
process. However after liberalisation, this turned out to be a tremendous challenge because of the 
competitive pressures. The case studies suggest that, as a result of liberalisation, the economic 
advantage orientation in the telecommunications industry moved from sales-based accounting to 
earnings-based accounting. 
New technology-based firms often face dec isions regarding the trade-off between increasing 
operating profits now, and investing in innovation to allow for profits in the future. Earnings are a 
firm-level performance measure. However, direct costs reduce earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation (referred to as ‘EBITDA’). Earnings will therefore increase if the 
organisation is able to quickly integrate component competencies, such as knowledge and skills or 
technical systems, into firm-level solutions. 
The increased pressure on earnings also arose out the rapid changes in the telecommunications 
industry. The holding companies of both departments were listed on stock exchanges, and hence 
subject to the scrutiny and measures used by investors. Stockholders of publicly owned companies 
are predominantly interested in two ratios: earnings per share (EPS) and price/earning ratios (P/E) 
(Tracey, 1996). EPS is net income divided by the number of common stock shares outstanding 
(Tracey, 1996). P/E is the current market price of a stock divided by EPS (Tracey, 1996). Hence 
the pressure is on the firm to provide quarterly figures that express profit and a solid P/E ratio, as 
such figures will be scrutinised in their published quarterly reports.  
Although new technologies may have to mature before adequate ventures can be built, the existing 
ventures still should produce enough capital to support this expensive endeavour.  
Whilst maintaining a highly innovative portfolio, it is thus important to keep each venture as 
productive as possible. The outcome of each individual venture relates to the long-term financial 
outcome. Based on the specific financial strategic considerations and targets from the holding firm, 
it would seem essential that the majority of the individual ventures create value.  
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In terms of a potential measurement for the outcome requirements, a certain managerial discretion 
is still required. During liberalisation, in both cases a shift of focus from volume to earnings 
emerged, which implied a changing perspective on the expected bottom line outcome. Holding 
firms may impose different performance indicators to express their subjective perspective on the 
anticipated value created. The value measures, as derived from the two case studies, were pointing 
towards earnings or profit but it has to be noted that these can vary from firm to firm. The 
requirements for the measurement system should thus include a flexible and subjectively 
interpretative value measure as the preferred output of the venturing process.  
4.5  DEVELOPING A POTENTIAL MEASURE FOR DYNAMIC 
CAPABILITIES 
The main requirements concerning a measurement for the uncertainty in the venturing process were 
driven by three dimensions: financial performance, dynamic capabilities and time. The uncertainty 
was pinpointed on the unpredictability between the input of the operational processes (resource 
configurations) and the output of the operational processes (finance). Although this relationship 
could be determined ex post when financial figures come in, ex ante no predictability exists. 
Furthermore, the changes in the resource configuration varied from venture to venture. Measuring 
these changes over time can contribute to understanding the dynamic capabilities of the firm.  
These three dimensions taken together can be used to interpret the productivity of the venturing 
process. The productive base of the firm is essential to venture new innovations effectively, 
therefore, new ventures require a productive base (Penrose, 1959). In new technology-based firms, 
the changes made to the venturing process to accommodate rapid innovations can hence be 
measured by looking at the productivity of the operational process with respect to new ventures 
entering the productive base.   
The dilemma interpreted from a pragmatic view is to preserve or improve productivity without 
losing the innovative capability. Productivity is a concept that allows measurement of performance 
and is regarded as being of vital importance for organisations (Drucker, 1991). Nevertheless, by 
innovating and trying new things, the control over productivity is effectively lost, as the future 
outcome of the innovation is uncertain. This has been regarded as an important dilemma, 
particularly in the dynamic environments of the case companies, where existing management 
information systems do not provide salience.   
A new measure has been defined which has been coined alternative productivity. This measure has 
been confirmed during a number of workshop sessions with the respective divisions. As previously 
shown, the input of the process at t=1 is not directly related to the output of the process at t=1, as 
the input renders productive services that will only be reflected in output later on.  
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For both parameters, however, set expectations can be identified. In order to achieve better 
productivity the resource allocation should decrease relative to the financial outcome. In the 
venturing process, when the venture enters the operational processes, it is expected that the amount 
of resources allocated to this venture will be high, and the financial performance will be low. Over 
time, however, the expectation is that the resource allocation should decrease while the financial 
performance should rise, due to the integration of the venture and optimisation of the productive 










Figure 21: Resource allocation versus financial performance over time  
A pattern can thus be created by combining both measures at certain points in time (productivity 
ratios) that together show a trend. Productivity typically describes a relationship between the output 
and the input over time. The basic productivity formula of the venturing processes for venture A 
can thus be described as follows.  




      OutputA(t) 
 PRA(t) = —————— 





Where:   PR  = Productivity Ratio 
   A = New Technology-based Venture A 
   t   = time 
   Output = Financial Performance  




As indicated by the case studies, the productivity ratio has now a defined output (a financial or 
value driven performance measure) and input (amount of resources spent on the new technology-
based venturing process).  
In order to measure resources, a value factor has been assigned. In both cases the cost factor of the 
resources was seen as most important. To allow for the fact that some resources are more valuable 
than others, a value factor has been incorporated, which brings a subjective element into the 
calculation of the firm. This value factor reflects the direct value consumed by the process under 
investigation and can be defined on a case-by-case basis. The value element that is of importance 
for a specific organisation can vary from the direct costs to the specific ranking or exclusive 
qualities a certain resource can bring into to the process. For example, there may be only one 
employee who has vital expertise in a certain activity; they will thus be more valuable to the firm 
than others.   
The value of the resource-input reflects the amount and cost of the resources consumed by the new 
venture during the integration period. This means that measurements can represent the amount of 
resources consumed by the NTBV over this specific period as a percentage of the total resources 
available to the firm. When these resources become more effective this should be reflected in an 
increase in productivity. For example, development staff are often needed to support the initial 
introduction of a new offering, although they would obviously be more productive in the 
development processes. The cases showed however that these people’s time is mostly taken up 
with fire-fighting problems in the operational processes as a result of poor integration efforts. If 
they were able to rapidly redistribute their efforts to the developmental processes a productivity 
increase could be achieved, providing of course that the performance of the venture remains intact.  
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This measurement is an initial proposition for the effective translation of the resource-based view 
to a numerical parameter. Although the resource-based view comprises many intangible factors, the 
case studies have shown that the most important measurement, in terms of monetary values, can be 
seen as the direct investment made to the individual processes in which the resources deliver their 
productive service.  
The output is taken as a strategic financial indicator attributed to the output of the new technology-
based venture. Again an allowance has to be made, as the value indicator is defined on a subjective 
basis, and stems from targets given by their holding firms. These output or performance indicators 
are typically financial in nature. Examples are profit, net contribution, revenue, financially driven 
key performance indicators and benchmarks of the new venture. 
Using these two measures over a (short) timeframe, which represents the integration of the new 
venture into the operations, produces a trend. I will refer to this trend as the alternative productivity 
trend (figure 22). Following the expectations emphasised during the case studies, the pattern should 





Integrating Venture in 
Operations
 
Figure 22: Productivity trend expectations  
 
This measure allows managers to dynamically determine the productivity trends of specific 
ventures. However, according to the probabilistic model, the uncertain outcome of new 
technologies suggests a dependence on the level of dynamic capabilities, with a more long-term 
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perspective. As proposed in chapter 3, dynamic capabilities do not guarantee short-term profits but 
should be regarded as a long-term competence of the firm. Firms that possess such capabilities 
show an ability to dynamically reconfigure the productive processes so as to enable exploitation of 
new ventures on a continuous basis. In other words, creating one successful venture (or one with a 
satisfactory performance) out of new technologies is important, but equally so is the ability of firms 
to replicate this success.  
In order to test the probabilistic process, a proxy for dynamic capabilities is required. Following the 
alternative productivity trend, an experimental measure has been developed using the case study 
material, and validated by both firms in workshops, to interpret a dynamic  capability by comparing 
multiple ventures.  
In order to explore a measure of dynamic capabilities, the alternative productivity trends of 
sequential new ventures can be compared and examined over time. A pattern can thus be created 
that potentially indicates if the firm is improving the integration process, or in other words, if a firm 
utilises a dynamic capability. 
A comparison between productivity trends shows the relative productivity ratios of a selection of 
new ventures that have been integrated in the operational processes. This can be done by taking, for 
example, a ratio from two consecutive ventures that are integrated in the operations during a similar 
timeframe. As a starting point, we can take the point when the venture is integrated into the new 
firm, usually referred to as ‘kick-off’.  
The case studies identified the first few months as crucial for the venture’s existence. Comparing 
these periods in the respective cases thus allows us to see any improvements made in the 
integration process itself. For example, a comparison can be made between venture A, with a 
critical phase from t=1 to t=5, and venture B, with a critical phase from t=6 to t=10, by creating a 
graph overlapping A(t) and B(t) in A(1-5) and B(6-10). It is essential that the respective points in 
time represent seemingly identical phases in the innovation life cycle.  
A ratio can now be calculated using the productivity indicator A and B at time (t): 
     PR B(t) - PR A(t) 
  DCA-B(ph) = —————————— 





Where:   DC = Dynamic Capability Ratio 
   PR = Productivity Ratio 
   A  = New Technology-Based Venture A 
   B = New Technology-Based Venture B 
   t   = time 
   ph = Integration phase  
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In order to measure two phases, it is important to remember that the dynamic capability relates not 
to a specific point in time, but to a specific phase of the integration process (ph). For example, if 
venture a starts at t=1, and venture B start at t=6, then ph represents the phase resembling both t=1 
and t=6. As this is the first measurement point that is compared we can thus say: 
 ph=1, for t=1 and t=6.  
In the example the following calculations can than be made: 
  DCA-B(1) =[ PR B (6) – PRA (1)]/ PRA (1)  
   DCA-B(2) =[ PR B (7) – PRA (2)]/ PRA (2)  
   DCA-B(3) =[ PR B (8) – PRA (3)]/ PRA (3)  
   DCA-B(4) =[ PR B (9) – PRA (4)]/ PRA (4)  
   DCA-B(5) =[ PR B (10) – PRA (5)]/ PRA (5)   
The five ratios can now be converted back into a trend that effectively compares the two 

















Comparing Venture A vs. B
 
Figure 23: Dynamic capability trend  
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The dynamic capability proxy can now be interpreted on a managerial level. When the trend is 
horizontal, the expectation is that this represents a stable dynamic capability, between the 
respective measurement periods.  When the trend moves diagonally upwards to the right it is 
expected that dynamic capabilities have been built or improved during the periods between 
measuring ventures A and B. Finally when the trend shows a chaotic or declining pattern this is 
expected to represent a lack of dynamic capabilities.  
4.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR AN INITIAL EXPERIMENT 
The proposed proxy for dynamic capabilities has obvious limitations and implications, as is the 
nature of any experimental measure. The line suggests that each venture follows a similar path into 
the integration of the operational processes. This can however vary as the nature of new ventures 
may vary. Some ventures can be implemented more easily into the operational system than others. 
If these are measured in the way shown above, the representation would not be an adequate one. It 
is thus essential for the experiment to select two ventures of both comparable size and nature, 
where real resource reconfiguration efforts are required, and new processes are introduced.  
Furthermore, the mathematical elegance of the proxy could be improved. The proxy for dynamic 
capabilities proposed here is kept as simple as possible. However this does not rule out future 
improvements by more refined efforts, by for example testing and applying different ratios and 
performing statistical analyses.  
These measures have been developed in conjunction with the two case firms, who both 
acknowledged their potential relevance during three sequential workshops. Even though clear 
limitations are already apparent, a next step is to carry out a first experiment to learn from these 
measures.  
Nevertheless, the proxy is only relevant in the context in which it has been created, and thus 
generalisation cannot be expected yet, especially since the important resource configuration in the 
case studies was predominantly of a singular nature. In cases where multiple resources play an 
equally important role – such as production facilities, equipment, stock, raw materials, or any other 
resources – the proxy will inevitably become more complex. 
The next section will describe the development of a system that aims to support the described 
measurement concept. Based on this system, an experiment has been conducted in which the 
probabilistic process model will be evaluated. However, in order to do so, it is also essential to 
evaluate the proxy for dynamic capabilities. Using qualitative analysis the existence of the dynamic 
capabilities in the experiment can be compared to the proxy. As this is the first experiment, lessons 
are expected to be learnt about the proxy as well as with regard to the probabilistic process model 
for uncertainty.  





DEVELOPMENT OF PROTOTYPE 
MEASUREMENT SYSTEM: XTREND 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to explore the proposed probabilistic process model, a supported prototype system 
(XTrend) has been developed for effective data collection and measurement in an initial 
experiment. Existing performance measurement information currently available to management is 
predominantly based on accounting, supplier management or quality management systems. Such 
systems utilise past data that may only become available to managers on a monthly or quarterly 
basis.  
However, managers of new technology industries have to make decisions in order to meet new 
business opportunities, for which the historical performance data may not be enough. As the 
literature study has shown, for such decisions managers rely on their judgement of these dynamic 
situations.  
Furthermore, literature has pointed to the importance of technology-based firms having the 
capability to dynamically reconfigure their resource-base in order to meet these new business 
opportunities that often occur and disappear in short cycles. Firms with such dynamic capabilities 
are expected to have a long-term competitive advantage over their competitors. However, there are 
limited measurement systems available that provide information on the relation between the firm’s 
ability to change dynamically and the performance created out of this ability. Moreover, there is no 
measure yet available that approximates a firm’s dynamic capability, so as to test the probabilistic 
process model.  
Based on the requirements from the case studies of chapter 4, this chapter will describe a prototype 
measurement system that aims to measure this dynamic capability, using a real-time dynamic 
information collection protocol.  
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5.1.1 System design 
The prototype system design follows a typical system engineering approach (Machol et al., 1965; 
Dandy and Warner, 1989; Blanchard, 1991). XTrend has been developed in order to complement 
existing information systems. The prototype development process is depicted in figure 24 and 
addresses the three main steps: requirement analysis, system development, and system 





Implement program to 
develop a system to 
meet the requirements
Implement program to 
develop a system to 
meet the requirements
Measure and evaluate 
the system in terms of 
compliance with the
requirements
Measure and evaluate 
















Feedback and corrective-action loop
 
Figure 24: Prototype system design approach (Blanchard, 1991) 
The first step in the system engineering approach reflects the requirement analysis. The data for the 
requirement analysis is derived from the case studies in chapter 4. The requirement analysis is 
aimed at supporting an experiment to explore potential measures for dynamic capabilities. Both 
case studies have actively participated in providing the relevant requirements through interviews 
and workshops. 
Following the requirement analysis a process has been developed to support the data collection 
required to measure the proposed proxy for dynamic capabilities. As the data required for the 
experiment was not obtainable through the existing information systems at either site a new data 
collection process was required. Additionally, a software system was developed to support the data 
collection for the experiment. 
Finally an initial experiment has been carried out in conjunction with key players from both firms 
to measure and evaluate the system with respect to the initial requirement analysis. This experiment 
is based on fictional simplified data, verified by the partners, in order to simulate a possible 
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scenario. The simulation allowed the system to be effectively tested and evaluated. An iterative 
cycle of action and reflection has been applied in order to complement the more traditional data 
collection methods, such as documentation, interviews and observations. Three consecutive 
workshops have been held with both firms to develop and refine the measurement procedures. 
5.1.2 Validity: feasibility, usability and utility 
To ensure the validity of the research approach of this section of the work, a set of output criteria 
have been adopted, stemming from a process approach (Platts, 1993). Platts argues for three criteria 
by which the process created (in this thesis the data collection process) can be judged and assessed. 
These criteria are feasibility, usability and utility.  Feasibility addresses whether the process can be 
followed, usability relates to how easy the process was to follow and utility concerns to the 
question of whether the process provides a useful step in strategy formulation.  
These criteria have been applied in order to establish the validity of the data collection method for 
the experiment. The main aim is to ensure the relevance of the chosen parameters and the 
measurement approach from a firm perspective. Focusing on the potential applicability in practical 
situations and thus integrating this pragmatic perspective in the exploratory conceptual context 
creates a solid basis for future research that is directed towards more workable solutions. The 
criteria for assessment are thus essential to evaluate the outcome of the data collection process and 
subsequent system, albeit in a preliminary prototype version. The criteria are embedded in the 
system engineering approach and the requirement analysis.  
Feasibility is achieved by repeating the process in different settings (Platts, 1993).  This has been 
an integral part of the workshops and several test sessions at the two case companies. In addition, 
various experts from both academia and industry have facilitated similar workshops to generate 
greater confidence in the measurements and the data collection process.  
Usability has been achieved through use of independent testing panels at both firms and an external 
reviewing board.  These help to ensure a minimum level of usability and allow for refinements 
throughout the development of the process.  
Finally, utility is achieved by the evaluation of a direct as well as an indirect output of the process. 
The direct output has been evaluated on the basis of the development and evaluation of a thought 
experiment (reported in section 5.4). The indirect output relates to the subjective perspective of the 
potential users, and was validated here through the execution of a number of interviews with the 
potential users.  
The validity criteria have been applied in order to ensure an acceptable level of validity to the 
development of the prototype measurement system in order to optimally enable the exploratory 
longitudinal study reported in chapter 6.  The resulting prototype also provides a basis for potential 
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future research in new ways of measuring intangible aspects of business and managerial decision-
making. 
5.2 REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS 
Some initial general requirements, based on the findings and the discussion in chapter 4, are 
predominantly oriented to the operationalisation of the proposed measurements and proxy in a 
practical real life setting.  
Firstly, because of the short timeframes in which new ventures are introduced, integrated and 
disbanded, it is essential that the system captures the data in real-time. It is also essential that the 
data is captured in a dynamic and continuous fashion. Therefore regular short intervals should be 
selected as the respective measurement points. For this experiment the intervals have been set on a 
monthly basis. 
A second requirement is the effective measurement of the allocation of individual resources to the 
processes. For example, instead of simply assuming that a developer spends the most of his time in 
development, this should actually be monitored. This requirement was also motivated from the 
employee perspective. Technicians, for example, did not like the fact that in some cases they spent 
40% of their effort in administration-related processes. The function description is thus not a 
guarantee for the productivity of the processes. The measurement of the resource allocation to the 
organisation’s processes should be performed on an individual level, rather than working with 
general averages and expectations that are based on the organisational structure and function 
descriptions alone.   
The XTrend measurement system should ther efore incorporate a technology that allows employees 
to easily submit their estimates of their percentage of effort spent on the venturing process being 
measured, against the other processes. An employee can thus allocate 100% of effort spent in 
specific processes and sub-processes, one of which is the new venture. 
In addition to the effort percentage, a value factor on what this effort is worth to the company needs 
to be incorporated. Obviously, the effort of a director or senior engineer is worth more than the 
effort of secretarial workers. During the case studies it became apparent that the value factor could 
be taken in two ways. The value could either be a cost factor representing a certain monetary value, 
or it could be seen as being relative to the total resources measured. By multiplying this value 
factor with the effort indicator an indicator emerges. This indicator (hereafter termed resource 
indicator) will serve as the input for the productivity formula 2 from section 4.5.   
Based on the initial requirements and the measurement proxies set out in chapter 4, the following 
data collection process has been developed.  
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5.2.1 Data collection process 
In order to obtain the relevant data for the construction of the measurements from the case studies, 
a data collection process has been developed. As described above, the data collection process has a 
dynamic real-time character.  
Two roles have been distinguished within firms for the purposes of this study: management and 
employees. Management data is concerned with two elements: set-up of the system, and input of 
the financial indicator. The resource allocation data comes from the employee side. Following the 
divisional character of the case studies, each division can be seen as a separate firm on its own, and 
is administrated like a profit centre.  



















Figure 25: Roles structure for data collection 
The system requirements reflect the flexible nature of the measurement requirement. The system 
should allow managers or administrators to create a variety of definitions for both the resource 
indicator and the financial indicator. As long as these parameters are in line with the uncertainty 
relation, the operators of the system should be able to work flexibly.  
The analysis of the data collection revealed a cyclical process structure with the following main 
activities: 
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• Set-up of the system, identification of: active periods, innovations (new 
products/services/solutions), the operational process structure, functions, departments, 
locations, relevant employees active or influencing the processes, and table of rights of 
usage for the system 
• Data input by Employees – resource distribution  
• Data input by Managers – financial distribution 
This process contains regular feedback loops based on the firm’s input requirements. The system 
should allow for flexible data collection at regular predefined intervals, i.e. data collected each 
month, week or day. This feedback loop implies a maintenance activity within the structure of the 
system, so that it allows for people leaving the firm, new people coming in, or the addition of new 
processes and innovations.  
To obtain regular data input an important requirement was the user friendliness of the system for 
both the employees and management. Ease of use for employees implied that it should take them 
no more than five minutes to fill in the data sheet.  
Furthermore, to prevent the system being misused – in terms of employees providing false 
information – employees are asked to distribute their time in percentages over all processes 
identified in the system.  A major concern was that employees could manipulate the accuracy of the 
data by providing a resource distribution that was favourable to their own situation. In particular it 
was evident that people would not reveal any personal in-efficiencies by allocating the percentage 
of their time spent on processes such as coffee drinking or surfing the net. In the interviews it was 
stated that, “…it should be prevented that employees get the feeling of being watched by big 
brother”.  
Allocating resource distribution in terms of percentages allows employees to more easily provide 
an estimate of their real time distribution that may vary from their contractual obligations. No link 
should be made to employee appraisals, or why they worked on a particular innovation when they 
should be doing something different. The system’s main intention is to create real estimates rather 
than exact figures, in a flexible manner, to create an understanding of how the operational process 
base is really used.  
The data collection process is depicted in the following picture: 



















































Figure 26: Detailed process structure for data collection 
5.2.2  Process step 1: set-up/maintenance of system 
The first step in the data collection process is the set-up of the system. To create a flexible 
approach, the system should allow the manager or administrator to define the specific 
characteristics of the division.  
The logical order for this is as follows.  Firstly, the manager should define the periods for which the 
system should be active. The manager should then identify the innovations in the integration phase 
(whether new products, solutions or services) and define the periods for which they should be open 
for measurement.  
Furthermore the process structure is defined. This structure represents the minimal three phases of 
the operational process stemming from the operational analysis. The division’s structure can be 
broken down into functions, departments and locations. This forms the basis for the identification 
of all relevant employees working in the system. Finally a table of rights should be issued to allow 
one or more persons extended access to the system (for example, process owners or department 
managers could be granted access to their specific reporting data). For confidentiality reasons, the 
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manager should be able to define rankings instead of real values to indicate the financial resources 
and the resource distribution values.  
5.2.3  Process step 2: data entry resource distribution 
The second process step represents the data entry for the resource distribution. All employees have 
access to the system and individually allocate their 100% time over the predefined innovations and 
processes. This user interface should be particularly easy to use and should take no longer than five 
minutes per employee.  
It is important to note here that the employees provide their own subjective judgement on the time 
spent on the relevant processes. In the case study it became apparent that it would be more useful to 
have their “thumb-feeling” of the resource allocation rather than striving for absolute correctness in 
the measure. 
Each employee will be issued with a username and password (defined by the manager in step 1), as 
to allow them to enter the data entry side of the system. 
5.2.4  Process step 3: data entry financial distribution 
The third process step represents the data entry for the short-term performance of the venturing 
process. The manager or administrator can provide a value indicator to each predefined venture 
(termed ‘innovation’ in the system) as part of the total. An example could be total profit and profit 
allocated specifically to the innovation under investigation in a certain time period. During the set-
up process the manager has the authority to identify whether the nature of the value indicator is 
financial (profit, revenue, etc.) or otherwise. 
The data collection process is an iterative process and is repeated on regular intervals. The set-up 
process takes the form of a maintenance process, so that changes to the process base, product base 
and organisational structure can be dynamically integrated.  
5.2.5 Organisational requirements  
The organisational requirements for the system relate to the level of detail by which data can be 
collected and processed. In addition to the measurements defined in the operational analysis, the 
cases indicated the need for more in-depth analysis of the results in case they varied from 
expectations. The in -depth analysis reflects the level of detail described in the set-up process step 1, 
where the complete organisation and process structure can be broken down.  
A breakdown of the data allows the companies to provide the resource distribution over the sub-
processes related to one specific innovation, and thus to optimally benefit from the data collected. 
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The three elementary sub-processes that have been distinguished in chapter 4 form the basis of this 
breakdown.  
Comparing deviations in the resource allocations over these three sub-processes over time will 
allow the manager or process engineers to identify potential problematic areas that require 
improvement. Large resource variations in the sub-processes can thus endorse specific action for 
change.  
This organisational requirement brings a third measurement level to the system that is oriented to 
support the effective building of new processes. An in-depth analysis to the resource configuration 
can pinpoint sources of uncertainty related to the resource configuration of the productive base of 
the organisation. This has formed a sub-element of the investigation of the research question that is 
primarily concerned with the enhanced understanding of uncertainty. It is not however directly 
related to the uncertainty relation concept and hence will receive only limited attention throughout 
this thesis.  However, the implications derived from this analysis for future research is important 
and hence it is included.  
5.2.6 Technical infrastructure requirements 
Next to the operational and organisational requirements, the system infrastructure of the cases plays 
an important role in the development of the prototype. These requirements stem from the legacy 
systems available in the divisions as well as the complexity of the computer infrastructure. The 
following main requirements have been identified: 
• The system should run on the organisation’s Local Area Network (LAN). The system 
should be a networked version and run on the central server of the organisation’s LAN, to 
enable accessibility for all employees and managers concerned.  
• The system should be compatible with a wide variety of Windows platforms, from 
Windows 98 to Windows XP and NT versions. 
• The system should be simple, with allowances for future interfaces to integrate existing 
Information Systems and a variety of databases such as Oracle and XML. 
5.2.7 Summary of the requirement analysis  
The requirement analysis provides the main system requirements for the development of the IT-
supported data collection tool. With respect to the alternative uncertainty concept, the uncertainty 
relation between the process and finance parameters has been further defined. The operational 
process analysis identified more detailed measurements which confirm the complexity and issues 
residing in the two telecom cases. In addition, the organisational and technical requirements 
provided the elementary system requirement for the prototype design of the data collection process 
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and reporting capability of the tool, with a specific focus on the usability and infrastructure 
demands. 
The main requirements derived from the analysis are: 
• Flexibility for customised interpretation of the performance.  By issuing a flexible 
parameter, firms are able to define their main strategic driver in terms of the value output 
of the venturing process. This could be earnings, profit, net contribution, revenue and so 
on. 
• Resource distribution as the main parameter for process performance.  The input of 
the processes is predominantly dependent on the (human) resources allocated to this 
process. Multiplied by the value (costs) of these resources, a distribution of the resources 
per individual over a selected amount of innovations and processes can be recorded. The 
sum of these distributions depicts the overall resource distribution and defines the second 
elementary parameter of the uncertainty relation.  
• Time element is essential to determine trends. There is no direct relationship between 
the input and output of the two parameters at one point in time. However the behaviour of 
these two variables at similar points in time can create a pattern that serves as a basis for 
developing a ratio.  
• Alternative productivity as a measure. Alternative productivity is the output divided by 
the input at a certain point in time. By taking this measure at various points in time a 
pattern is created that represents the uncertainty relation. These patterns can be reported 
and interpreted to enhance understanding of the uncertainty.  
• Comparing the alternative productivity patterns creates a dynamic capability trend. 
A comparison of a number of these patterns provides insight into the dynamic capabilities 
embedded in the firm. 
• The measures should be applied to that part of the venturing process where an 
innovation is integrated in the main operation process. This represents the most critical 
phase in the venturing process, and the patterns created during this phase visualise the 
uncertainty related to the innovations and the process portfolio.  
• Real-time measures are required. Whereas most traditional information systems only 
allow for such projections in hindsight, the system should collect and report the patterns on 
a real-time basis.  
• Frequent measurement points are essential. Short interval periods should be set to allow 
the creation and interpretation of these patterns to enhance understanding and create more 
predictability in the evolution cycles of these patterns. 
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• A comprehensive data collection process should be incorporated. Data is collected from 
two sources: employees and managers. Both play an essential role in the effective data 
collection process, and should be enabled to do so in a time-efficient and straightforward 
manner. 
• From an organisational perspective, it is essential to allow for a breakdown of the 
measures in the various elements of the organisation structure (functions, 
departments, location). Such resource configurations can reveal problem areas and hence 
enhance the understanding of what causes unpredictable patterns. The implications derived 
from such an in-depth analysis can contribute to future research implications. 
• Technical requirements for the system architecture. The system should be easily 
integrated into the existing systems of the company. The system should be accessible by all 
relevant parties from the LAN, and should be supported by the main versions of the 
Windows operating system. 
5.3 PROTOTYPE SYSTEM DESIGN – XTREND 
This section describes the core elements of the system’s architecture and functionalities using the 
process model. The system is a specifically designed software application that supports the data 
collection and reporting process of the alternative uncertainty concept. This section is split into two 
parts. Firstly, a description of the technical elements of the system will be discussed. Secondly, the 
data collection process and the functioning of the system will be elaborated, illustrating the 
functionalities of the system for each process step.   
5.3.1 System architecture 
The XTrend application is developed using WINDEV 7. WINDEV is a software development 
environment for Windows. WINDEV works with Windows 3.1 as well as Windows 95, 98, XP and 
NT. An important point for the ease of development and maintenance is that the source code is the 
same for all five Windows environments. WINDEV interfaces with most programming languages 
such as C, C++, Java, VB, Pascal, COBOL, and FORTRAN. 
XTrend is based on Client/Server architecture (see figure 27). Client/Server architecture means that 
the data is stored on a “server” computer, but can be accessed (read/write) from a “client” 
computer. The application and all data are stored on the server. When the user starts the 
application, it is loaded into the local memory of the PC. In a network environment all users thus 
access the same databank. However, it is also possible to install the application locally on the PC. 












Figure 27: Client/server architecture XTrend 
The database engine is integrated with the development environment. 
At any time, all information regarding a file or a field can be accessed and altered. 
The integration of the user interface and database allows for easier and more compact programming 
and limits the risks of bugs while easing maintenance. WINDEV’s database engines (Hyper File 
and xBase) manage the databases on a network, with potential locking facilities at the record and 
file level. WINDEV’s database engine supports large-scale networks of 200 PC workstations and 
more19. 
The file works independently from the server, regardless of the server type (LanManager, Novell, 
NT). The XTrend application is developed for multi-users, but will also function on a single 
machine. The data structure is depicted in figure 28. 
                                              
19 200 is an indication, not a limit; the theoretical number of PCs is infinite (source: http://www.windev.com). 
 
Development of Prototype Measurement System 120 
 
 
Figure 28: Example file structure XTrend 
5.3.2 Process supported application: XTrend 
Using the process model from the requirement analysis this chapter will provide an overview of the 
main functionalities of the prototype application XTrend. Following the three basic steps I will 
discuss the main functional elements and how they relate to the requirements.  
5.3.2.1  Process step 1: system set-up 
Process step 1 consists of 10 sub-processes that set the specifications of the firm’s characteristics. 
Sub-process 1: start-up 
The first sub-process is similar for all main process steps and concerns the start-up of the program 
from the LAN server. Each employee and manager has been allocated an employee identification 
name and a password (figure 29). Furthermore, the employee can select a preferred language: 
German, French or English.  
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Figure 29: Entry screen XTrend 
Based on the user specific settings, the employee or manager will be directed to the relevant data 
entry or reporting screen.  
The main entry screen for the administrator/manager is depicted in figure 30 and comprises the 
following core elements: navigation, performance measurement reporting menu, period selection 
bar, and a set-up menu.  
 
Figure 30: Master reporting screen 
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Sub-process 2: identify periods 
The period section allows the administrator to define the measurement period (figure 31). The 
period reflects the overall activity of the system. The period selector is aligned with the date/time 
properties as set up on each individual PC.  The amount of intermediate periods defined here 
represents the reporting frequency. It is entir ely up to the administrator what to choose, i.e. months, 
weeks, or even days. 
 
Figure 31: Period identification screen 
Sub-process 3: identify innovations 
The first parameter to be defined is “innovation” and reflects a typical new technology-based 
venture. The definition of innovation (figure 32) in this context is the embodiment of the new 
technology in a business model of a new product, service, contract or any other form of deliverable 
the company is offering. The administrator can define the innovation portfolio that requires 
monitoring. This is particularly useful in the telecommunications industry, since in this industry at 
least three categories of operation can be distinguished: 1) end products consisting of a multitude of 
parts, which in turn are built out of thousands of components; 2) service offerings, which can be 
defined and integrated as in the product offering; and 3) large, customer-specific developments 
which can represent innovation projects. The administrator is free to choose his or her preferred 
measurable operation. 
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Figure 32: Innovations identification screen 
Using the navigation menu, the administrator can add, modify and delete new innovations. Each 
innovation is accompanied by a period in which the innovation is “active,” meaning this is the 
period that the administrator desires to open up the innovation for measuring (for example, the first 
five months after introduction).  
Sub-process 4: identify processes 
In sub-process 4 the administrator integrates the company specific processes linked to each 
innovation (figure 33). The prototype version of XTrend allows for two hierarchical levels of 
process definitions. The figure below depicts the input-window for the administrator in the field 
“Processes”. In the left-hand column the overall process is depicted whereas in the right-hand 
column the respective sub-processes can be inputted. In addition, the period in which the various 
processes are active (and therefore require measurement) can be defined by the administrator. 
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Figure 33: Process identification screen 
Sub-process 5: identify functions 
The prototype system XTrend can be modified in order to pinpoint data from various areas such as 
functions, departments, and locations. It allows the administrator to define the various “functions” 
that are active within the organisation. These functions are similar to the employees who have to 
provide the data. In the venturing process these could be: Sales, Marketing, Pre-sales, R&D 
managers, Product managers, System engineers, Team assistants. 
Sub-process 6: identify departments 
Departments can be defined in a similar way. This section allows the administrator to define the 
various departments under measurement. This is done to provide the heads of the departments with 
their individual performance figures. In the innovation process departments that are under 
investigation could be R&D departments, Marketing departments or Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR) departments, but also Sales departments and Operational departments. 
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Figure 34: Identifying functions, departments and locations 
Sub-process 7: identify locations 
With respect to co-development and the virtual structures that emerge in technology companies, a 
section on location has been integrated to effectively measure the performance of location specific 
teams.  
Sub-process 8: identifying employees 
In sub-process 8 the administrator can identify and define the employees who partic ipate in the 
organisation and who are subject to process controlling. All relevant information about each 
employee can be inputted, including the FTE (full time equivalent) percentage, personnel costs and 
overheads.  
Sub-process 5:  
Identify Functions 





Development of Prototype Measurement System 126 
 
To accommodate the fact that some organisations do not allow salary costs to be disclosed, the 
system also supports the use of rankings (i.e. CEO=10, Manager=6, Staff=3). By doing so the 
relative value aspect of each employee is still factored into the calculations. 
In this section the administrator also defines the access passwords for the respective employees.  
 
Figure 35: Employee identification screen 
Sub-process 9: Identify table of rights 
In order to support larger, more complex organisations, more administrators can be defined. Each 
administrator can be allocated certain rights to either set up parts of the system or view results. 
Blocking screens can limit an administrator’s views, to protect confidential information. The table 
of rights (figure 36) focuses on each of the sub-processes outlined in the set-up process. 
Sub-process 10: close system 
Similar to all three main processes, the last process is to exit the system. A proper exit from the 
system is required for the information to be sent to the main database. 
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Figure 36: Defining administrators and access rights 
5.3.2.2  Process step 2: data entry resource distribution 
The second process step in the data collection process is data entry for resource distribution. All 
employees identified in the system can now access the system and allocate 100% of their effort 
spent on the predefined innovations and processes.  XTrend has two levels of resource data entry 
(figure 37). The first screen shows the selection of available innovations from which the employee 
can make their choice. By clicking on the respective innovation the employee is enabled, through a 
user-friendly interface, to select the percentage of their effort (of a total of 100%) to the available 
innovations. For example if the systems aims to measure the venturing of an innovation X, the 
system will ask the employees to how much effort each individual has spent on this innovation in 
the measurement period. Assume that in this case a sales engineer has worked 70% of his time on 
the existing product portfolio, and spent 30% on innovation X. The first data entry step will collect 
this information from the sales engineer.  
The second data entry level is concerned with the effort spent on the specific sub-process that 




And issue specific screen 
access rights 
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allocated to the innovation in total of each employee is divided over the predefined sub-processes. 
In order to encourage usage, the employee does not have to make the calculation but again can 
allocate a full 100% over the sub-processes. In the example, assume three sub-processes (A, B and 
C) are relevant for innovation X. In step 2, the sales engineer is asked to allocate his efforts over 
these three sub-processes. The sales engineer does not have to start from his initial 30%, but can 
start from a 100%. He can thus allocate for example 20% to sub-process A, 50% to sub-process B 
and 30% to sub-process C.  
During the development it was found that this way it is easier and quicker for the employees to use 
the system, as the mathematical breakdown is done by the system.  Tests revealed that the system 
requires a maximum of five minutes input time per period for each employee. Employees are thus 
not unnecessarily burdened with additional administrative tasks which ultimately encourages 
participation.  
As previously described the start-up and close down of the system is similar as in process step 1. 
 
Figure 37: User friendly interface to allocate resources  
5.3.2.3  Process step 3: data entry financial distribution 
Process step 3 relates to the collection of the data concerning the relative financial performance or 
rent created out of a specific innovation. This indicator should be taken as relative of the total rent 
created in a predefined context (e.g. a division or firm). The administrator is responsible for the 
precise definition of the context and input of this figure.  For example, a manager of a technology-
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based firm can decide to measure the earnings of innovation A against the total earnings created by 
the firm over a predefined period. This can for example be in the first month of introducing 
innovation A to the market the earning created out of this innovation is 10% of the total earnings 
that period. The frequency is similar to the data collection for the resource parameter so 
comparable trends can be constructed. 
An optional set-up process is integrated in the system that allows the administrator to define the 
financial indicator in the various possibilities. In the set-up menu a dedicated window exists for 
defining the indicator (figure 38). This setup menu also allows for redefining the term innovation 
(in case a division only works with products or services in which case the term innovation might 
cause confusion).  
 
Figure 38: Optional set-up for redefinition of innovation and financial Indicator 
The value input for the indicator is depicted in figure 39. The administrator can define the nature of 
this indicator based on its relevance to the firm. In cases where this information is sensitive, a value 
ranking can also be given that still produces a relative result. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in 
mind that the performance indicator should reflect the rent created from the efforts spent on a 
particular innovation, and it thus seems appropriate not to add any additional indirect costs.  
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Figure 39: Finance data entry screen 
The system is developed to allow for future interface capabilities (for example with SAP), in order 
to minimise the effort. However, in the prototype stage it was decided that a manual data entry was 
preferred.  
5.4 PRELIMINARY SYSTEM TEST – A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
Together with the two case companies, a “thought experiment” has been constructed to test the 
system’s reporting capabilities. A thought experiment is an experiment that is based on fictional, 
simplified data, though this data has been confirmed as a realistic representation of reality by the 
case companies. The validity of the simplified thought exper iment stems from the iterative 
development of the experiment. Furthermore, interviews and discussion with an external review 
board have been held and incorporated in the construction of the thought experiment. This review 
board was made up of consultants, academics, other industry players and funding bodies20. This 
thought experiment will be used to introduce the mathematical underpinnings of the system.  
The thought experiment is constructed using an example of a fictional company X and its 
respective innovation patterns and venturing process. Company X takes the characteristics as 
identified on a divisional level in large high technology companies, where new 
products/service/businesses (hereafter called “innovations”) are developed on a dynamic and 
continuous basis.  
                                              
20 The workshops and review board formed part of the “Genesis” project, funded by the EU under the IST 5th Framework 
program. 
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The data selected for testing the system are interpreted as to reflect a situation whereby company X 
is building a dynamic capability in the venturing process. The underlying assumption is that 
company X can only create value out of innovations by rapidly exploiting these innovations.   
The thought experiment follows the introduction of two consecutive innovations, A and B, over a 
period of five months each.  The complete measurement period of the experiment is 11 months, 
with innovation A being introduced into the early adopter market in March 2001 and innovation B 
introduced in September 2001. Measurements are executed on a monthly basis.  
The input and output parameters have been defined following the alternative productivity formula. 
The input variable used in the experiment is total resources used per innovation (A and B) in 
relation to the rest of the business (other). Resources in this case are the value of the allocated time 
to the processes of innovation A and B. In order to simplify the underlying principles, the example 
considers only five people actively working in company X, consisting of five full-time employees. 
The output variable is based on a concrete financial measure related to profit. The main indicator 
for company X has been defined as the net contribution per innovation on a monthly basis, as a part 
of the total net contribution.  
      NetConA(t) 
 PRA(t) = —————— 




Where:   PR  = Productivity Ratio for Company X 
   A = New Technology-Based Venture A 
   t   = time 
   NetCon= the output defined as net contribution of A as a       
       percentage of total net contribution of firm 
   ResAl  = the input defined as resources allocated to the venturing  
       processes of A as a percentage of total resources available  
          to the total process portfolio 
 
The sub-processes in the example reflect the three critical sub-processes observed in the integration 
phase. Each innovation has been allocated three sub-processes. These sub-processes are labelled 
accordingly, for innovation A as: A1, A2, A3, and for innovation B as: B1, B2, B3. This data will 
be used to perform the in-depth process analysis. 
5.4.1 The expectations for company X 
Company X has a set of expectations related to the active building of dynamic capabilities. Since 
the venturing process is now better managed and changed, company X expects better performance 
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in the vital introduction of an innovation onto the market, and the successful take up of this 
innovation.  
These expectations are similar to those set out in the development of the proxy for dynamic 
capabilities. In the first period the company expects high resource allocation to a particular 
innovation. In addition, not a lot of profit will be made in this first period and hence the financial 
indicator – the net contribution of the innovation – will be low in the first periods. However over 
the course of the product life cycle of this innovation, the expectation is that resource allocation 
will go down. The dynamic capability provides the company with the capability of dynamically 
building, reconfiguring and streamlining the process portfolio of the company; hence it should not 
take the company long to utilise these processes. Furthermore, the net contribution is expected to 
rise due to increased sales. 
In addition, company X also expects to see not only improvements on the basis of one innovation, 
but also a progressive trend for future ventures. In other words innovation B ought to show a better 
productivity trend compared to innovation A. 
It is important to note here that the system measures one perspective of the innovation process 
concerned with understanding the specific commercialisation uncertainty high-tech companies 
face. Obviously there are numerous other factors that can influence the performance of the 
processes. The system does not aim to provide direct decision-making advice, but aims to help 
understand one part of this uncertainty. If trends appear that do not support the above straight-line 
thinking, it is important that explanations can be found why the trend deviates from the 
expectation. For example when the system is monitoring a strategic development – whereby a high 
investment is required to prepare a new market – a different pattern might be expected (more 
resources invested, less direct returns).  This anticipation should be reflected in the trends produced 
by the system, thereby clarifying the measurement.  
Performance measures should always be complemented by the managerial judgement or qualitative 
view of the situation. To illustrate this important matter, take the example of a car. In a car, various 
performance measurement instruments tell the driver something about the drive, but the driver is 
bound to end up in trouble if they only stare at one of these dials. There is a similar situation for 
performance measures in companies. Only when the decision maker takes in the full spectrum of 
interpretations and its context can a judgment been made. The measures proposed here should thus 
also be regarded as complementary to existing measures.   
Finally, with respect to the in-depth understanding and location of where uncertainty resides in the 
sub-processes, the in-depth analysis has been tested. The aim is to identify the potential of such in-
depth understanding in the light of the case study findings.  
In summary, based on detailed data set, three levels of analyses will be reported using the prototype 
XTrend. Firstly the productivity trends will be presented and discussed. Secondly, an elaboration 
on the in-depth analysis will further the evaluation of the process performance. The testing phase 
Development of Prototype Measurement System 133 
 
will conclude with the evaluation of the experimental dynamic capability trend and the 
interpretation to the expectations set out in this experiment.  
A comprehensive data set has been constructed to simulate the thought experiment. The data set 
comprises of all the values that have been entered into the system in order to produce the 
subsequent trends. The data set is split up in three sections:  
• Resource allocation data on the level of the venturing process of an innovation in the 
integration period, compared to resources allocated to the rest of the process portfolio  
• Resource allocation data on the level of the sub-processes of the venturing process  
• Financial Data (net contribution) on the level of the innovations as a percentage of the total 
net contribution generated by the firm. 
The first two levels address the input of the employees, whereas the last set is concerned with the 
data input on the management level.  
Based on this data set, XTrend allows for the effective reporting of the measurement proxies of 
resource allocation, net contribution, productivity trend and dynamic capabilities, as well as a sub-
process analysis. Firstly, a resource allocation trend is created over time, to identify the behaviour 
of the resource distribution in the critical phase of the venturing process. Secondly, a financial 
performance allocation trend shows the return on the innovations. Thirdly, these two patterns are 
combined to establish a coherent view of how each of the two patterns behaves over time and how 
they compare. Finally, the alternative productivity formula is used to produce the dynamic 
capability trend. 
The next sections will discuss the respective data sets of the thought experiments, the calculations 
and the XTrend reports in the following order:  
• Resource Allocation 
• Net Contribution 
• Productivity Trend 
• Dynamic Capability Trend 
• In-depth sub-process analysis  
5.4.2 Resource allocation 
5.4.2.1  Data set and calculations for resource allocation 
The values for the data concerning the resource allocation on the level of the innovation are based 
on a collection of all individual inputs of the employees. In the thought experiment five employees 
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have been identified: Mr. 1, Mrs. 2, Mr.3, Ms. 4, and Mr. 5. These employees have entered the data 
in the first access screen after starting up the application.   
These five employees in total have entered five values for each innovation, over the five months 
that these innovations have been monitored. In total, 10 values per person (two lots of five periods) 
have been defined. An overview is provided in table 10 for innovation A, and table 11 for 
innovation B.  
INNOVATION 
A 
  PERIOD     
 COST (€) / YR COST (€) / MONTH 
(CE) 
MAR-01 APR-01 MAY-01 JUN-01 JUL-01 
MR. 1 100,000 8,333.33 20% 20% 15% 15% 20% 
MRS.2 50,000 4,166.67 40% 35% 30% 30% 30% 
MR. 3 150,000 12,500.00 30% 50% 45% 40% 30% 
MS. 4 120,000 10,000.00 20% 10% 20% 20% 20% 
MR. 5 80,000 6,666.67 15% 15% 15% 15% 10% 
       
TOTAL 500,000 41,666.67 10,083.33 11,375.00 11,125.00 10,500.00 9,333.33 
       
RELATIVE RESOURCE ALLOCATION  24.2% 27.3% 26.7% 25.2% 22.4% 
Table 10: Resource allocation for innovation A 
INNOVATION 
B 
 PERIOD     
 COST (€) / YR COST (€) / MONTH (CE) SEP-01 OCT-01 NOV-01 DEC-01 JAN-02 
MR. 1 100,000 8,333.33 20% 20% 15% 15% 15% 
MRS.2 50,000 4,166.67 30% 30% 30% 30% 25% 
MR. 3 150,000 12,500.00 50% 50% 30% 25% 15% 
MS. 4 120,000 10,000.00 15% 10% 20% 20% 20% 
MR. 5 80,000 6,666.67 15% 15% 10% 10% 10% 
       
TOTAL 500,000 41,666.67 11,666.67 11,166.67 8,916.67 8,291.67 6,833.33 
       
RELATIVE RESOURCE ALLOCATION 28% 26.8% 21.4% 19.9% 16.4% 
Table 11: Resource allocation for innovation B 
The first column represents the five employees. The second column represents a weighting factor. 
Each employee has been attributed a weighting, which in this case is reflected by their yearly salary 
costs. This information is provided by the manager/administrator during the set-up of the system. 
Furthermore, each person represents a full time employee. In this simplified experiment the 
assumption is made that no alterations took place on the individual level concerning their salary or 
time. 
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The third column represents the value per interval period. In order to create the monthly value of 
the time allocated, the salary is divided by the amount of intervals over the yearly salary. In the 
experiment, monthly intervals have been selected, which results in a monthly value per person of 
salary divided by 12. For example salary costs for Mr. 3 are set at €150,000. Per month these costs 
are €12,500.  





Where,   Ctotal = Total Costs of Employees 
   Ce      = Cost of Employee (e)  




In the experiment for both innovations this is €41,666.67.  
The remaining columns represent the actual data from the employees in each respective month the 
innovation was monitored. For example Mr. 1 spent 20% of total his time on innovation B in 
September 2001, 20% in October, and 15% in November, December and January.  
The figure used for the respective graphs is represented by the bottom row, relative resource 
allocation. This row represents a calculation of the percentage allocated to each innovation per 
month and thus equals ResAl(t). The cost per month of each employee is taken into account as to 
allow for a proper weighting of the various employees and their relative values. Obviously, a 
secretary costs less than a top engineer, and hence this should be reflected in the total percentage 
allocated.  
The calculation is based on a formula that multiplies the monthly percentage of resource allocation 
by the cost per month. The formula is as follows: 
Ctotal = Σ
e = 1 
n
Ce














Where,   Ra = Resource allocation to innovation (a) as a percentage of  
       total (employee input) 
   a = Innovation   
 ResAl = percentage of total value of resources spent  
 t  = Time  
 
For example, the resource allocation for innovation B in September is calculated as follows:  
 
[(20 x 8,333.33) + (30 x 4,166.67) + (50 x 12,500.00) + (15 x 10,000.00) + (15 x 6,666.67)]
41,666.67
=  28 
 
 
The resource allocation to innovation B in the month September 2001 is thus 28 % of the total 
resources allocated from the sample. These percentages form the first concrete sets of 
measurements for the productivity measurement. 
5.4.2.2 XTrend reporting on resource allocation – resource indicator 
The resource indicator visualises the behaviour pattern of the relative changes in resource 
distribution to innovation A and innovation B. Both innovations are measured in their respective 
time period, the critical phase in the venturing process. Innovation A is measured from March 2001 
to July 2001, and innovation B from September 2001 to January 2002. Five intervals have been set 
to compare the data. The graphs of innovation A and innovation B are depicted in figure 40. 
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Figure 40: Resource indicators for company X 
Following the general expectations set out in the thought experiment, both patterns follow a 
declining line. During the integration phase of a new innovation in the productive base of the 
organisation, it is expected that at first a lot of resources will have to be allocated to the integration 
of the innovation in the main operational process. As routines start to develop, a reduction of 
resources spent on a particular innovation can be expected.  
Furthermore, a first observation regarding the differences between A and B shows that innovation 
B has a steeper decline than innovation A. Company X is under the assumption that dynamic 
capabilities are being developed. Following this assumption, a preliminary statement might be that, 
since the organisation is better able to handle this critical phase the second time round (with 
innovation B), the pattern of resource allocation should be more favourable and predictable in 
comparison to innovation A.  Nevertheless this only provides half the picture, as there are 
numerous other reasons why this pattern might be as it is. For example, it is possible that because 
the financial returns are not showing any result, the company is spending less time on innovation B 
and slowly letting it exit their system.  
Other external factors can also have an influence on the behaviour of this pattern. Although the 
thought experiment follows a simplified simulation of the venturing process, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that resource allocation alone does not provide the full story on the integration 
capabilities of the company. Hence uncertainty still remains if this graph is interpreted on a 
standalone basis. 
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5.4.3 Net contribution 
5.4.3.1 Data set and calculations for net contribution 
The management input required to establish the data set relates to the net contribution an 
innovation has made as a percentage of the total net contributions of the product portfolio. The 
administrator/manager inputs this data. In the thought experiment the following simplified values 
have been selected. 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INNOVATION A 
PERIOD MAR-01 APR-01 MAY-01 JUN-01 JUL-01 
NET CONTRIBUTION OF 
INNOVATION  A (IN  €) 
20,000 30,000 30,000 40,000 35,000 
TOTAL CONTRIBUTION OF 
PRODUCT PORTFOLIO (IN  €) 
100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 
RELATIVE NET CONTRIBUTION  
(AS % OF TOTAL) 
20% 30%  30%  40%  35% 
Table 12: Net Contribution of innovation A  
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE INNOVATION B 
PERIOD SEP-01 OCT-01 NOV-01 DEC-01 JAN-02 
NET CONTRIBUTION  OF 
INNOVATION  B (IN  €) 
20,000 25,000 35,000 40,000 50,000 
TOTAL CONTRIBUTION OF 
PRODUCT PORTFOLIO (IN  €) 
100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000 
RELATIVE NET CONTRIBUTION 
(AS % OF TOTAL)  
20% 25%  35%  40%  50% 
Table 13: Net contribution of innovation B 
These values form the output values for the productivity formula to calculate the productivity and 
dynamic capability trends.   
5.4.3.2 XTrend reporting on financial performance – finance indicator  
XTrend provides direct reports of the financial performance patterns of both innovations over time. 
Based on the data entries made by the manager/administrator, a pattern is created to evaluate the 
fluctuations of the performance over the period. Both patterns are reported over a similar time span 
as the resource indicator, with similar measurement intervals. The graphs are depicted in figure 41.  
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Figure 41: Financial indicators for company X 
The patterns in the financial indicator graphs both show increasing financial performance.  This is 
according to the expectations of company X. As the venturing process utilises the productive base 
of the firm, more profitable markets are reached and thus the net contribution of the innovations 
increases. 
A comparison between A and B again projects a line that follows the assumptions made about the 
installation of dynamic capabilities. The line for innovation B is smoother and steeper than the line 
of innovation A. Nevertheless, similar to the resource indicator, a standalone interpretation is not 
sufficient to draw any meaningful conclusions with respect to the comprehension of the uncertainty 
in this critical phase.  
5.4.4 XTrend calculations and reports on productivity trend 
Based on the above data set, the proxy for productivity can be calculated. Firstly, however, a 
combination graph can be reported to see how the respective finance and resource indicators relate 
to each other. This has  been included to provide managers with a feel for how the two trends relate 
to each other.  
5.4.4.1 Combined finance -resource indicators  
The third trend projects both the resource and financial indicators in their respective time frames. 
This graph is referred to as the combined finance-resource indicator. The trend allows for a 
combination of the two lines, to see how the financial indicator of net contribution (output of the 
processes) relates to the value of resources allocated to the processes (input). The graphs of both 
innovation A and B are depicted in figure 42. 
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Figure 42: Combined Finance-Resources indicators for Company X 
Here it becomes apparent how the input and output relate to one another. Both lines follow the 
initial expectation that resource allocation to a newly introduced innovation to the market will 
decline whilst financial performance (net contribution) per month will increase. As noted in the 
previous graphs, the curves of innovation B are steeper and smoother than innovation A. 
5.4.4.2 Productivity ratios and trend 
Based on this data the productivity ratios, PRA(t), can be calculated using formula (4) in section 
5.4. In numerical form the ratios have been calculated as follows: 
INNOVATION A PERIODS     
 MAR-01 APR-01 MAY-01 JUN-01 JUL-01 
FINANCIAL INDICATOR (F) 20% 30% 30% 40% 35% 
RESOURCE INDICATOR (R) 24.2% 27.3% 26.7% 25.2% 22.4% 
PRODUCTIVITY RATIO (F/R) 0.83 1.10 1.12 1.59 1.56 
Table 14: Calculation of the productivity ratios for innovation A  
INNOVATION B PERIODS     
 SEP-01 OCT-01 NOV-01 DEC-01 JAN-02 
FINANCIAL INDICATOR (F) 20% 25% 35% 40% 50% 
RESOURCE INDICATOR (R) 28% 26.8% 21.4% 19.9% 16.4% 
PRODUCTIVITY RATIO (F/R) 0.71 0.93 1.64 2.01 3.05 
Table 15: Calculation of the productivity ratios for innovation B 
The table shows the calculations based on the data set provided in the previous chapters. The 
productivity ratio (output divided by the input) is calculated at one point in time, so as to visualise 
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the relation between these parameters. This trend effectively visualises the uncertainty relation 
between the measures to evaluate the pattern.   
For example, for innovation B in September 2001, the relative financial indicator was calculated as 
20%, and the resource indicator as 28%. The relative productivity ratio that follows is 20/28, which 
equals 0.71. This ratio on its own has little meaning, as the underlying values can vary enormously. 
However projected over time, it does show how this interpretation of productivity behaves as a 
trend (figure 43): 
Figure 43: Productivity trends for innovation A and B 
This simulation is now based on dynamic subjective figures of input and output. These subjective 
elements taken together are aimed at sharpening the judgement of the decision maker about the 
uncertain relationship between resource commitments versus performance of specific technology 
ventures.  
In the thought experiment, the simulation shows that both trends represent an increase in 
productivity. Innovation A sees an increase in the ratio of approximately 0.8 over five months, 
whereas for innovation B an increase in the ratio of approximately 3.2 has been achieved.  
A typical evaluation of the above data and graphs shows how the venturing process improved. In 
other words, the expectations are met in that the pattern of innovation B shows a more rapid and 
steeper increase in comparison with innovation A.   
Applied to a variety of innovations over a wider time span (or measurement intervals) these trends 
enable the company to better understand this pattern. The productivity pattern projects whether or 
not the company possesses the capability to commercialise the innovations effectively and 
according to a (short-term) plan and external factors. If the pattern shows a deviation from the 
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company’s expectations, actions can be taken towards a deeper analysis in order to understand the 
underpinnings of the behaviour of the pattern.  
As with any interpretation of data, it is important to note that these graphs do not make a decision 
or suggest making any statements by claiming there is a direct causal link between short-term 
performance and the quality and effectiveness of process management. The data provides a basis 
on which interpretation and expectations can be valued and monitored, and hence provides 
additional and complementary measures.   
5.4.5 XTrend calculations and reports on dynamic capability trend 
The final analysis is the DC Trend (or Dynamic Capability Trend). The DC Trend aims to provide 
the organisation with an understanding of their capability to change their process portfolio on a 
routine basis. The concept stems from a theoretical background set out in the requirement analysis 
phase.  
In the thought experiment, following innovations A and B, the DC Trend can be constructed by 
comparing the two innovations’ active periods, and measuring the difference in behaviour. An 
overview of the values based on the calculations is provided in table 16.  
 
DC TREND      
INNOVATION A 1 2 3 4 5 
SELECTED  
PERIOD RANGE 
MAR-01 APR-01 MAY-01 JUN-01 JUL-01 
PRODUCTIVITY RATIO 
(F/R) 
0.826 1.099 1.124 1.587 1.563 
INNOVATION B      
SELECTED  
PERIOD RANGE 
SEP-01 OCT-01 NOV-01 DEC-01 JAN-02 
PRODUCTIVITY RATIO 
(F/R) 0.714 0.933 1.636 2.010 3.049 
DC TREND [(B-A)/A] -0.136 -0.151 0.456 0.266 0.951 
Table 16: Calculation of the dynamic capability trend for company X 
 
The DC-Trend compares the two productivity ratios used to calculate the productivity trend. 
Firstly, the five monthly measurement points are compared as follows: 
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DC T REND  
PHASE (PH) 
TIME (INNOVATION A) T IME (INNOVATION B) 
1 t = 1 = March 2001 t = 7 = September 2001 
2 t = 2 = April 2001 t = 8 = October 2001 
3 t = 3 = May 2001 t = 9 = November 2001 
4 t = 4 = June 2001 t = 10 = December 2001 
5 t = 5 = July 2001  t = 11 = January 2002 
Table 17: Defining comparable critical phases for the DC Trend 
The DC Trend ratio is calculated as the Productivity Ratio (PR) of innovation B minus the PR of 
innovation A, divided by the PR of innovation A (following formula 3 from section 4.5). As a 
reminder, the formula is as follows: 
             PRB(t) - PRA(t) 
  DCA-B(ph) = —————————— 




For example, in phase 1, the relative DR of innovation A equals 0.826. The DR of innovation B in 
the same phase equals 0.714. The dynamic capability ratio now equals [(0.714-0.826)/0.826] which 
is –0.136.  
The pattern created is referred to as the Dynamic Capability Trend (see figure 44). 
 
Figure 44: Dynamic capability trend for company X 
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The graph represents the dynamic capability ratio in the respective phases of the integration of a 
venture into the operational system. This graph shows a relative increase in the alternative 
productivity of innovation B against innovation A. The line is positive and hence can be interpreted 
in the context of the thought experiment as indicating an increase in dynamic capabilities.  
However as mentioned previously, the line produced here does not unilaterally state that the 
company is doing a good job, nor is this line the only possible outcome, as the inputs are 
subjectively defined. Other factors play a major role, such as the comparability of the innovations 
(some are expected to have a longer life-span than others). Furthermore the trend is subject to 
strategic implications, for example introducing new products and services can also be a strategic 
investment for the company. In such cases, losses are often anticipated and accepted as other 
objectives are seen as temporarily more important (e.g. creating a large market share). 
The next section will evaluate the proxy as well as the system by comparing it to a qualitative 
analysis of dynamic capabilities in order to determine if the representation is similar as the 
qualitative data suggests. Furthermore, if this is the case, the measure shows fluctuations in the 
dependent variable of dynamic capabilities in the probabilistic process model. This would imply 
that the existence of dynamic capabilities, as identified by the proxy, should have increased the 
likelihood of overall good performance.  
5.4.6 In-depth sub-process analysis 
Further to the productivity and dynamic capabilities trend, that aim to provide the measures for the 
uncertainty relation in a more generic fashion, an in-depth analysis has been integrated into the 
XTrend application as a starting point for pinpointing and evaluating seemingly troublesome sub-
processes. The level of detail used in the thought experiment relates to the main three sub-
processes, as specified during the requirement phase.  
• sub-process 1:  Sales and customer oriented processes 
• sub-process 2:  Specific innovation related processes 
• sub-process 3:  Installation and After sales processes 
XTrend allows for a further breakdown into detail, by the dimensions of department, location and 
function. These requirements have been integrated based on the importance stressed in the case 
studies.  
During the case studies, it was identified that particularly in sub-process A (comparable to the sales 
and customer relation management processes) there was over -proportional resource allocation. In 
one of the cases this was also location specific. After close examination, it was found that in one 
region the greatest efforts were invested in the sales and customer relation management process, 
compared to the other sub-processes, but this did not bring about any additional results. In stark 
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comparison, another region created much better results without the extreme investment in these 
specific processes. This was interpreted by management as a lack of process efficiencies in the 
under performing region and subsequent actions to resolve this matter were instigated.  
The company immediately reinforced proactive process engineering activities in order to change 
and improve the process efficiency of the sub-processes of sales and customer relation 
management.  
Based on this observation, the development of the prototype incorporates a potential breakdown of 
the resource allocation to the sub-processes. 
5.4.6.1 Data s et and calculations for in-depth analysis 
In addition to the relative resource distribution to the respective innovations, the employees are 
asked to provide their resource allocation on the sub-processes for both innovations. In order to 
simplify this process for the employees, they can distribute their total effort (100%) over the 
various sub-processes per innovation. In other words, if an employee allocated 15% to an 
innovation, this number does not have to be carried forward and split between the three sub-
processes. In the thought experiment the situation is simplified since the innovations do not overlap 
each other.   
An overview of the data set values of the resource distribution as selected for the thought 
experiment is presented in table 18 for innovation A, and table 19 for innovation B.  
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SUB-PROCESS A1 Resource Allocation 
 (Re) 









to Innovation A  
(a) 
  Resource Allocation to Sub-process A1  
(SubA1) at month (t) 










Mar-01 Apr-01 May-01 Jun-01 Jul-01 
Mr. 1 100,000 8,333.33 20 20 15 15 20 10% 10% 5% 5% 0% 
Mrs.2 50,000 4,166.67 40 35 30 30 30 20% 25% 20% 70% 100% 
Mr. 3 150,000 12,500.00 30 50 45 40 30 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 
Ms. 4 120,000 10,000.00 20 10 20 20 20 50% 60% 65% 60% 55% 
Mr. 5 80,000 6,666.67 15 15 15 15 10 60% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
             
Total 
(Ctotal) 
500,000 41,666.67      5,475.00 7,556.25 7,475.00 7,437.50 6,258.33 
Total( ResAl)       13% 18% 18% 18% 15% 
             
SUB-PROCESS A2 Resource Allocation 






Cost/yr Cost/month  
(Ce) 
to Innovation A  
(a) 
  Resource Allocation to Sub-process A2 
(SubA2) at month (t) 










Mar-01 Apr-01 May-01 Jun-01 Jul-01 
Mr. 1 100,000 8,333.33 20 20 15 15 20 50% 40% 50% 30% 30% 
Mrs.2 50,000 4,166.67 40 35 30 30 30 50% 40% 45% 15% 0% 
Mr. 3 150,000 12,500.00 30 50 45 40 30 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Ms. 4 120,000 10,000.00 20 10 20 20 20 25% 20% 15% 15% 10% 
Mr. 5 80,000 6,666.67 15 15 15 15 10 40% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
             
Total  500,000 41,666.67      2,754.17 1,812.50 1,818.75 1,162.50 920.83 
Total (ResAl)       7% 4% 4% 3% 2% 
             







Cost/yr Cost/month  
(Ce) 
to Innovation A 
(a) 
  Resource Allocation to Sub-process A3 
(SubA3) at month (t) 










Mar-01 Apr-01 May-01 Jun-01 Jul-01 
Mr. 1 100,000 8,333.33 20 20 15 15 20 40% 50% 45% 65% 70% 
Mrs.2 50,000 4,166.67 40 35 30 30 30 30% 35% 35% 15% 0% 
Mr. 3 150,000 12,500.00 30 50 45 40 30 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Ms. 4 120,000 10,000.00 20 10 20 20 20 25% 20% 20% 25% 35% 
Mr. 5 80,000 6,666.67 15 15 15 15 10 0% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
           
Total  500,000 41,666.67    1,854.17 2,006.25 1,831.25 1,900.00 2,154.17 
Total (ResAl)     4% 5% 4% 5% 5% 
Table 18: Resource distribution sub-processes for innovation A  
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to Innovation B 
(a) 
  Resource Allocation to Sub-process B1 
(SubB1) at month (t) 










Sep-01 Oct-01 Nov-01 Dec-01 Jan-02 
Mr. 1 100,000 8,333.33 20 20 15 15 15 10% 10% 5% 5% 0% 
Mrs.2 50,000 4,166.67 30 30 30 30 25 20% 25% 20% 70% 100% 
Mr. 3 150,000 12,500.00 50 50 30 25 15 50% 70% 60% 50% 35% 
Ms. 4 120,000 10,000.00 15 10 20 20 20 50% 60% 65% 60% 55% 
Mr. 5 80,000 6,666.67 15 15 10 10 10 60% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
             
Total  500,000 41,666.67      4,891.67 6,254.17 4,395.83 4,233.33 3,331.25 
Total (ResAl)       12% 15% 11% 10% 8% 
             









to Innovation B 
(a) 
  Resource Allocation to Sub-process B2 
(SubB2) at month (t) 










Sep-01 Oct-01 Nov-01 Dec-01 Jan-02 
Mr. 1 100,000 8,333.33 20 20 15 15 15 50% 40% 50% 30% 30% 
Mrs.2 50,000 4,166.67 30 30 30 30 25 50% 40% 45% 15% 0% 
Mr. 3 150,000 12,500.00 50 50 30 25 15 40% 15% 30% 45% 35% 
Ms. 4 120,000 10,000.00 15 10 20 20 20 25% 20% 15% 15% 10% 
Mr. 5 80,000 6,666.67 15 15 10 10 10 40% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
           
Total  500,000 41,666.67    4,733.33 2,354.17 2,645.83 2,302.08 1,264.58 
Total (ResAl)     11% 6% 6% 6% 3% 
             







Cost/yr Cost/month  
(Ce) 
to Innovation B 
(a) 
  Resource Allocation to Sub-process B3 
(SubB3) at month (t) 










Sep-01 Oct-01 Nov-01 Dec-01 Jan-02 
Mr. 1 100,000 8,333.33 20 20 15 15 15 40% 50% 45% 65% 70% 
Mrs.2 50,000 4,166.67 30 30 30 30 25 30% 35% 35% 15% 0% 
Mr. 3 150,000 12,500.00 50 50 30 25 15 10% 15% 10% 5% 30% 
Ms. 4 120,000 10,000.00 15 10 20 20 20 25% 20% 20% 25% 35% 
Mr. 5 80,000 6,666.67 15 15 10 10 10 0% 15% 15% 15% 15% 
           
Total  500,000 41,666.67    2,041.67 2,558.33 1,875.00 1,756.25 2,237.50 
Total  (ResAl)       5% 6% 5% 4% 5% 
Table 19: Resource distribution sub-processes for innovation B 
In order to calculate the distribution of the resources over the specific sub-processes, the cost factor 
has to be taken into account (Ce), as well as the individual resource allocation to the innovation 
related to the processes (Re).  As previously mentioned, the employees only have to allocate 100% 
over the sub-processes. No further breakdown is necessary.  
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For example, take the sub-process B1 in the period September 2001. The employees have inputted 
the following data: 10%, 20%, 50%, 50%, and 60%. These are the percentages allocated by the 
employees to sub-process B1 from the total of 100% over B1 to B3.  The first consideration is 
similar to the calculation of the resource distribution over a particular innovation, that each 
employee has a cost factor (Ce). This is the total cost of the employee in that month. Secondly, the 
employees have not worked for the full 100% in the sub-processes B1-B3, but according to the 
resource allocation to the innovation B, only a percentage of their time (Re). In this case this was, 
RMr1=20%, RMrs2=30%, RMr3=50%, RMs4=15, and RMr5=15, for the month of September. These 
individual percentages are taken from the resource distribution input of the employees to 
innovation A.  







Where,   ResAlXe = Percentage of total value of resources allocated to a   
          subprocess X of Innovation a  
   SubeX   = Percentage of total resources allocated to sub-processes X,  
          by employee e   (employee input)    
      Rae = Resource Allocation to Innovation a of employee e,   
         (employee input) 
   Ce = Costs of employee e 
   Ctotal = Total Costs of Employees 
   n = number of employees  
   t = time (a specific month) 
In the example this would work out as follows: 
 
[(83.33 x 20 x 10) + (41.67 x 30 x20) + (125 x 50 x 50 ) + (100 x 15 x 50) + (66.67 x 15 x 60)]
41,666.67
=  12 
 
 




[(Ce/100)RaeSub eX ] 
Ctotal  
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So, ResAlXe(t)= 12%, which indicates that 12% of the total value of the available resources have 
been distributed to sub-process X = A1 of in the venturing process of Innovation a= A, at t= 
September 2001. These values are allocated on the bottom row of each individual sub-process table 
and together make up the trend that will be reported in the in-depth analysis. 
5.4.6.2 The in-depth process analysis and interpretation for company X 
The graphs are construed based on the information given by the individual employees on their 
relative resource allocation to sub-processes (ResAlXe). The results of this analysis following the 
data set of the thought experiment are depicted in figure 45.  
The graphs show a more even distribution of the resources in the venturing process of innovation B 
compared to the venturing process of innovation A. Whereas innovation A, especially in sub-
process A1, shows no decline in resource allocation, this is the case in innovation B. An 
interpretation of this could be that, especially in the first customer oriented processes, changes are 
being made and less effort is apparently required to exploit new innovations.  
In summary, the in-depth analysis provides complementary indicators. The graphs provide an easy 
overview of the resource allocation behaviour over the sub-processes, and can indicate weaknesses 
portrayed as over-distribution or under-distribution. This analysis adds value in that it enables 
uncertainties, detected in the previous analysis, to be pinpointed. Unusual patterns can now be 
more easily detected and subsequently addressed. The uncertainty can thus be interpreted in on a 
deeper, more detailed level.  






Resource allocation sub-processes innovation A Resource allocation sub-processes innovation B 
 
Figure 45: In-depth analysis company X
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5.5 OVERVIEW AND EVALUATION OF THE PROTOTYPE SYSTEM 
XTREND 
The prototype application developed in this chapter attempts to operationalise the proxies for 
productivity and dynamic capabilities by providing real-time models of concrete innovation 
patterns and behaviours. Managers are thus able to understand these patterns as they emerge and 
not on hindsight, thereby increasing the predictive power of these patterns.  
The XTrend application is new in that such data would normally only become available at the end 
of a formal financial reporting period. Furthermore the data used to create the various reports stems 
from individual estimations rather than from exact hindsight analysis. The accumulation of these 
estimations allow for the dynamic measurements. Using this system managers are empowered to 
rationalise and act upon inefficiencies from a process perspective, by monitoring the various trend 
reports – and are alerted to these before conventional management information systems could 
provide such information. 
The prototype application XTrend fulfils the requirements to effectively collect and create the 
patterns for this new insight. The alternative uncertainty concept on the basis of the proposed 
uncertainty relation can be measured using XTrend in real-time. The assumption is that such 
patterns allow for a more predictable behaviour once interpreted in the abstract concept of dynamic 
capabilities, with the ultimate goal of enhancing the understanding of the underlying uncertainty in 
the critical phases of the venturing process in high technology companies. 
This experiment is the first one of its kind aimed at transforming the abstract conceptual ideas from 
dynamic capabilities into a measurable interpretation for the purpose of enhancing the decision-
maker’s judgement. This is particularly so as it is based on hard data derived from systematically 
measuring accumulated individual subjective interpretations. Nevertheless, it should be 
acknowledged that the chosen ratios are not necessarily the only correct ones. 
It is too early to give a precise meaning to the productivity and dynamic capability ratios because, 
as previously argued, the numerical outputs are not expected to be causally related within the 
measured time frame. The experiment in the next chapter w ill further elaborate on the 
interpretation that can be given to both these numerical outputs, to evaluate the potential of what 
these calculations can contribute to developing a proxy for the intangible concept of dynamic 
capabilities and how this eventually can assist in drawing conclusions towards a more probabilistic 
treatment of decision-making under uncertainty.  
The next chapter aims to incorporate the XTrend tool in creating an enhanced insight into the 
probabilistic process model as well as an evaluation of the selected proxies. Following a 
longitudinal case study in a division that typically ventures new technologies, uncertainty and 
dynamic capabilities are evaluated based on existing concept. These findings will be compared 
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with the findings of two retrospective case studies in which patterns are created using the XTrend 
application. The discussion will be of an exploratory nature, so as to evaluate the potential of this 
new approach to understanding and measuring decision-making under uncertainty. 





CASE STUDY – SIEMENS SWITZERLAND 
ENTERPRISE NETWORKS DIVISION 
6.1 UNDERSTANDING UNCERTAINTY IN NTBVS – A LONGITUDINAL 
CASE STUDY WITH MULTIPLE SITES 
Following a longitudinal case study at Siemens, this chapter aims to gain more insight into the 
proposed probabilistic process model on uncertainty which has been operationalised in the previous 
chapters. The study is an instrumental case study which is suited to enhancing conceptual insights 
(Stake, 1998). The state of theory development on the topic of uncertainty using dynamic 
capabilities as a central focus is relatively new; hence an instrumental case study is most 
appropriate (Stake, 1998).  
The longitudinal character of the case study ensures a comprehensive data set in the context of new 
technology-based venturing firms. The study was held at the Enterprise Networks division (ICE) of 
Siemens, a large German multinational that has its main expertise in electrical manufacturing. The 
study has been carried out over a period of three years and followed in excess of 150 semi-
structured interviews with all levels of the organisation and over 25 workshops with top 
management. Furthermore, access was granted to numerous internal reports and the company 
Intranet, which added to the dataset of the case. 
6.1.1 Case study design 
The case design (figure 46) follows a case study methodology that combines a real-time 
longitudinal case study with two retrospective case studies about the same phenomenon (Leonard-
Barton, 1990).  
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Figure 46: Structure and context of case study – longitudinal case study with multiple sites 
The longitudinal study provides a close-up view of patterns concerning the phenomenon of 
uncertainty and the impact of dynamic capabilities on this uncertainty as they evolve over time. 
The longitudinal case study has been carried out on the level of the Enterprise Network division. 
Following accepted data collection methods (i.e. Yin, 1989), the longitudinal study evaluated why 
and how dynamic capabilities were introduced in the department.  
The case study elaborates on a distinct reaction of the division to the imposed uncertainty. The 
need for this reaction is finance-, market- and technology-driven. The subsequent reaction can be 
interpreted using the dynamic capability framework. The understanding of uncertainty in relation to 
the strategy of the company for dealing with uncertainty in terms of their dynamic process base is 
discussed by analysing the evolution of such dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000).  
The qualitative study on the evolution of dynamic capabilities in the division approximates a 
change of the proposed control variable of dynamic capabilities in the probabilistic process model. 
This qualitative perspective can be compared to the proposed proxy for dynamic capabilities using 
the XTrend system.  
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6.1.2 Site selection 
In order to utilise the prototype measurements two comparable new technology-based ventures 
within the division have been selected. These ventures represent the retrospective case studies 
(Leonard-Barton, 1990) and are typical examples of the processes whereby new technologies are 
formed in a business venture and integrated into the operational processes of the organisation.  
The cases represent the integration of a new innovation into the main productive base of the 
division (figure 47). This confirms the second phase identified during the system development and 
deals with the process changes necessary to support the integration. These case sites offer the 
opportunity to identify patterns indicative of dynamic processes, with the aim of gaining more 
insight into the measurement concept and system. Using initial quantitative material from the 
measurement system, a first evaluation of the proxy for dynamic capabilities is made.  
The ventures, HiNet Express and Com-B, are comparable in that they concern a typical 
architectural innovation for the business. The first case relates to a new Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) system, HiNet Express; the second case concerns an architectural innovation 
relating to a reconfiguration of the business architecture of telephone systems, Com-B. Both cases 
were, at the time of their development, considered to be the main strategic way forward for the 
division; hence implementation scales were comparable. For both cases, process engineering 
initiatives have been executed to support the integration of the innovation in the system 
6.1.3 Data collection 
The cases have been measured during two sequential five-month periods, representing identical 
phases of the venturing process (figure 48). The two sites can hence be seen as a microscopic view 
on a venture level that allows for a comparison with the data found in the overall longitudinal case 
study. The measurement periods are identical in their starting nature, taking the innovation from the 
competence centre or business development centre to the operational processes, and are measured 
on a monthly basis. 
 




















New Technology Based Ventures 
 
Figure 47: Two multiple site cases of integrating new innovations in the operational system of ICE 
Data has been collected using a variety of sources and methods for each individual case as well as 
for the overall longitudinal study. An overview of the methods used, including the timeline and 
data sources, is provided in table 20. The division is located in Switzerland and covers five regional 
areas that are operated from local offices in Zurich, Bern, Basel, Renens and Lugano. The 
longitudinal case was carried throughout all five regions, whereas the multiple site cases focused 
on one particular region. 
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Table 20: Description of methods used: timeline and data sources 
 
Case Study 158 
 
6.1.4 Data analysis: a critical approach  
The longitudinal case study generates a substantial amount of data that allows for a critical review 
of the probabilistic model. The problem with multiple data sources is that the richness of the data 
can endanger the efficiency of the research (Leonard-Barton, 1990) and abundant data can obscure 
the process patterns. Therefore the data has been structured following a specific classification, so as 
not to lose sight of the phenomenon under study.  
The data sources for case study research can be classified over four dimensions: internal, external, 
primary, and secondary (Yin, 1989).  Internal data refers to data collected from the main unit of 
analysis, the firm. External data relates to sources outside of the firm, such as independent 
newspaper articles, interviews with customers and competitors, government sources, etc. Primary 
data refers to data gathered specifically for the research project and phenomena under study, 
whereas secondary data refers to data collected that could have other purposes (Yin, 1989).  Table 
21 provides an overview of the sources of data used for the research project and their respective 
classification. 
 PRIMARY SECONDARY 
INTERNAL • Interviews (with personnel of 
firm)  
• Participant Observation 
• Internal Documentation 
• Internal Archival records  
• Direct Observation 
• Physical Attributes 
EXTERNAL • Interviews (with customers 
and external experts such as 
consultants and academics) 
• External Documentation 
• External Archival 
Records 
 
Table 21: Classification of data sources  
In addition, a process modelling technique has been applied to allow for a more formal and 
systematic analysis of the data and to examine the underlying processes of the cases. This has been 
developed at CeTIM and allows for the effective visualisation of the process activities and co-
ordination link (N. N., 2000a). Using participant observation and facilitation in the form of 
workshops, process plans have been created which were accepted throughout the case firm. The 
purpose of these plans was to complement the data set by deconstructing the firm’s underlying 
venturing processes and to identify uncertainty within these processes compared to the literature.  
Finally the measurement approach has been applied to generate quantitative data in order to explore 
the probabilistic process model. The quantitative data is generated by XTrend and systemises 
patterns regarding the candidate solution for a dynamic capability proxy for uncertainty.  
These patterns are reinterpreted against the qualitative data analysis of the longitudinal case study 
in order to draw conclusions and make initial statements on the potential contribution of dynamic 
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capabilities on a managerial decision-making level for new  technology-based ventures. This 
process is also known as triangulation (Jick, 1979). The data from the longitudinal case study is of 
a purely qualitative nature, whereas the data from the respective case also incorporates the 
quantitative measure. Triangulation allows for cross-validating the results and strengthens the 
validity of the results (Jick, 1979). 
The qualitative data analysis was partly based on a reflective process (Tesch, 1990). A reflective 
process involves disciplined thinking and is ideally suited to exploratory work for gaining further 
insight into a phenomenon (Stake, 1998). The reflexive process was necessary to select the 
retrospective case studies.  
Although a reflexive analysis does not have any explicit formal systematic data analysis techniques 
or processes, the data analysis for this study does entail some systematic and verifiable elements. A 
database has been set up with the transcripts of the semi-structured interviews. Furthermore, a 
collection of numerous internal documents, such as process models, press releases and internal 
reports, has been stored in a database. Patterns and consistencies can then be identified using the 
database. Pattern matching allows analysis of data that has been obtained from multiple 
perspectives and levels (Leonard-Barton, 1990: 249) and can thus be used for the specific process 
of building explanations between these various perspectives (Yin, 1989; Campbell, 1975; Miles 
and Huberman, 1984).  
The aim is “to analyse the case study data by building an explanation about the case” (Yin, 1989: 
113). The goal of this exploratory study is not so much to draw conclusions but to develop new 
ideas for further study (Yin, 1989), or hypothesis generation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). In this 
research project, the phenomenon of uncertainty is the thread that winds through the case study 
reports to evaluate the initial ideas proposed in this thesis, and to recommend future research. 
Obvious limitations to the generalisability of the results are apparent.  However, the current state of 
the theory and the exploratory nature of the study the approach and case selection is a logical start. 
The vast amount of data collected within the context of the experiment will contribute to 
identifying further areas for research that could further enhance the generalisability of this 
alternative way of understanding uncertainty. 
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6.2 BACKGROUND OF CASE OBJECT – SIEMENS  
The case object of this study is Siemens, or more specifically, the Enterprise Networks department 
(ICE) in Switzerland. The outline of this case has already been discussed in the development part 
of this thesis (chapter 4). As the development and operationalisation of a potential probabilistic 
process model incorporates many individual organisation-dependent factors (the parameters for 
resources, the critical venture phases etc.) it seems appropriate to carry out the first experiment in 
this setting.  
6.2.1 Organisation structure of ICE 
The organisation structure of ICE went through several changes during the longitudinal study, 
indicating that there was in fact a need for change in its own right. At the start of the study the 
department was involved in a post-merger integration of a recently acquired data division. The 
complexity in the organisation was further exacerbated by the high frequency of new technologies 
and subsequent offerings that the division maintained in its portfolio.  
The changes discussed in the following study will show how managerial decisions were realised in 
order to make the organisation more dynamic and anticipate the unsettled environment. To this 
extent the main commitments that have been made relate to the changes in the division from a 
structural division to a process division.  The main building blocks of the organisation consisted of 
the sales, logistics, maintenance and services, new business development, product management, 
marketing, finance and R&D competence centres.  The study will show how the organisation 
rationalised these main ingredients in order to become a more process-oriented organisation.  
6.2.2 Initial identification of uncertainty for ICE 
At Siemens, the progression from new technological ideas to profitable businesses has already been 
acknowledged as important but difficult, with lots of uncertainty (Scheepers et al., 1999). This 
problem is not only visible on a corporate level, but is also particularly important for the day-to-day 
operations and managerial decisions of the various divisions. 
In addition to the brief outline provided in chapter 4, the case study focuses on the business 
segment of information & communications (I&C) in the Enterprise Networks division (ICE) in 
Switzerland. Traditionally, the national subsidiaries of Siemens are sales outlets of the Siemens 
Group. However, the I&C division in Switzerland is different in that it also strongly engages in 
R&D activities (the total R&D budget is €51 million, of which €18 million is allocated to the ICE 
division), especially in the VoIP section.  
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Some initial facts indicate that uncertainty is a potentially major problem for the division21: 
• The sharp fall in prices is expected to see the first margins drop under 10%. 
• The central processes still appear to be the consequence of the previous co-operation with 
the company owned by the federal state that held the legal monopoly. 
• The cost of capital, which was at around 9% in the early 1990s, was approaching 15% at 
the start of the study in 1999.  
• In 1990, the development of technological innovation of average importance cost €5 
million; today, it costs more than €11 million. This rise is due to the increasing complexity 
of the market requirements. 
• Whereas in 1990 the cost of activities inherent to the marketing of a product amounted to 
about 20% of the proposed price, today it reaches around 55%. 
All these developments required the division to take action. The next section will elaborate on the 
financial, market and technological underpinnings of the requirements for change at ICE.  
6.3 UNCERTAINTY AND THE NEED FOR CHANGE AT SIEMENS ICE 
6.3.1 Finance-driven change 
At Siemens, one of the main drivers for change emerged as a consequence of the turbulence in the 
financial markets. Although the impact of this turbulence on the division was highly visible, the 
division on its own is not able to influence financial markets, as its own financial results are 
consolidated in a global conglomerate of companies under the holding company Siemens AG.  
Nevertheless the management of both Siemens Group and the division perceived these externalities 
as uncertain. Numerous interview and archival data has shown that the finance-driven uncertainty 
was regarded to be very high. The uncertainty stemmed from two major factors: the introduction of 
Siemens AG at the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the turmoil in the financial markets 
resulting from the downturn in the technology sector. Both events emerged in the timeframe of the 
longitudinal study and had a major impact on the business.  
The next section will discuss these two factors and elaborate on the uncertainty and managerial 
decisions the division faced.  
                                              
21 Sources: MSM, Siemens AG, Munich, Siemens Switzerland, Marcom. 
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6.3.1.1  Stock exchange listing at NYSE 
The globalisation drive of the holding company resulted in the listing of Siemens on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE). Siemens’ NYSE listing took place on 1 October 2000. In several press 
releases, von Pierer, CEO of Siemens Group, made it clear that improvement of profitability is top 
priority (Birnstiel, 2000).  
The company aimed at an EBIT margin (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes as a ratio of sales) 
trend in the range of a 20% increase per annum from operations. To achieve these new goals, six 
drivers have been defined: improving business excellence; growth through innovation; continued 
optimisation of the business portfolio; strengthening synergy management; transforming Siemens 
into an e-company; and global market penetration, with a focus on the U.S. and China. As von 
Pierer noted, “Our goal is clear: we want to put each of our activities in a leading market position” 
(Birnstiel, 2000).  
Siemens aims to be a leader in both innovation and market position (Ramelsberger, 2001). The 
company’s owners should have a yield on their Siemens investment that measures up to the best in 
the industry. The company hopes to be a global player with a global presence – “strong in Europe, 
the company's home market; strong in the U.S., the world’s most important electrical market; and 
strong in Asia, which has the highest growth rates” (Ramelsberger, 2001). 
Siemens chose the NYSE rather than NASDAQ22 because nearly all of its direct competitors are 
listed on the NYSE (Ramelsberger, 2001). NASDAQ – traditionally home of the stocks of 
technology-based companies – is primarily attractive to small and medium-sized companies with 
strong growth rates and levels of profitability that are often still very low. In von Pierer's words, 
“Siemens is a company characterised by technology-driven growth businesses coupled with the 
well-established structures and experience that come from more than 150 years of corporate history 
– in other words, by New Economy with substance”(Ramelsberger, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the technology burst on the financial markets brought about high levels of 
uncertainty for the company, as stock prices plummeted. In figure 48 the stock price performance 
of Siemens AG on the NYSE is compared to the S&P 50023. The decline at Siemens was magnified 
in comparison to the S&P 500 companies. 
                                              
22 National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation   
23 Standard and Poor’s 500 is an index consisting of 500 stocks chosen for market size, liquidity, and industry group 
representation. The S&P 500 is one of the most commonly used benchmarks of the overall stock market (source: 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sp500.asp) 
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Figure 48: Siemens stock price against the S&P 500 trend from 30/3/2001 to 13/5/2002 
(source: FLife AG) 
The impact of these events had resonance for the ICE division in Switzerland.  
6.3.1.2  Impact on the ICE division  
Subsequently to the stock listing, financial reporting had to be converted from the German GAAP24 
to the US GAAP. For the ICE division this implied a change from turnover oriented reporting to 
EBIT reporting. While turnover reports volumes, EBIT is based on margins. Sales revenues are 
diminished by the process cost and therefore link revenue growth with process efficiency gains. 
The new accounting standards have strong impact on external and internal performance criteria for 
the entire company and its business units, as well as for individual managers.   
The targets for the local divisions, such as ICE, changed accordingly and new EBIT margin targets 
have been set. The EBIT margin targets are in the range of a 20% increase per annum from 
operations. Additionally, Siemens made the overall targets public for the first time, creating a high 
level of reporting transparency (Birnstiel, 2000) and increasing the exposure to further uncertainties 
in the financial markets.   
The holding company started to scrutinise all divisions carefully. Before the stock listing the 
group’s business areas were relatively profitable, so the next level, the divisions, were now up for 
scrutiny (Birnstiel, 2000). “Some are highly profitable while others have yet to exploit their 
potential” (von Pierer). Siemens announced that it would quickly prune out weak spots. No division 
would be kept on life-support at the cost of others, and although the Group was seen as a good 
                                              
24 General Accepted Accounting Principles, the common set of accounting principles, standards and procedures which 
companies are required to follow. 
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performer overall, some of its divisions were seen to have over-capacity and would require 
restructuring (Birnstiel, 2000).  
All these externalities instigated higher levels of perceived uncertainty throughout the management 
board of the ICE division. They faced decisions with the trade-off between increasing operating 
profits now and investing in innovation in order to allow for profits in the future (Katzy and Dissel, 
2001).  The division clearly realised it had to change and be more agile in order to create profit out 
of innovation quickly and on a routine basis.  
6.3.2 Market-driven change  
ICE operates in the telecommunications enterprise network market. The customers are enterprises 
for which tailor-made information and communication solutions are provided in five major areas: 
Voice networks, Data Networks, Application (Hardware and Software) Services, and recently 
Converged Networks (Voice over Data Networks). Table 22 shows a brief overview of this market 
and some product examples. 
Applications (Hardware and Software)
• Call Center (ACD, IVR, CTI, CC applications
• Messaging (Voicemail, Unified Messaging)
• Others
Applications (Hardware and Software)
• Call Center (ACD, IVR, CTI, CC applications
• Messaging (Voicemail, Unified Messaging)
• Others
Converged Networks
• Next generation PBX
• PBX/LAN Connectivity
• Next Generation Phones (IP, …)
Converged Networks
• Next generation PBX
• PBX/LAN Connectivity



















Table 22: Enterprise Network market 
Using the product life cycle (Levitt, 1965) Siemens found a profound change in the pattern of new 
technology-based ventures. Based on the 1995 figures, this curve shows a product life cycle of 
three years, with investments of approximately €10 million per product. Figure 49 depicts the 
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traditional curve that shows that the product has a positive cash-flow during the maturation phase 
of the life cycle. This implies the existence of so-called cash-cow products (Katzy et al., 2001). 
Cash cows can be defined as products that generate cash for the firm and where the products are 





Figure 49: The traditional product life cycle   
This representation of the business was valid until 1995. In the telecommunications industry, a 
range of factors have been reported which can cause drastic changes in the life cycle of the 
products.  
Compared with the traditional curve, the market-life cycle has shortened to nine months, and the 
required pre-investments have more than doubled. An example of the new life cycle is depicted in 






Figure 50: The present life cycle on the telecommunications market  
(Example of the new Wireless generation) 25  
                                              
25 Source : Department of Marketing and Finance of Siemens Switzerland, Swisscom. 
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With the disappearance of the cash cow, rapid integration of technologies into the operational 
processes becomes a requirement. The need to enhance productivity in the integration phase of new 
ventures in the operational process is paramount as the pre-investments become higher as well, and 
thus require a countermeasure. The division needs to capitalise on these technologies quickly in 
order to meet the EBIT targets. 
In the course of this analysis it became clear that the ICE division needed new organisational 
competencies. During an interview session, the following diagram (figure 51) was produced to 
show the competence required to quickly move from one product life cycle to the next. It shows 
that the organisation has to be able to quickly switch from innovation to innovation, rather than to 
rely on the cash cows. In addition to the corporate strategy a separate business strategy was 










Figure 51: Switching business opportunities 
6.3.3 New technology-driven change  
The third driver for change at the division stems from the technological underpinnings and 
complexity of the offerings. The uncertainty from a technological perspective at the ICE division 
relates to the changing architecture of both the component structure and the business model. The 
telecommunications services market is increasingly outperforming the telecommunications 
equipment market in volume. This development is driven by the trend of increased demand for 
comprehensive, customised solutions.  
From an innovation point of view, the complexity of the products within the division increased 
dramatically. The traditional component innovations (e.g. PBX26, Internet) occurred with high 
                                              
26 Private Branch eXchange (private telephone switchboard). 
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frequency and the mixture of the components became more and more important. The mixture of 
traditional and IP-based networks and the stronger penetration of software applications is visible in 
converged products where ‘Voice’ is digitally routed over ‘Data’ networks. These typical 
architectural innovations led to the increased importance of architectural competencies of the 
business unit. 
This is particularly true for VoIP where voice technology and LAN technology come together for 
one product. IP telephony and VoIP are key themes in the telecommunications industry. IP is an 
acronym for “Internet Protocol” – a network level data transfer protocol which is often used for 
networking PCs and accessing the Internet.  
The benefits offered by IP telephony are to cut the cost and investments of communication between 
various business sites. The innovation came in the form of IP telephony gateways which no longer 
link individual terminals such as PCs via the Internet, but rather connect entire communication 
systems located at different sites. This ensures that the infrastructure familiar to the user (telephone, 
features, and dialling behaviour) would remain intact. At the same time, new possibilities can be 
offered, for instance the call can be routed (transparently for the user) by the telecommunications 
system via an IP telephony gateway and the Internet by means of the Least Cost Routing 
functionality.  
VoIP innovations are typical architectural innovations (Henderson and Clark, 1990), where the 
components do not change but the architecture between these components does. Voice components 
such as the PBX (communication servers) and Data networks are integrated. An example of a VoIP 
system and the different components that are integrated into the new product structure is provided 
in figure 52.  
The increased product complexity requires a more solution-oriented approach by the vendors. The 
share of enhanced services revenues generated by integrating converged systems and applications 
is strongly outperforming the share of revenues made with traditional voice-based systems. The 
lack of human skills associated with the topics convergence (of voice, data and media), IP 
networking and application development leads to increasing service costs and new business 
opportunities for hardware suppliers in the services business. 
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Figure 52: Example of the architecture of a network solution integrating Voice and Data technologies  
 
The challenge of these architectural innovations is the ability to create and integrate these resources 
in such a way that the ventures are successfully integrated into the operational business of the firm. 
The changing links and coordination on the product level relate to the respective changes on the 
business level. In the case of VoIP, for example, transmission without time delay is essential for 
good audio quality, but less crucial in the transmission of text or graphics of an Internet web page. 
Several studies have extended the concept of architectural innovations by examining on which 
level the innovation occurs in a product. At the core of this research stream is the notion that, while 
firms may possess or could develop the competencies required to develop new product 
architectures, they often fail to recognise the way in which organisational competencies must be 
reconfigured to successfully sustain it on a business level (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Existing 
organisational structures and routines operate to preserve current component linkages and thus raise 
cognitive barriers to the development of new architectures.   
6.3.4 Impact of the uncertainties on the division 
The above mentioned changes had implications for the management of the division, which had to 
make decisions to overcome the associated uncertainty that emerged from these changes. 
Interviews confirmed that the uncertainty was predominantly observed in the venturing process, 
where new technology-based ventures are integrated in the productive base of the division driven 
by the operational processes. Although the division’s competencies in the information and 
communication technologies proved very competitive (a variety of awards on the technological 
advances were granted to Siemens), the organisational assets caused inefficiencies. These 
inefficiencies emerged on the interface between the new product/solution development department 
and the sales and marketing department. The division’s management board perceived the interfaces 
Case Study 169 
 
between the small entrepreneurial ventures (new businesses) and the large sales organisation as 
unsatisfactory (i.e. long lead times, inefficiencies, dissatisfaction of employees). 
At ICE it was evident that the incubation of new ventures in the various competence centres was 
sufficiently supported. For example, the VoIP competence centre was led by a board member of the 
division who also acted as an entrepreneur (previously owner of a company) and therefore able to 
create a small venture within the company. This venture brought together the backgrounds of both 
data and voice engineers, and focused on developing new technology-based solutions, with own 
projects.  
Nevertheless, these processes of the independent centres were not adapted to the existing sales and 
marketing department. This department was characterised by two distinct channels supporting the 
two technologies of voice networks (telephone) and data networks (computers, Local Area 
Networks).  
The malfunctioning of this post-acquisition integration of the data and the voice side was perceived 
to be a result of two existing cultures. Siemens is a traditional telecoms producer and has telephony 
competencies. In 1996 the need for data communication led to the decision to buy a data company 
(employing approximately 90 people). A separate data division, Siemens Nixdorf, initially bought 
the company. In 1998 this division (approximately 120 people) integrated with the ICE division. 
However, the different technology orientations implied a degree of culture conflict. The voice side, 
which used to work with over 95% of Siemens -made products, now had to collaborate with a data 
organisation, which used to work with more than 95% of products and components from external 
suppliers. In general, the observations revealed that the culture from the data side is more flexible 
in nature due to co-operation with relatively young and flexible organisations such as Cisco and 
3com, which the employees considered as having a more flexible and autonomous stance towards 
the innovation process.  
The ICE division ran two separate order management systems, and the ordering process of putting 
in an offer and delivering the goods and services required over 23 transaction systems. The 
incompatibility of the two IT  worlds and their legacy systems led to the need for increasing 
coordination efforts to be put in place when customers ordered data, voice and converged 
equipment and solutions.  
The incompatibility stems from the division’s history, in that it (the voice side) used to deal with 
fairly stable customers, like the national phone operator. However due to the liberalisation, 
deregulation and privatisation trends in 1998, the market has become more competitive (N.N., 
1999d). More customers, and thus competitors, came on the scene. Previously the organisation 
received clear-cut orders (from the voice side of the business) from well-known customers with 
relatively well-known products. However the environment changed to the provision of more 
complex innovations to a diversified market. 
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Increasingly complex innovation problems were observed due to a decentralised organisation. The 
technological knowledge of the new (converged) products could not be diffused in the regionally 
organised department. Switzerland has three dominant regions with their own language and culture 
(French, German and Italian). Whilst appropriate from a customer relation point of view (as it 
presents one regional face to the customer), the technological knowledge of these complex 
businesses is not available in all parts of the country. In an interview, a presales consultant 
confirmed this, “…sometimes I have to spend up to two days to find the best supplier for a 
particular cable, even though I am almost certain that the same problem has already been solved 
somewhere else in the organisation.”  
Customers also perceived this lack of knowledge transfer in the sales process. One customer, who 
ordered Swiss-wide PBXs and telephone-sets, came to the conclusion that the installation differed 
in Lugano (Italian region) from the one in Basel (German region). Due to the enhanced and more 
complex features of the products, his employees, who travelled frequently between the two sites, 
had to learn how to operate the same equipment twice, because the installation was not 
standardised.  
The lack of knowledge transfer was not limited to the different regions within the same function 
(presales, technicians), but equally occurred cross-functionally. Interviewees demonstrated that 
diverging sales strategies withhold Siemens from optimising the sales of new products. For 
instance, customers told of several occasions where they were aware of new Siemens products 
before the sales-force knew about them.  
Internal reasons for the lack of knowledge transfer were further limited by the organisational 
competencies and the motives of the sales-force to concentrate on old and familiar products instead 
of innovative solutions. A salesman quoted, “Why would I spend a day on trying to sell one VoIP 
system, whilst I can sell three PBX systems in the same time?” 
Traditionally the sales-force was specialised in selling products, which required little additional 
effort. At Siemens this was also referred to as the “sales of boxes”. This was typically a result of 
their traditional supplies to the national phone operator. The national phone operator employed 
people with similar technological competences as the Siemens employees. Therefore the sales 
process was one between two specialists both having extensive knowledge of the technical 
underpinnings of the product, and the customer just wanting to have the best technology available 
without any additional services or installation requirements. However, as another business 
customer put it, “I do not care what kind of PBX is in my cellar, I just want to make a phone-call”. 
The above mentioned process implications were further rooted in the commission mechanisms. The 
commission scheme was sales oriented (regionalised) and depended on individual sales volumes. 
Established products generate better sales than new products. Although new businesses have been 
explored using pilot projects, specialists and the use of so-called competence centres, there were no 
clear rewards for sales staff to invest in building their sales competence on new products. 
Moreover, the product and solutions managers, who were responsible for the introduction of these 
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new ventures, were organised as support functions and seen as overhead costs rather than part of 
the direct value creation process. This caused more motivational glitches and, as a result, the 
information flow of new product information was seen as unsatisfactory by the sales organisation.  
Such interface problems between the development oriented departments and the sales department 
culminated when large nationwide projects were to be realised. These projects require the co-
operation of numerous employees from different departments and regions. In practice this resulted 
in insufficient accessibility by phone, lingual barriers and a lack of readiness to co-operate. 
6.4 MANAGERIAL DECISIONS TO CHANGE : REALISING DYNAMIC 
CAPABILITIES 
It was evident to the management board of the division that changes had to be made. This lead the 
board to embark on a multitude of efforts to make the divisions better prepared for the uncertainties 
arising from new technologies.  
These efforts were executed under an initiative which was known throughout the division as the 
ICE2000 project. This initiative was the most prominent division-wide project held during the 
length of this study. As the following sections will show, this project can be interpreted as a 
sequence of managerial decisions that resulted in, what I refer to as, an enhanced level of dynamic 
capabilities within the firm. These actions represent, from a qualitative perspective, a change in the 
controlled variable of the probabilistic process model on uncertainty 
6.4.1 Rationalising the productive activities 
The division’s board decided to engage in a process change management initiative. Before the case 
study commenced, ICE had already undertaken three Business Process Re-engineering projects, all 
of which were unsatisfactory. The last project (the so-called GPO project) resulted in a description 
of the processes within the ICE division, but the organisation was not able to implement any 
recommendations for improvement of the processes. This led them to start the ICE2000 project in 
January 2000, which aimed to check the current processes against the results of the GPO (which 
ended in June 1999) and furthermore improve the processes.  
The project was the first step in creating a new process concept that aimed to rationalise the 
malfunctioning interfaces between the technology push (i.e. new ventures) and market pull factors 
(i.e. the sales and operations processes). An in-depth process analysis revealed the weaknesses as 
described above and based on these weaknesses the division entered a bottom-up consensus 
approach in order to establish the new process concept to optimise new innovation introduction to 
the productive base. The board decided to radically alter the existing ways of working, and create 
one coherent process in which this would be possible. This process concept is depicted in figure 53.  

















































Figure 53: New process concept ICE 
 
The main decision that arose from this new process concept was the definition of four distinct 
phases: customer contact, customer needs and requirements, proposal preparation and services 
management. The interfaces between these four phases were seen as crit ical for enabling profitable 
venturing of the division’s product and services base. Furthermore, these phases are valid for the 
complete portfolio of the division’s offerings. Whereas previously each specific technology (such 
as voice and data) maintained their own specific processes, the new process concept rationalised a 
new way of working that integrated these approaches, and made the division realise that there were 
coherent and technology-independent ways of working.   
Phase one represents the customer  contact. The input for this phase focuses on informing and 
establishing potential customers. As a result of the increasingly competitive markets, the former 
sales activities have been redefined. Formerly sales representatives mainly focused on maintaining 
the existing customer base. As the national operator, the department’s main customer, faced more 
competitors, this meant that more active sales actions to be taken by the division. This led to the 
creation of a new process coined “Hotmaking” (making potential customers interested). The output 
is defined as a sales lead, which is the input for the phase two, Customer Relations Management. 
The second phase aims to create a clear customer requirement. Customer Relations Management 
receives the sales lead from Hotmakers, the call desk, or requests for tenders from existing 
customers. The task is to turn these sales leads into clear business opportunities. This phase is 
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characterised by a high customer focus, in which the customer requirements and needs will be 
defined. The output is a clear business opportunity that will be presented to the internal market. 
Phases three and four are the actual bid management and the service management processes 
(including distribution, installation, maintenance and consulting). These processes are 
predominantly technology oriented.  
The internal market represents the negotiation between the sales pull and technology push 
activities. The previously described process implications and incompatibilities led to the common 
understanding of having an internal market structure within the order mechanism. Internal market 
is a metaphor for switching. The rules of the game can be interpreted as a means to generate the 
dynamic capability of getting new ventures into operational processes of the division.  
Two main changes resulted from this new process concept. Firstly, the organisation structure 
required more flexibility and working in virtual teams. Secondly, the internal market should 
actively support continuous process (re-)engineering for the new technologies based ventures, 
confirming the four distinct new technology-based venturing phases. 
6.4.1.1 Internal market and virtualisation 
In order to increase exploitation of the opportunities arising from new technologies, the 
management board decided to restructure the division so as to support an entrepreneurial spirit. 
Whereas previously the division was split up into a multitude of small organisations working 
independently within the division, deploying their own island solutions and processes, the division 
now consisted of two main elements: development and operations. With respect to the interface 
inefficiencies identified during the project between the product/solution development departments 
and the operational side of the business (e.g. marketing, sales, presales and installation and 
services) the division aimed to create better co-ordination between these two functions by allowing 
internal business ventures to grow. The focus for this analysis is based upon the process for large 
innovative projects.  
Firstly, the development side in the division created the so-called ‘business house’, in which new 
ventures are incubated. The business house is a combination of the previous product management 
and solution management departments. Engineering specialists together with business experts 
develop new product/solution combinations in dedicated business venture groups. The venture 
leaders are responsible for producing a business plan in order to shift the focus from product 
development to business development. In addition to development activities the venture groups 
have the objective to start pilot projects with selected customers to test the commercialisation of the 
innovations. The business house supports these venture groups. They serve as an incubator, 
providing the necessary funding and facilities to start-up business ventures.  
Secondly, the sales side of the operations is structured in customer areas instead of regional areas. 
The sales/customer relations management departments now cover specific customer groups such as 
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hospitals and banking and insurance companies. Where it was previously this department’s role to 
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Figure 54: Internal market and virtual venture teams 
The division has introduced a new coordination mechanism in order to allow for more rational 
go/no-go decisions (figure 54). This mechanism is based on network co-ordination where the 
project manager is able to compose virtual teams by negotiating with the several specialist areas. 
The virtual team becomes a project-oriented team, built up out of pools (ventures) of specialists. 
Co-ordination is based on the internal market in which negotiations can take place within certain 
rules, which are being defined.  
6.4.1.2 Enabling the venturing process 
The interface between the business house and the operations department can be explained with a 
revolver metaphor. The business house builds the bullets – the venture groups, which are 
successively inserted into the revolver – the operations department. The mechanism of a revolver 
consists of one barrel for several chambers of bullets. This is true for the operations department, 
which should portray a single source of competence in marketing and selling towards the customer. 
The coordination mechanism allocates each sales opportunity to the correct group of specialists 
(ventures).  
When a start-up is successfully nurtured in the business house it will be integrated into the 
operational department. The team of specialists will then take the function of specialist in their field 
of expertise (e.g. VoIP) within the operational department. The sales/customer relations department 
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is then able to feed this internal venture with business opportunities, by exposing the tested solution 
to the extensive sales network. The mechanism of systematically placing new ventures into the 
operational department can therefore be identified as a new dynamic routine.  
In summary, when looking at the Siemens Division three distinct phases for the ventures can be 
identified (Katzy, et al., 2003), each requiring their own specific capabilities (figure 55). Firstly, 
the incubation phase, where the new venture is nurtured to make a business out of an innovation. 
Secondly the venture is grafted into the existing operational processes, by systemically and 
continuously reconfiguring the organisation. Thirdly, in the exit phase the resources of ventures are 






















Figure 55: Incubating, grafting and exit capabilities (Katzy, et al., 2003) 
In the first phase the emphasis is on the capability of the division to develop or incubate new 
technologies into ventures. In the business house new ventures are created which act like 
entrepreneurial “start-ups”. This means that each venture is supported, next to the solution 
development and product management activities, in writing a business plan. This phase of the 
venture is referred to as the incubation phase, where the business provides the necessary 
competencies, budget and support for these “start-ups”. 
In the second phase of the venturing process, the division requires the capability to “graft” the new 
venture into the operating part of the organisation. When new ventures are ready to be exposed to 
the sales network of the division, the ventures can be integrated into the sales/operations 
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department. This change is an organisational one, for the venture is no longer strictly dependent 
and supported by the business house, but interfaces with different departments. This is the second 
phase in the entrepreneurial venturing process, which is termed grafting. Grafting means the 
successful installation of a venture into the sales/operations department. The division requires the 
ability to reconfigure the resource base of the firm to accommodate the changes in these two phases 
of the venturing process; in other words, the division requires dynamic capabilities.  
The final stage depends on the division’s capability to successfully organise an exit for matured 
new ventures. The venture process ends with the exit of an innovation from the department. There 
are two options available: firstly the venture group could function as a stand alone department i.e. a 
spin-off; secondly the venture group might reach the end of its life cycle and cease to exist. 
6.4.2 Evolution of the dynamic capabilities at the division 
Parallel to the three venture phases, capabilities can be observed that evolved in the organisation. 
The dynamic capability framework (Teece et al., 1997) elaborates on the evolution of dynamic 
capabilities and can be used to position the proposed changes in the division within the perspective 
of dynamic capabilities.  The framework suggests that paths shape the specific asset position of the 
firm, which in turn shapes the processes. Subsequently these processes build the dynamic 
capabilities. 
Applying these three lenses to Siemens ICE shows the evolution of the dynamic capabilities. By 
identifying the paths, positions and processes at Siemens ICE, the evolution of the above-
mentioned capabilities becomes apparent. 
Two major paths can be identified that relate to the specific incubation, grafting and exit 
capabilities. Firstly the technological trend where the telecommunications industry integrated the 
data networks (local area networks). This trend extends to the current trend of the convergence of 
voice and data solutions. Secondly, the changes in the telecommunications market, the increasing 
R&D pre-investments required, and the decreasing product life cycle can be identified as a major 
path dependency. The new product life cycle curve shows the need for a constant capability to 
switch and diffuse new architectural knowledge on the products and solutions throughout not only 
the new product development but also the new business development process, with increased pace.  
Furthermore the specific asset position of the firm is apparent in the architectural nature of the 
innovations on both a product and a business level. In accordance with Teece, Pisano and Shuen 
(1997), the case shows how these changes contributed to the current specific asset position at ICE 
(figure 56). Firstly the technological position, as determined by the previous path dependency of 
the architectural innovation, is interpreted as a lack of architectural knowledge and a deficiency in 
the diffusion of innovations between the voice and data sides of the division. Although the 
technical inventions appeared to be successful, the diffusion of this knowledge did not reach the 
sales organisation.  
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Instead of benefiting from the complementary assets brought by the extensive sales network and 
the business house (e.g. award winning inventions), the two did not meet. They were opposing each 
other and the lack of coordination had a negative influence on the processes.  
The lack of diffusion of the architectural knowledge of the VoIP innovations throughout the 
organisation resulted in inefficient process co-ordination. The case study shows a range of 
examples that illustrated these inefficiencies. This was particularly visible at the interface between 
the sales organisations (both voice and data side with independent order mechanisms), and the new 
product/solution developments and successful technology-oriented competence centres.  
The initiation of the ICE2000 project allowed both sides to acknowledge these inefficiencies. The 
learning effect created a shared mental model throughout the division, resulting in a new process 
concept including a new coordination mechanism between the operational side and the R&D side 
of the division. In addition, the organisation became aware of the necessity not only to re-engineer 
the processes to their current asset position, but also to systematically update its routines and the 
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Figure 56: Building of dynamic capabilities at ICE (Katzy et al., 2003)  
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6.5 IMPROVED DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES AT ICE: CHANGING THE 
CONTROLLED VARIABLE 
The subsequent results of this (ongoing) learning process within the division led to the 
transformation of the organisational routines at the interfaces in question. The decisions that 
followed can be interpreted as the deliberate building of dynamic capabilities within the firm.  
In the course of the case it can be observed how the dynamic capabilities for the venturing process 
were built in order to cope with the uncertainties. Nevertheless, not only are the processes of 
incubation, grafting and exiting essential, but so is the fact that the division is able to change on a 
routine basis, or what Zollo and Winter (2002) would term ‘second order dynamic capabilities’.  
6.5.1 Visible improvements in the division’s dynamic capabilities 
In the Siemens case the commitments to a variety of actions to improve the dynamic capabilities 
within the firm were visible in various activities. From an organisational perspective, dynamic 
capabilities can be regarded as tools that manipulate resource configurations (Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000) in order to deal with the uncertainty and create competitive advantage. In dynamic 
markets these capabilities rely heavily on new knowledge created for specific situations (Eisenhardt 
and Martin, 2000).  
Following Eisenhardt (2000), dynamic capabilities are processes that can be observed in the firm, 
such as rapid prototyping, process engineering and alike. The decisions following the ICE2000 
project were geared to install a number of such processes. These decisions are visible in the actions 
taken to support the incubation and especially the grafting phases of the new venturing process. 
At Siemens dynamic capabilities became visible by the installation of a dedicated team responsible 
for the ongoing changes necessary in the processes. This team was dubbed the “change 
management crew”. They reported directly to the board and were under supervision of both the 
business house and the operations division. The team consisted of a core group of five people, with 
an external expert to provide the change consulting.  
The team raised its profile within the organisation over the course of the study. Interviews 
confirmed that the team was seen as the dominant factor and the basis of all process engineering 
activities within the organisation, and as such was respected for its activities. The team worked 
closely with the board in order to meet strategic challenges, but was not responsible for any 
performance targets itself. Instead, the role of the team was typically to provide a coaching and 
supporting function to help management change the organisation. As one director noted, “Change 
management is a core competence, just as selling telephone equipment is. We do not have this 
competence, and thus we outsource it, by hiring an independent external consultant that leads the 
internal change management crew.” The team was seen as the driving force for the learning process 
at the division.  
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The team’s main activities were facilitating workshops and moderating meetings according to 
business process re-engineering techniques (e.g. Davenport, 1993; Hammer and Champy, 1993; 
Elzinga et al., 1995; Mueller, 1999; Tockenbuerger, 2000). This can be seen as a typical process of 
dynamic capabilities.  
However, in addition to these existing techniques, the team also indulged in R&D efforts that were 
specifically designed to test and improve new methods and tools. The team established many links 
to academic institutions and was open to adopt and validate new and improved methods for process 
management. This can be seen as the second order dynamic capability (Zollo and Winter, 2002) 
where the division has not only got existing processes to change, but also changes these learning 
process continuously to maintain the state-of-the-art.  
This learning process emerged as a continuous interaction between the evolving technology and 
markets. The aim was to adapt processes to evolutions in technologies and markets on a continuous 
basis (see figure 57). Continuous iterations with technologies and markets ensure business 
processes that meet environmental requirements.  
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Figure 57: Process engineering approach (Katzy et al., 2001)  
The change management crew adapted and developed a dedicated change cycle in order to 
effectively re-engineer processes. This cycle can be interpreted as a stable pattern or routine in its 
own right, with the aim of updating the operating routines on a continuous basis.  
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This learning process followed a dedicated cyclical approach of plan-do-check-act (Deming, 1986). 
An illustration of this process is depicted in figure 58. Following this cycle the team was able to 
dynamically adapt processes. Based on change requirements from the introduced new technology 
(innovation), the team identified new core processes and set process objectives. Following this, 
detailed processes were designed and implemented, focusing on established BPR27 methodology. 
The last phase represented the process controlling activities in which a variety of measurements 
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Figure 58: Learning cycle (Katzy et al., 2001 after Deming) 
From this perspective the dynamic capabilities, as embedded in the learning cycle routine, follow a 
similar process to that stipulated by Zollo and Winter (2002). The cycle intrinsically incorporates 
three learning mechanism phases on specific parts of the processes: experience accumulation, 
knowledge articulation and knowledge codification. These three phases become apparent when 
examining the process. The process exhibits the learning mechanisms of experience accumulation 
and knowledge articulation, as in interviews, workshops and reviews, when the processes were 
discussed individually and groups. The articulation focused predominantly on the weaknesses and 
strengths of the process base in an attempt to reveal the best way forward. Furthermore this 
articulated knowledge on the processes was captured in various reports and process plans, 
handbooks and working documents. These artefacts can be seen as a clear act of knowledge 
codification.  
                                              
27 Business Process Re -engineering.  
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However during the three-year study, the process of creating this knowledge was refined by the 
introduction and testing of various methodologies and tools to achieve this. The process team 
articulated and refined the learning cycle continuously, and subsequently reported the results to the 
rest of the division. During the longitudinal study the process team evolved into a central node 
within the structure of the division. This became apparent as the team and its results became 
increasingly central to internal dissemination activities such as conferences and on the Intranet. In 
Zollo and Winter’s interpretation this can be seen as second order dynamic capabilities (Zollo and 
Winter, 2002).  
6.5.2 Evaluation of dynamic capabilities and understanding 
uncertainty 
The study has revealed a set of distinct decisions that can be attributed to the subsequent building 
of dynamic capabilities. Hence this can be regarded as a deliberate change in the controlled 
variable of dynamic capabilities, which has been confirmed on a qualitative level, through the 
interviews and observations. As previously mentioned, the ICE2000 project was the main factor of 
change within the division at the time of this study. Obviously other initiatives had been developed 
and implemented, but not with the same impact and awareness throughout the division. Moreover, 
most initiatives that did change the organisation were direct results of the ICE2000 project. For 
example, 18 project teams were created to support the changes in the process base.  
The longitudinal study clearly shows two patterns concerning dynamic capabilities. Firstly, the 
conditions of dynamic capabilities were essential to enable the division to remain competitive 
within its high velocity market. The emerging dynamic capabilities focused in this sense on the 
incubation and grafting phases of the venturing process, where the interfaces of the existing 
productive base need to be adapted or changed in order to integrate new ventures so as to quickly 
shift business opportunities and benefit from short life cycles.  
In the course of the three-year study the process changes instigated by the change management 
crew were the most prominent changes made in the division. No other initiatives or decisions 
created the impact of ICE2000 and the change management crew. This can thus be regarded as an 
approximation to a ceteris paribus situation, where the building of dynamic capabilities is the 
dominant changing variable, and other variables remain relatively unchanged. No indications of 
this or alternative decision drivers were observed or elaborated in the interviews.  
These dynamic capabilities can be recognised when looking at the installation of a process team 
(also known as the change management crew), whose job is to change and maintain the process 
base of the division. Furthermore, the methods and tools applied by this team represent a pattern of 
change that is evolving into a stable but effective approach to change the operational routines.  
Furthermore, these routines of dynamic capabilities evolved themselves throughout the study. 
Updated and new methodologies were applied and more dissemination and training activities were 
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developed to ensure high impact. Another interesting observation is that at the start of the study, the 
process team was very dependent on top management support to convince the division that this was 
required. However at the end of the study, the process team was an established entity within the 
division that was actively being used by the whole organisation. This shows that the dynamic 
capabilities themselves evolved, and confirms the assumptions of Zollo and Winter, and Teece et 
al., that dynamic capabilities can take the form of more stabilised patterns.   
From the perspective of uncertainty, the dynamic capabilities observed in the case study are based 
on routinely changing the process base of the organisation as a strategy for uncertainty. However, 
these dynamic capabilities only become apparent when reviewing the organisation from an 
academic abstract perspective. The actual evaluation of the dynamic capabilities and the potential 
effects these may have had on the competitive advantage of the firm can only be done in hindsight. 
No measures were in place to see the effect on the uncertainty or having a more predictive power in 
order to strategise ad hoc. As mentioned in a workshop, “we are now able to produce processes 
quicker that allow for innovations to enter the market, however we do not know if we are only 
getting better in producing crap processes quicker, or if there is a real effect in terms of profitability 
and competitive advantage.” 
One of the main uncertainties stemming from the above case study was the pressure put on the 
department to operate profitably. However the profit figures only followed later, so there was no 
indication of whether the new processes actually fulfilled this requirement. The uncertainty relation 
proposed in this thesis between resources as an input and financial performance as an output 
remains uncertain.  
The probability function, from a qualitative perspective is thus approximated in that the control 
variable of dynamic capabilities changed, where other variables remained relatively stable and thus 
approaches the initial conditions set out for the experiment. Nevertheless, the uncertainty was still 
apparent as no measure or indication could be given yet to support the probability function and the 
expectation that this situation should result in an increased likelihood for better performance.  
In order to explore this probability function, the next step in the experiment is to evaluate the proxy 
for dynamic capabilities.  
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6.6 EXPERIMENTAL MEASURES: TESTING THE SYSTEM IN TWO 
VENTURING CASES 
The evidence from the longitudinal case study confirms that the evolution of dynamic capabilities 
is apparent. The next step in the exploration phase is to compare these results to the proxies of 
productivity and dynamic capability for new technology-based ventures. 
Two comparable ventures within the division have been selec ted to test the proposed proxies of 
productivity and dynamic capabilities. The cases represent the introduction of the HiNet Express 
platform and the Com-B business model. The venturing initiative of HiNet Express was the first 
VoIP application to enter the mainstream market. Com-B was a business architecture that ventured 
the combined technologies of telephone and data equipment together with a carrier network 
provider.  
The underlying new technologies of these two ventures stems predominantly from the merging of 
distinct voice and data technologies. The next section will briefly describe the underlying new 
technologies in more detail, as well as the background of the HiNet Express and Com-B ventures. 
6.6.1 New technologies at Siemens: HiPath  
The technological platform of the Enterprise Networks division during the length of the study was 
dependent on the emergence of the converging technologies on voice and data. The Siemens 
‘Enterprise Convergence Architecture’, called HiPath, aimed to strengthen business 
communications by enabling a company's existing voice and data infrastructures and applications 
to interoperate globally over all networks. This innovative approach is based on open standards and 
distributed architectures.  
HiPath technology is an enterprise convergence architecture that provides a flexible, affordable and 
rational migration path to the IP-world of highly integrated communications and applications. It 
provides customers with choices regarding when and how they implement applications whilst 
protecting and evolving their current infrastructure and application investments. Potential offerings 
include customer relationship management, web-based call centres, e-business, and support for 
internal co-operation, virtual teams and mobile working.  
The HiPath technology brought about uncertainty in that the future potential was hard to predict. 
Whereas some scenarios had been drawn up by, for example, the Gartner Group, these should be 
seen more as beacons to the future than the only right way of venturing this technology. This 
became apparent with the Com-B venture that introduced a whole new dimension on the new 
technologies which was not predicted at the start of the study. The introduction of VoIP systems 
and its expected technology life cycle was projec ted in 2000 (Vandermate, 2000) using the “hype 
cycle” of the Gartner Group (figure 59). The hype cycle charted a typical progression of a 
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technology from ‘over -enthusiasm’ through a period of ‘disillusionment’ (based on the inevitable 


















Figure 59: Technology hype cycle VoIP (Gartner Group, taken from Vandermate,  2000) 
Siemens was a superior provider of this new technology. Ken Landoline, vice president and 
director of telecom research at the Robert Frances Group, stated in 2000, “IP technology is still an 
early adopter solution and widespread deployment will take place over several years, due to 
scalability, interoperability, quality of service, security and latency issues” adding, “Siemens’ 
HiPath is one of the most comprehensive architectures that we have seen to date to address many of 
these key issues” (N. N., 2000).  
From a strategic perspective this new technology was seen as essential. “Siemens’ HiPath 
architecture ensures the protection of current and future Hicom and HiNet investments,” said 
Landoline. “Additionally third-party vendors’ products and solutions can interoperate with 
solutions based on the HiPath architecture” (N. N., 2000). This strategy was based on market 
projections from the Infotech Group (Vandermate, 2000), which saw the convergence of voice and 
data markets gain more and more market share (figure 60). 
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Figure 60: Expected market trend for Voice/Data convergence (Infotech taken from VanderMate, 2000) 
The first venture based on this new technology arrived in 2000 under the name HiNet Xpress. In 
2000, Siemens introduced new IP products, including a flexible IP gateway, enhanced IP phones, 
IP-based workflow applications and an IP-based communication and application platform, called 
HiNet Xpress.   
This was followed in 2002 by the integration of fixed network providers, the Com-B venture. Fixed 
network providers represent the so-called carrier networks that offer communication channels 
between users (for example the landline phone networks), whereas Enterprise Networks provide 
the communication platform within enterprises.  
6.6.1.1 New technology-based venture 1: HiNet Xpress 
HiNet Xpress replaces traditional server based communication systems and combines fax, e-mail 
and telephony features on a client desktop PC. From a technical perspective both voice and data are 
processed in the same manner based on the Internet protocol and, as such, the user has access to all 
applications from a standard user interface. Intelligent call distribution enables not only telephone 
calls but also fax, e-mails and voice messages to be routed. In addition, in a call centre for example, 
e-mails are not allowed to pile up in a mailbox to be subsequently processed, as previously was the 
case, but are forwarded directly to the screen of the next free agent. The call centre supervisor can 
view the status of e-mail processing on screen at any time and help avoid bottlenecks. This allows 
call centre systems to be used with greater efficiency aims to reduce costs across the entire work 
process.  
Case Study 186 
 
 
Figure 61: Example of HiNet Xpress configuration 
HiNet Xpress does not simply translate the existing PBX architecture into a VoIP system, but is a 
true architectural innovation. The traditional PBX architecture consists of telephones, with very 
limited processing power, connected via a separate network to a central PBX. This central server 
takes care of all communication processes. Because HiNet Xpress runs on multimedia PCs, 
processing power is no longer a bottleneck. This means that no central intelligence is needed to 
direct the company’s communication processes. Instead of a central server, the distributed HiNet 
Xpress software processes calls and generates features locally. Because it does not rely on a central 
feature server this architecture makes the HiNet Xpress system not only more robust than server 
based PBXs, it is also much more scalable than traditional PBXs, especially in conjunction with the 
use of teleworking clients.  
The venturing model stemmed from the initial results derived from the ICE2000 project activities. 
The process model was driven by the internal new process concept and the internal market to 
support the effective take up of the new venture. Effectively this meant a post-merger integration of 
the voice and data processes at the division.  
6.6.1.2  New technology-based venture 2: Com-B 
Com-B is an innovative solution offered by Siemens together with an external carrier network 
partner. Com-B takes over a business model from the mobile communications market where 
customers can get a mobile phone for free while using a specific telecommunications provider for a 
specific time period. Siemens transferred this business model to the small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SME) market. An SME can get state-of-the-art telecommunications equipment 
(including internet access) for free while using a specific carrier network provider. Siemens 
provides the equipment and maintenance during a 36-month contract.  
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The technological innovation in this construction is the follow-up innovation of HiNet Xpress from 
the HiPath family.  The architectural innovation from a technical perspective still applies, as Com-
B is the combination of this offering with an external network provider.  
The emphasis of this new venture base is on the new business architecture. In the previous case of 
HiNet Xpress, the emphasis was on integrating the coordination of, and architectural knowledge 
about, data and voice technologies in the venturing process. Within Com-B a similar architectural 
knowledge transfer is necessary to create the venturing process of this new business model, 
whereas HiPath is complemented with carrier network technologies. 
The architectural innovation of Com-B has been illustrated by a new core process concept (figure 
62). The customer orders, pays and receives the equipment from Siemens under the Com-B co-
operation contract. The cost is a fixed amount that is included in the contract obligations together 
with the carrier network contract. Siemens delivers the goods and their part in the process is 
complete. The carrier network provider, who then deals with the maintenance and service of the 
technology, will also pay out a discount to the customer since they use the Com-B construction.  
This new business architecture stemmed from a process engineering effort that was a follow up of 
the methods, tools and techniques utilised to produce the new process concept of the internal 
market. The result described here was the second version of the business architecture. In the first 
run, the business architecture was structured that the customer got the equipment virtually for free 
(all payments went through the carrier provider), however this business model did not work to the 
satisfaction of both partners. 
The architectural implications of the above described core process were significant in that it had to 
fit on both sides (Siemens and the carrier network operator) with the operational processes and 
systems for the ordering and delivery contracts. Numerous interfaces between these two processes 
had to be reviewed to align the processes in order to market this construction. 














Figure 62: Com-B business architecture  
6.6.2 Comparability of the two ventures 
In order to use these ventures in the experiment it was essential that they were relatively 
comparable. Obviously each venturing case has its own specificities with respect to the underlying 
technologies, the market, and the organisation. Nevertheless in order to carry out the experiment, it 
is necessary to have a certain degree of comparability to experiment with the proposed proxies and 
measurement system.  
The cases are comparable in three aspects: strategic intent, scale, and level of architectural 
integration. The comparability has been verified through both the interviews and workshops.  
Both cases were regarded as the main strategic driver for the future, at the time of their 
implementation. Internal communication patterns show similar behaviour in the announcement of 
the venture as the way forward for the business. Furthermore interviews with top management and 
the process team confirmed that both were seen as equally important strategic business 
opportunities. 
Secondly, the scale of the two cases is comparable as both involved a division-wide rollout, and the 
business opportunities covered the whole division. The division was also a similar size at the time 
of the rollout of both ventures. Both cases were highly marketed at conferences such as the leading 
CeBIT conference in Germany, and received national newspaper attention (e.g. N. N., 2001). 
Furthermore, as the test results revealed, a comparable amount of resources were committed at the 
start of both ventures (approximately 70% of total resources available). 
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Thirdly, both ventures consisted of radical new architectures in both technological and business 
terms. The architectural integration of the two innovations had comparable implications from a 
process perspective. The technology of HiNet Express was the first architectural innovation of 
VoIP. Com-B was more oriented towards co-operation with an external network provider in a new 
architecture. The implications for process engineering on the architectural level were similar, as 
both ventures had to deal with two groups of component providers (HiNet Express: Voice and Data 
providers; Com-B: VoIP and Fixed Network Providers) that required integration.  
As mentioned in the previous section, during the study efforts have been made to enhance 
venturing of the new technologies. These efforts represent the evolution of the observed elements 
of the dynamic capabilities within the division driven by the change management crew. Examples 
are the use of advanced methodologies and tools for process engineering activities, and training 
modules to ensure knowledge transfer and implementation. For both ventures two distinct process 
engineering efforts can be identified. 
6.6.2.1 Process engineering for HiNet Xpress 
As previously mentioned, the HiNet Xpress case was set in the context of the ICE2000 initiative. 
The process engineering activities represent the start of building an ongoing capability in the 
division to establish productive processes. From this perspective the HiNet Xpress venture can be 
seen as the first venture that could benefit from this commitment. 
When analysing the process engineering activities carried out before the introduction of HiNet 
Xpress it became apparent that the division had improved its ability to design processes. Before the 
start of the ICE2000 continuous process management programme (effectively, the installation of a 
dynamic capability within the division), efforts to align processes failed to produce any concrete 
results. The last project run in 1998 was internally organised. This effort took a year and the result 
was two large folders full of processes, without implementation potential.  
The HiNet Xpress process engineering approach was split into three phases: conceptual, 
implementation and measurement. The conceptual phase of the process engineering effort took five 
months (from January to May 2000). The implementation phase took nine months (from July 2000 
to March 2001).  The measured phase (process controlling) commenced afterwards, but it was soon 
found that no existing measures were effective enough to actually pursue this. Here it is interesting 
to note that the lack of measures occurred as a result of a lack of specific process related real-time 
data. The proposed measures developed in this thesis became the preliminary impetus for this new 
raw data in terms of real-time process based measurement, and thus executes the triangulation 
(Jick, 1979) and cross validation of the work. An overview is depicted in figure 63. 
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Figure 63: Process engineering for HiNet Xpress 
6.6.2.2 Process engineering for Com-B  
The process engineering efforts for the Com-B processes showed a clear improvement in 
comparison to the HiNet Xpress processes (figure 64). The conceptual phase for the process 
engineering of the Com-B innovation took one month (August to September 2001). This is an 
improvement of 80% in comparison to HiNet Xpress. Furthermore the implementation took five 
months (October 2001 to March 2002), which implies an improvement of 44%. Com -B was 
introduced to the market in January 2002, and an amendment to the business architecture was made 
in March 2002. In total, the combined phases of development and implementation of Com-B saw 
an improvement of 57% in comparison with HiNet Xpress.  
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Figure 64: Process engineering for Com-B 
On this level of innovation the changes confirm the evolution of the division’s dynamic capability. 
The improvements show that the division, with the installation of a dedicated team for process 
engineering and the methods and tools, were able to more effectively engineer new venturing 
processes for new innovations.  
6.6.3 Productivity measurement – XTrend measures 
The question remained whether this had any impact on the performance of the division. The 
improved process engineering efforts result in a decrease of process development time. 
Nevertheless, no measurements were available to evaluate these efforts to real business 
performance. 
Uncertainty for the management board of ICE was not reduced, which became apparent during a 
division wide rollout of the processes at a yearly conference. Although the 160 employees present 
at the rollout were enthusiastic about the new processes and keen to implement them, the board of 
Switzerland Group (the effective owners of ICE) needed more convincing performance related 
results. These were however not available.  
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During the case it became apparent that a probability function does not only contribute to 
managerial decisions, but if it holds true, even in approximated form, could have provided 
convincing arguments for the investors in the division as well. The initial concept thus provides a 
basis on which further operationalisation can be built, and the need for a real-time performance 
measurement system.  
This observation appears to open the doors for an interpretation of theoretical interpretations of 
capability and direct resource commitments (decisions) geared to support the active 
operationalisation of these capabilities. This will be further addressed in the conclusion. This 
section aims to test the initial candidate solutions.  
Retrospectively, data has been collected to evaluate the developed proxies with the collection tool 
XTrend. Based on interviews and data available from internal systems, a recollection could be 
made for the concrete measurement-points resource allocation and financial contribution.  
The measurement took place in a sample region of the division, which represents a comparable 
sample of the total division. The figures given are relative, to conform to confidentiality 
agreements.  
Both ventures have been measured in the venturing process from the point of their respective 
introduction in the operational process and thus have comparable starting points. The starting point 
has been chosen as the point when the venture left the development stage (business house) and 
entered into the process engineering phase to be taken up by the operational system (the operations 
department), which have been identified by the director of the business house.  
The cases have been measured for a period of five months; HiNet Express was integrated into the 
operations department in October 2000, and Com-B was introduced in January 2002. The results of 
the measurements taken in these cases are provided below. Using XTrend, five measurements have 
been taken in each case to examine the relationship between the resource distribution and the 
financial indicator28. The graphs represented here will present and discuss the proxy for alternative 
productivity in the individual ventures and the expected increase in the dynamic capability proxy, 
and will compare this to the qualitative analysis of the longitudinal study.  
6.6.3.1  Productivity measurement HiNet Xpress 
HiNet Xpress has been measured over the period of October 2000 to February 2001 (five 
consecutive measured points). The “combined finance and resource indicator” graph (figure 65) 
                                              
28 For confidentiality reasons, the scales of the graphs presented are relative. The data has been classified as retrospective 
as the numbers were provided by means of interviews with top management. Nevertheless, the numbers were based on 
previous existing management systems, which the author had access to, and the results resemble real-time data. 
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shows the timeline on the X-axis. The Y-axis depicts the resource and finance indicators of HiNet 
Xpress. The indicators multiplied by a hundred create the respective percentages.  
 
 
Figure 65: Combined finance-resource indicator HiNet Xpress 
The resource distribution varies between 0.63 (63%) and 0.71 (71%) and the fluctuation patterns 
are balanced. From the resources  input perspective no major changes are visible either up or down. 
This can be confirmed from a qualitative perspective which revealed that little restructuring efforts 
were executed within these critical five months.  
The 63% to 71% of the total resources  of the sample that has been invested in venturing HiNet 
Xpress rendered a return of between 0-20% of total returns. The efforts put in the additional 
product portfolio did not require an equally high investment to venture the rest of the financial 
results.  
The fluctuations and the behaviour of the relative returns are more volatile than the resource inputs, 
particularly in measurement point four, where no significant returns on venturing HiNet Xpress 
have been reported. These figures confirm the uncertainty as perceived on board level. Despite the 
tremendous amount of process efforts poured into the division, the returns were still perceived as 
poor and uncertain. Only in the first three months can a positive impact be seen, where returns 
gradually increase from 6.7% to 20% of total returns. This is followed by a drop to 0% of financial 
returns on the venturing efforts of HiNet Xpress, which illustrates the high uncertainty.  
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Combining the measurements according to the productivity ratio produces a graph that shows 
heavy fluctuations (figure 66). When analysing the productivity ratio, the graph clearly shows a 
turbulent path in the first five months of introduction. The first three measurement points show an 
increase in the productivity ratio from 0.11 to 0.28. However, due to the zero returns in 
measurement point four, productivity rapidly decreases to zero, only to pick up again in 
measurement point five to 0.1. 
 
Figure 66: Productivity trend HiNet Xpress  
Based on the productivity ratio in the HiNet Xpress case, no patterns have been presented to 
support the expectation that the process engineering efforts that preceded the measured venturing 
process had any significant effect on productivity improvement as calculated using the alternative 
productivity ratio. Although support can be generated from the first three measurement periods, the 
fourth measurement period does not confirm the expected productivity pattern. However, 
measurement point five shows an increase in the productivity ratio of 0.1 from period four. This 
quick recovery implies rejection of potential interpretations from this measurement for 
understanding the venturing process of new technologies is not the immediate conclusion. 
Compared to the longitudinal data, it appeared that there was uncertainty with respect to the 
commitment of resources towards the new venture and the new profitability targets set by the 
Siemens Group. Based on past data, several months later the division stated an interim strategy to 
pursue existing products rather than VoIP to boost profits. It also indicates that at the time no 
understanding of the underlying uncertainty relation was available. This resulted in a higher 
exposure to the risk of falling in the chasm and losing out as one of the main players in Switzerland 
to enter this market (referring back to the Gartner expectations in figure 64).   
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In spite of these developments, the division did not give up the efforts related to the effective 
building of dynamic capabilities within the division. Although the action-performance relationship 
was not satisfactory and led to a change in strategy – back to the old technology base in order to 
boost profits – the department still acknowledged the importance of exploiting new technologies.  
6.6.3.2 Productivity measurement Com-B 
Com-B has been measured in the time period from January 2002 to May 2002, comparable to the 
time period of HiNet Xpress.  Again the “combined finance resource indicator” and the alternative 
productivity indicator have been used to interpret the patterns in the light of dynamic capabilities 
and the respective uncertainty in the venturing process between the performance and the resource 
commitments (figure 67).  
 
 
Figure 67: Combined finance-resource indicator Com-B 
The relative amount of resources spent on the venturing process as compared to the total shows a 
variance between 0.42 (42%) and 0.92 (92%). The increase is relatively stable but flattens in 
measurement point four. Compared to the resource indicator of HiNet Xpress, it can be noted that 
at the start of the Com-B introduction relatively less resources have been used (42% for Com-B 
against 63% for HiNet Xpress). Additionally, whereas with HiNet Xpress a decrease in resources 
committed to this venturing process is visible from measurement point three, no decrease at all is 
apparent in Com-B. Com-B only shows a flattening of the resources committed to the venturing 
process. Compared to the thought experiment expectations, this arguably suggests that based on the 
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resource input alone, HiNet Xpress follows the expectations of the behaviour of relative amount of 
resources allocated to a new venture more than does Com-B. Nevertheless, a different perspective 
emerges when comparing the resource indicator patterns against the performance patterns. 
The performance pattern of Com-B shows a stable increase from 0.02 (2%) to 0.19 (19%) of total 
performance.  The trend appears more balanced than HiNet Xpress, which could indicate that the 
relationship follows a more predictable path from the time of introduction. Both ventures have seen 
a relative return maximum of approximately 19-20% in the five-month measurement period. 
However, the performance trend of HiNet Xpress was characterised by a much more volatile 
behaviour compared to Com-B. The venturing process of Com-B shows an initial return of 2% of 
the total returns in period January 2002. However, four periods show a stable increase of 
approximately 2% per month, with the exception of the increase from period two to period three, 
which approximates to 12%. In all measurements, however, the trend is upwards, not downwards 
as was the case with HiNet Xpress in period three. This implies that although a higher investment 
in resources in Com-B was visible from the resource indicator, this paid off in terms of 
performance. As the resource indicator flattens in the last month, the financial indicator is still 
increasing steadily.  
Translating these measurements into the productivity ratio, a more stable pattern emerges (figure 
68). Although the productivity ratio at one point for HiNet XPress reached 0.28 (period three), 
which is 0.07 higher than any of the measurement points in the Com-B venture, the overall pattern 
of Com-B is much more settled and shows a predominantly increasing trend. Whereas in the case 
of HiNet Xpress, a chaotic pattern characterised the initial venturing phases with a drastic drop 
from period three to four of 0.28, no such fluctuations appear in the productivity trend for Com-B. 
Com-B seems to settle faster and more closely resembles the path as developed in the thought 
experiment (chapter 5). Only a slight decline of 0.01 from measurement point three to four is 
visible. The qualitative study has shown that this can be attributed to a modification in the business 
architecture of Com-B and the line picks up again in month four. 
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Figure 68: Productivity trend Com-B 
The findings of the qualitative analysis, which suggested that the division improved its capability 
for integrating new ventures into the operations department, seem to be supported by the 
productivity ratios and trends, which show a change from a volatile (HiNet Xpress) to a more 
predictable and settled trend in productivity (Com-B). Overall, the Com-B trends seem to suggest 
that the integration of this venture in the operational base of the division by effectively engineering 
the processes seems to behave in a more predictive manner, especially when taking into account the 
increase in productivity of 57% in process engineering and the subsequent reduced investments 
(time and effort of process engineering are not included in the measurement) that have been made 
to introduce Com-B in comparison to HiNet Xpress. 
Based on the patterns derived from the alternative productivity measure, it seems that the division 
was able to perform better the second time around. Nevertheless, it has not yet explained why the 
peak in the productivity ratio of 0.28 in month three of HiNet Xpress was not replicated with the 
Com-B venture. As with any measure, these measures also are very much dependent on the context 
in which they have been created. To this extent the triangulation with the qualitative data seems to 
suggest that the fluctuations of the productivity line in Com-B can be better explained, understood 
and perhaps even be used to predict future performance than was the case with the measurements 
with HiNet Xpress. For example, the conclusion drawn about the slight drop from March 2002 to 
April 2002 for Com-B appears to be related to changes in the business model 
It also has to be acknowledged that, with regard to the productivity ratios, although the process 
activities were the main changing variable during this experiment, other factors could still have had 
an impact on the development of these measurement results. Also the extended timeframes of the 
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two introductions of the ventures into the operational systems and the frequency of measuring can 
potentially produce a different perspective or interpretation of the changing behaviour of the 
resource commitment versus performance relationship. This can indicate that there is a need for 
more empirical research on a division level. From a pragmatic perspective however it also opens up 
more potential, in case extended measurement does enable better interpretation and prediction of 
the venturing process, and these measures could serve to indicate and interpret external influences 
on the productivity trend of the new venture.  
6.6.4 Dynamic capabilities proxy: HiNet Xpress versus Com-B 
The final measure has been referred to as the dynamic capability trend. The dynamic capability 
trend sets out to explore a potential measurement of a firm’s level of dynamic capabilities 
according to the uncertainty relation as applied in this thesis. In this case, and according to the 
expectations set out in the qualitative study, the dynamic capability proxy should show an effect 
that resembles a positive increase. 
This experiment aims to evaluate the proposed proxy for dynamic capability by applying it in a 
comparison of HiNet Xpress and Com-B. The dynamic capability measure, as developed in 
XTrend, takes a ratio over similar periods of introduction (five months each) and attempts to 
visualise the assumptions made during the retrospective evaluation of the “combined finance 
resource” trend and the alternative productivity trend. Using the XTrend measurement system the 
following pattern has been created (figure 69). 
 
Figure 69: Dynamic capability trend HiNet Xpress versus Com-B 
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The dynamic capability ratio is derived from the expectation that a dynamic capability can be seen 
when an improvement in the productivity ratios is visible over time. This has been done to reflect 
the expectations of a long-term capability by measuring and subsequently comparing short-term 
business opportunities (in this case the ventures Com-B and HiNet Xpress).  
The formula compares the two productivity ratios of two consecutive ventures. In the comparison 
this difference is taken as a percentage of the productivity ratio of the first venture. This implies 
that the dynamic capability ratio will show positive if the second venture outperforms the first, and 
thus an improvement is visible. A negative dynamic capability ratio would imply that the 
productivity ratio of the first venture was favourable to the second venture. Nevertheless, additional 
to the individual measurement points, the dynamic capability ratios combined give a trend that 
aims to reflect the firm’s capability to change during the venturing process.  
The first assumption that has been made is that the relative venture introduction periods are 
comparable. In this experiment this means that the periods from month one to five for HiNet 
Xpress are similar in the performance and resource allocation expectations to the periods from 
Com-B in their characteristics. A ratio can thus be prepared that compares the first productivity 
measurement point of HiNet Xpress to the first productivity measurement point of Com-B. The 
measure reflects the relative difference in percentages between the productivity ratios of Com-B 
(0.05 in period one) to HiNet Xpress (0.11 in period one).  Com-B then shows a difference of -0.55 
(or -55%) against HiNet Xpress. This indicates that the productivity in similar timeframes (period 
one) is better in the HiNet Xpress Case, compared to Com-B. 
Period two shows a relative decrease of this proxy of -0.64 (or -64%). Again HiNet Xpress seems 
to outperform Com -B when considering the productivities of both ventures over comparable 
periods. The dynamic capabilities proxy shows a 9% decrease from phase-1 to phase-2, which 
would indicate that the dynamic capability of the division has declined instead of improved, and 
thus would imply the proxy does not support the findings of the qualitative data.  
Period three again shows a negative comparison of the productivity of Com-B against the 
productivity of HiNet Xpress. The proxy shows a negative difference of 25%. Although this 
negative difference could again imply that the dynamic capability proxy does not reflect the 
situation as established by the qualitative data, the pattern that emerges from the dynamic 
capability trend is a fast increase of 39%. This could also imply that an improvement has been 
made in the dynamic capabilities of the firm as the productivity of Com-B has increased from the 
last measurement period compared to HiNet Xpress. 
This pattern also holds true for period four, where the proxy implies that both the productivity of 
Com-B and HiNet Xpress are similar, or approximate to zero. Nevertheless an increase of the 
dynamic capability is implied, as the productivity of Com-B again improves on average 25% more 
than that of HiNet Xpress, in a similar phase of the venturing process.  
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Finally, in period five, the proxy shows for the first time that the productivity ratio of Com-B 
outperforms the productivity of HiNet Xpress, with a relative increase of 102%. This means that in 
a similar period (month five) after the introduction of the new technology venture, productivity of 
Com-B improved 102% compared to that of HiNet Xpress.  
This would indicate that the dynamic capability proxy, especially the trend in the latter phases, 
indeed reflects the assumptions made from the qualitative data analysis. This analysis showed that 
an improvement in dynamic capabilities is apparent. In the comparison of the cases HiNet Xpress 
and Com-B the dynamic capability trend shows an ever-increasing upward line, except for period 
one. The dynamic capability trend shows an average increase of 39% over the first five months of 
introducing a new technology-based venture into the operational processes (table 23). This line thus 
seem to confirm the results that emerged from the longitudinal case study which showed that, after 
the division had actively created dynamic capabilities, the division can change more rapidly and 
with better results in terms of performance against resource commitment.  
 
 PHASES 
 1 2 3 4 5 
DC RATIOS -0.55 -0.64 -0.25 0 101 
CHANGE  (2-1) -0.08  
CHANGE (3-2)  +0.39  
CHANGE (4-3)  +0.25  
CHANGE (5-4)  +1.01 
AVERAGE CHANGE +0.39 
Table 23: Changes in dynamic capability ratios 
 
These insights suggest the measures seem promising for interpreting intangible aspects such as 
capabilities within a firm. Taken from the perspective of the individual monthly comparisons, only 
periods four and five would support this as only in these phases was the productivity of Com-B 
similar or better than HiNet Xpress. However when comparing the relative changes in the dynamic 
capability ratio, only period two denies a positive change of the dynamic capability of the firm, 
where the proxy shows a slight decrease (-0.08) as compared to the previous measurement. Over a 
period of five months an effect of 39% improvement in this ratio is visible.  
The dynamic capability ratio thus seems to be helpful in measuring and interpreting the 
observations made during the longitudinal case studies. The graph reflects a positive impact, which 
indicates that dynamic capabilities are being built within the division. The proxy could be a first 
step towards potential ways of measuring intangible processes such as dynamic capabilities.  The 
graphs and interpretations presented here reflect what Zollo and Winter (2002) would refer to as a 
knowledge codification of the action-performance relationships. The system actively supports the 
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knowledge articulation (the survey style data collection) and codification (the reports). Future 
research can be directed towards further exploration of the managerial contributions that such 
systems can provide. 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE STUDY 
Based on this longitudinal case study and the measurements of the two sites, some initial 
conclusions can be drawn concerning dynamic capabilities and the respective measurement of these 
capabilities using the XTrend prototype system.  
6.7.1 A longitudinal study on dynamic capabilities 
The case study has provided an initial insight into how dynamic capabilities can be measured to 
fuel potential statements on a probabilistic process model for uncertainty. The nature of this study 
is instrumental, and aims to provide further insight into the phenomenon of uncertainty and the 
relevance of using uncertainty relations to enhance the understanding of uncertainty. Hence limited 
attention has been given in this initial phase to replication of the results. Nevertheless, the 
assumption made throughout the thought experiment in chapter 4 seems to be confirmed by the two 
cases, which opens areas for future research.  
Two main findings can be derived from the qualitative study. Firstly, the longitudinal case implied 
that dynamic capabilities could be deliberately implemented in an organisation. Although most 
literature on dynamic capabilities still portrays them as intangible assets of a firm that have only 
been understood on an abstract level and observable mostly in hindsight by interpreting their 
evolution (i.e. Teece, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 2000; Zollo and Winter 2002), the 
Siemens case shows that the characteristics of such dynamic capabilities can be intentionally 
implemented. Siemens actively endorsed some of the techniques and processes expected to form 
dynamic capabilities, such as continuous process engineering activities and rapid prototyping 
(Eisenhard, 2000). This would imply that dynamic capabilities can be deliberately and actively 
implemented, and thus become part of the managerial decision-making process. 
Secondly, the Siemens case showed that the problems arising from the long-term effects of such 
dynamic capabilities relate to the exploitation of short-term business opportunities, and on this 
confluence an uncertainty emerges on the level of managerial decision-making. Capabilities are 
understood to provide a long-term competitive advantage (Teece et al., 1997), and evolve over 
time; it thus takes time and investment to build them up.  
However, a paradox emerges where these capabilities are prescribed for organisations that are 
engaged in turbulent environments (Teece, 1994; Zollo and Winter, 2002). The Siemens case 
showed that in these turbulent times, business opportunities are characterised by their short 
timeframes (for instance, an internal study has shown that product life cycles declined from three 
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years in 1995 to no more than nine months in 2000). In order to survive, it is essential that these 
business opportunities are exploited effectively, which subsequently implies a strong focus on 
short-term results when making decisions. 
6.7.2 Measuring dynamic capabilities 
Within the case study, however, and supported by the experiment, Siemens ICE did not abandon 
the long-term plan of building dynamic capabilities, and subsequent investments, in favour of 
short-term results. In contrary, the division aimed to establish a separate change management crew 
that would deal with the change demands of the division, effectively embodying the dynamic 
capabilities, which can then be measured and evaluated using the XTrend system, providing short-
term dynamic performance results. 
This situation provided the required grounds to experiment with the developed proxies on 
productivity and dynamic capability. The longitudinal case study and the retrospective cases 
confirm that the division was able to increase their dynamic capability to change, which can be 
interpreted as the effective building of dynamic capabilities . These capabilities addressed the 
incubating and grafting of new ventures into the productive base of the firm.  
Triangulation of the quantitative and qualitative data shows an encouraging result in three of the 
four measurement periods, confirming the expectations made at the outset of the experiment and 
the qualitative analysis.   
Measuring the productivity of the process engineering activities has already revealed the impact of 
the investments in the building of the dynamic capabilities. The process engineering activities, as 
part of the new business development for Com-B, showed an improvement in time of 57% 
compared to HiNet Xpress.  
However, the longitudinal case studies confirm the literature (Zollo and Winter, 2002) in that such 
improvements are not enough to enable decision-making towards the long-term competitive 
advantages expected to result from dynamic capabilities. Instead, the short-term action-
performance relationships – described in this thesis as resource commitment (decisions) versus 
performance relationships – are related to the dynamic capabilities and thus also require improved 
understanding. This meant that these two perspectives were measured simultaneously, and by using 
the XTrend system, allowed for the creation of patterns reflecting such resource commitment 
versus performance trends, albeit in a real-time fashion.  
The proposed proxy for dynamic capabilities showed an effect of 39% as an average increase per 
month over the first five months of grafting new ventures into the operational process base. During 
the longitudinal case study, this effect has been confirmed by the qualitative data gathered 
throughout the division via observations, workshops and interviews. The triangulation of these 
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results shows that the proxy provides a potential contribution to increasing the understanding of 
dynamic capabilities 
As previously indicated, for this first experiment the system has been applied with retrospective 
cases. As the experiment required a comparative amount of qualitative data, which would confirm a 
change in the observable dynamic learning processes within the division, the two cases of HiNet 
Xpress and Com-B have been measured using retrospective data. This data was provided by an 
existing system, complemented by direct information from the board of the division.  
In addition to the proxy evaluation, on a system level some initial insight emerged on the in-depth 
process analysis. The development of the system has been done in close co-operation with the 
division, who, irrespectively of the cases presented here, carried out some independent tests, 
especially concerning the in-depth analysis. The in-depth analysis is concerned with the resource 
allocation to sub-processes, which has been referred to as process-based costing. From this 
perspective, the experiment provided the division with a tool that allowed the management to 
actively monitor and predict resource allocations based on the process measurements.  
Within the experiment, the data provided by these efforts resulted in some interesting findings 
concerning apparent discrepancies with respect to the resource base and the services rendered by 
these resources. In particular, a comparison between two regions under similar circumstances 
showed that one region was able to render more productive services with the available resources 
than the other region.  
These insights led the management of the division to focus the process re-engineering activities on 
the under performing division. As such, the tool was directly used to make decisions concerning 
the commitment of resources to the process engineering activities. The knowledge codified by the 
system actively supported the division in utilising the change management resources optimally. In 
this sense, and conforming Zollo and Winter’s (2002) argument on the importance of experience 
accumulation, knowledge codification and knowledge articulation for the evolution of dynamic 
capabilities, these results suggest the system itself contributed to the evolution of the dynamic 
capabilities at the division. 
Although no comprehensive data set is yet available to evaluate the exact impact of these results, 
the contribution of the system from a pragmatic perspective was regarded as very relevant. These 
unexpected benefits have been confirmed in various interviews with both users and decision 
makers. Furthermore, plans have been made to test the system on a division wide level.  
6.7.3 Implications and future research 
This also has implications for future research. The combination of performance measurement and 
process engineering seems a promising avenue. More empirical research is required to learn how 
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such process oriented performance measurements can benefit process engineering activities, and 
the deliberate commitments required to build dynamic capabilities within an organisation.      
Finally, future research should be directed to expand on these results and on the instruments and 
methods proposed in this thesis. Further cases should be held to see if the ratios are replicable or 
need revision. Furthermore an implication arises with respect to the timelines used (five months) 
and the comparability of these timelines. Future research should amplify the case in a real time, 
instead of retrospective, study. This can also support the evaluation of the potential managerial 
benefits of this approach and real-time data collection. Here the sub-process measures could add to 
the enhanced resource reconfiguration capabilities of the firm.  
With respect to the probabilistic process model set out in chapter 3, the first results as detailed in 
this chapter show encouraging signs for further research in this area. The proxy as such could thus 
be a first candidate solution to evaluate the likelihood of dynamic capabilities enhancing 
performance.  
The study also provides some first qualitative indications that dynamic capabilities, as described in 
this thesis, seem to improve the organisation’s performance on a long-term basis. Notably, halfway 
through the study a division wide conference was held as part of the process engineering activities 
in order to roll out some of the new processes. Although staff present at this conference were 
enthusiastic about the results presented by the management, the board of I&C (the respective 
owners of the division) were less impressed as the new processes and all the efforts invested in 
them did not yet show that the division would come in on target. This resulted in accumulated 
pressure on the management of the division and high levels of uncertainty about the future of the 
division. The management however persisted in the change activities. Two months later, the 
official financial results showed the division had outperformed all other division by at least 20% 
and was most in line with the agreed targets. This can be regarded as an initial indication that the 
dynamic capabilities did increase the likelihood of increased performance for the division. 
This implies that whilst the experiment has indicated that constructing such a probability function 
is a time consuming effort, the results derived from this particular study should be regarded as an 
encouraging start. Especially with regard to the co-evolution of both the theoretical underpinnings 
of the input and output variables as well as the framework of dynamic capabilities, the probability 
function is likely to evolve in conjunction with these areas. This study has merely commenced 
operationalising these abstract theoretical frameworks in the light of understanding uncertainty 
within NTBVs. 





CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
7.1 SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS 
This thesis aimed to address the uncertainty faced by managers when making decisions concerning 
NTBVs. I have argued that such decisions are difficult but important for management to 
comprehend and thus a relevant topic to explore.  
7.1.1 Input versus output: uncertainty and venturing new 
technologies 
Uncertainty can be conceptualised when looking at the outcome versus the input of the new 
venturing process. From the outcome perspective, existing approaches are helpful when more 
refined knowledge is available or can be assumed. Nevertheless, the outcome of venturing new 
technologies is uncertain, not only to the extent that the performance, such as profit, of a potential 
future state should be judged, but also that it is yet unclear what the actual potential future states 
might be. When the latter is known, existing frameworks such as decision theory, planning 
activities and real options planning can provide potential solutions to conquer such decision 
queries. Nevertheless, the uncertainty this thesis focuses on does not have this level of knowledge 
and as such requires a different approach.   
On the input side of NTBVs, existing theoretical frameworks have addressed various views that all 
point towards the importance of the capabilities a firm needs to increase the chances of a long-term 
competitive advantage. Specifically, with the dynamics involved in venturing new technology-
based ventures, I have argued that the emerging framework of dynamic capabilities seems to be 
appropriate as it addresses the problems associated with venturing new technologies. 
Decisions, within this context, are commitments of resources to achieve future returns. Within the 
process of venturing new technologies, the condition of being able to reconfigure these resources in 
a dynamic manner (a dynamic capability) is seen as essential to create a competitive advantage. 
Nevertheless, this concept does not make a claim on future returns other than the assumption that it 
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enhances the competitive advantage or that it is indirectly related to firm performance (e.g. 
Henderson and Cockburn, 1994; Iansiti and Clark 1994; Zott, 2000). Dynamic capabilities are 
believed to address the so-called action-performance linkages (Zollo and Winter, 2002) and are 
claimed to reduce the causal ambiguity between these linkages. This seems impossible, however, 
when looking at the specific uncertainty of new technologies.  
The prevalent uncertainty for new technology-based ventures seems to hinge on the ambiguity 
surrounding the decisions made and the outcomes rendered by these decisions. The problem seems 
associated to the fact that although capabilities are required to make managerial decisions that 
result in long-term competitive advantage, the short-term decisions are of equal importance, as 
business opportunities need to be exploited in very short cycles. Long-term performance becomes 
more and more dependent on an organisation’s ability to exploit short-term business opportunities 
on a continuous basis, and thus continuously create performance from new business development.  
The analogy used in this thesis has treated this uncertainty by conceptually losing the argument of 
causality when looking at the input-outcome uncertainty for new technology-based ventures. This 
thesis proposed exploring an alternative perspective for this problem and adopting a method to deal 
with this uncertainty based on the treatment of uncertainty on a sub-atomic level. The use of 
probabilities and experimenting to understand and measure probabilities proved particularly 
successful in dealing with uncertainty in quantum theory.  
Others have already suggested the exploration and use of such insights for managerial phenomena, 
but no analogy yet exists to solve the specific uncertainty encountered when venturing new 
technologies. This thesis has shown that, from a rational perspective, such approaches are 
becoming more and more favoured by scholars for understanding managerial phenomena. 
Nevertheless, many of these works remain on an abstract philosophical level or only note that this 
is a potential way forward. Furthermore, various interpretations have been granted to the essence of 
the uncertainty principle, but very few have focused on the method that afterwards proved so 
successful. As such, this thesis contributes a new perspective by providing a first operationalisation 
of the treatment of uncertainty, using an analogy to Heisenberg’s concept and methods.   
7.1.2 Losing causality: towards a probabilistic process model 
Losing causality, in this sense, means losing the assumption that there is an underlying causal 
relationship between the input and outcome of the new technology-based venturing process. As it is 
an ambiguous relationship, the underlying causality is replaced by a probability. Whereas current 
approaches are still focused on uncovering potential causal relationships, this approach implies a 
need to start looking for potential predictions without this underlying causality. Such an approach 
is distinct from, for example, decision theory as it does not assume likelihoods in a causal sense but 
aims to understand likelihoods in non-causal relationships, where some uncertainty remains, but 
perhaps becomes more manageable.  
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Based on this idea, a first probabilistic process model has been constructed to reflect an uncertainty 
that resides between the input-capability perspective and the output-performance perspective. 
Within this process model it is argued that a duality exists between the resource input and the 
performance output of the new technology-based venturing process. Although current theories from 
a capabilities perspective argue that the existence of the right capabilities would ultimately increase 
the chances of an enhanced competitive advantage, there is no certainty that this will actually 
happen.  
A new way of exploring the duality between capability and performance is to explain the 
relationship in terms of likelihoods instead of ambiguous causal relationships. Having so-called 
dynamic capabilities within the firm increases the likelihood of improved performance, which has 
been expressed as a conditional probability.  Using dynamic capabilities as a variable, the 
expectation would be that organisations that have a dynamic capability are more likely to generate 
increased performance from new technologies than organisations that do not have this capability.  
Unlike conventional quantitative research, it was not the aim to validate a potential causal 
relationship between dynamic capabilities and performance based on positive correlations. Instead, 
the aim was to explore how this uncertainty can be explored in order to understand and support 
managerial decisions. If there are indications that there is a higher probability of increased 
performance when dynamic capabilities are present, this would encourage the decision-making 
process to focus and monitor all factors attributed to the constitution of such dynamic capabilities, 
and complement existing decision-making approaches. For example, resource commitments 
(decisions) under this specific uncertainty can be made to deliberately establish and nurture the 
elements that constitute a dynamic capability within the organisation. In essence, the aim is to 
provide managers with a new way of looking at this uncertainty. 
7.1.3 Towards a proxy for dynamic capabilities 
Exploring a potential probability, however, is time consuming, particularly as no measures yet exist 
for the intangible dynamic capability (Teece, 1994). A first step is thus to develop a proxy for 
dynamic capabilities. The experiment commenced by exploring a potential metric. As the aim is to 
support managers, the proxy should have empirical validity. A multiple case study has been carried 
out in order to construct a candidate solution.  
The proxy was based on a conceptualisation of where dynamic capabilities reside in the new 
technology-based venturing process. This conceptualisation is derived from three distinct phases of 
the venturing process, whereby the second phase, the effective integration of new technology-based 
venture into the productive base of the firm, was identified as most important and relevant.   
Conclusion and Implications 208 
 
7.1.4 Designing a measurement instrument  
Based on this conceptualisation, a measurement instrument has been developed to enable the 
evaluation of the proxy. This development of the system contributes an alternative real-time way of 
capturing process based resource allocation information. Instead of using completely accurate 
hindsight information, which often is made available too late to use for decision-making purposes, 
the system allows for real-time estimations to be made by the staff on their individual resource 
distribution on a process level. The employees are asked to provide their resource distribution to 
the processes related to the new technology-based venture as a percentage of their total effort. The 
system tracks the changes and reconfiguration of the resource-base of the firm over time.  
This information can then be used to compare the performance of the new venture to the overall 
firm performance. The system allows for easy collection of the two data sets and calculates a ratio 
that represents the productivity of the new venturing process. The usefulness of this ratio has been 
tested and validated in the two case companies.  
By comparing the productivity measures of sequential new technology-based ventures, a proxy 
emerged that has been identified as a potentially relevant representative of dynamic capabilities. By 
comparing the productivity ratios in similar phases of the new venturing process, a ratio emerged 
that has been termed the dynamic capability ratio. The system provides a graphical interface in 
order to depict the trends of the productivity and dynamic capability ratios over time.  
Evaluating these productivity and dynamic capability ratios requires experimentation. The 
expectation is that systems that can produce such real-time ratios could ultimately support 
managers in making better predictions on future performance based on measurements of the current 
capabilities.  In this context, the ratios presented here should be regarded as first candidate 
solutions and have been trialled at one new technology-based firm.   
7.1.5 Testing the dynamic capabilities proxy in a longitudinal case 
study 
Using a longitudinal case study at the Enterprise Networks division of Siemens, a qualitative study 
identified the evolution of dynamic capabilities within the organisation. The study provided 
insights into how specific decisions can lead to an enhanced level of dynamic capability. The 
evolution of dynamic capabilities was observed through specific learning routines that have been 
installed by the division.  
At Siemens, managers realised the importance of dynamically reconfiguring the available resources 
and the operational processes. A dedicated change management crew was assigned to continuously 
update and re-engineer the process base of the division. In addition, a dedicated process 
engineering methodology and process development tool were applied and further developed 
throughout the study. These efforts resulted in a clear process engineering improvement of 57% of 
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development time when comparing the process development phases of two NTBVs: HiNet Xpress 
and Com-B.   
In addition to the longitudinal study, the two NTBVs were also studied using the measurement 
system. The measurement system has been applied in order to evaluate the productivity ratios and 
the dynamic capability ratio. The productivity ratio appeared to be volatile in the HiNet Xpress 
venture. However, in the Com-B venture this trend was more settled. This can be taken as a first 
confirmation of the evolution of dynamic capabilities in the firm, as the venturing process seems 
more stable due to enhanced process engineering activities. However, HiNet Xpress showed the 
highest productivity at one point (0.28), which has not been replicated in the Com-B case (which 
reached a maximum of 0.21). More data is required to explore possible reasons for this.  
The study showed promising results concerning the dynamic capabilities proxy, where an effect of 
39% was measured over a five-month period. The dynamic capability ratio was negative in three 
out of five points, due to the higher productivity ratios in HiNet Xpress. This would imply that the 
dynamic capability ratio does not appear to reflect the results of the longitudinal study. However, 
when the rate of change is studied, it appears that an average increase of 39% occurred in the 
dynamic capability ratio over the full five months. Especially in the last phase, the Com-B venture 
outperformed HiNet Xpress, which supports the longitudinal results. Alongside the qualitative 
observations and data analysis, these results are encouraging for future research.  
Furthermore the measurement system itself seemed to contribute to these deliberate efforts of 
building a dynamic capability.  In addition to serving as a measurement instrument, the information 
and insights based on an analysis of the resource allocation to sub-processes management 
contributed towards some specific decisions regarding changing apparent process inconsistencies. 
This indicates a potential new area of research to further develop and test the system as a tool that 
has the potential of assisting organisations in building dynamic capabilities.  
Finally, the experiment confirmed the expectation that studying potential probabilistic process 
models is time-consuming, and though the study yielded some promising initial results, future 
research is necessary in order to further these results.   
7.2 DISCUSSION ON IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
7.2.1 An alternative understanding of uncertainty 
The main contribution of this thesis has been to raise the issue of non-causality when looking at 
uncertainty. Following an analogous approach based on Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, this 
thesis has argued for the introduction of three factors that could potentially enhance the 
understanding of uncertain phenomena. 
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Firstly, uncertainty can be identified as part of a relation. This is also referred to as a duality – a 
relationship between two observable parameters that cannot be explained. Instead of treating 
uncertainty as a collection of unknown elements or sources (such as environmental uncertainty, or 
technological uncertainty), uncertainty can be identified between two such parameters. It is 
important to note that this thesis does not claim the existence of uncertainty principles within other 
phenomena. Even the uncertainty principle itself was disputed by the likes of Einstein, who 
described this concept as an intermediary step in uncovering the quantum world with certainty. 
However, the conceptual underpinnings of this principle, such as the notion of duality, offer a 
potential new way of exploring uncertain phenomena.  
This follows from the second factor identified in this thesis, which is the treatment of this duality 
by using probabilities. Instead of attempting to clarify the causal ambiguity within such dualities, a 
new way of understanding them is to explore the relationship between the parameters in terms of 
potential likelihoods, without assuming causality. In other words, when there is no understanding 
of what happens between two measurement points in the duality, the focus can be on uncovering 
potential likelihoods without assuming an underlying causality.  
To this extent this thesis provides a point of departure in the quest for alternative ways of dealing 
with uncertainty. As Henri Poincaré aptly noted, “To undertake the calculation of any probability, 
and even for that calculation to have any meaning at all, we must admit, as a point of departure, a 
hypothesis or convention which has always something arbitrary about it. In this choice we can be 
guided only by the principle of sufficient reason. Unfortunately this principle is very vague and 
elastic” (Poincaré, 1905). This seems true for the study and explains the prevailing qualitative 
nature required in order to interpret the first results.  
The third factor relates to the experimental research method for exploring such potential 
probabilities. As pointed out earlier, exploring probabilities is a time consuming and arbitrary 
process. To this extent this thesis can be regarded as a first experiment in which an uncertain 
relationship is tested on potential likelihoods between the parameters. This study should be 
regarded as a point of departure. The interpretations of the duality and ratios chosen in this 
dissertation to measure this duality to construct a potential probability model are still arbitrary at 
this stage and the experiment should be regarded as a trial. This indicates the necessity for future 
research. Following Parkhe (1993) it is essential to accept approximations, especially in this early 
stage.  
Whilst the results of the experiment in this thesis show encouraging signals and areas for 
improvement, the underlying concepts are not necessarily limited to the context of this experiment. 
The fundamental new way of understanding uncertain relations by losing the causality argument 
could potentially benefit other areas in which relationships can be identified that are persistently 
ambiguous and uncertain. The appreciation of the conceptual underpinnings should be on the 
applications derived from the treatment of such uncertain relations in terms of enhancing the ability 
to predict, even without certainty.  
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7.2.2 Dynamic capabilities and performance: a matter of likelihoods  
This thesis has explored these alternative conceptual underpinnings of uncertainty in the field of 
venturing new technologies. To this end I have proposed and evaluated an experiment that looks at 
the specific uncertainty of new technology-based ventures relevant for managerial decisions. In this 
context this thesis draws attention to the potentiality of making a decision that might not result 
directly in the preferred outcome or result but does however increase the likelihood of a favourable 
future outcome.  
Within this context, this thesis draws on the dynamic capability framework, and the uncertain 
relation between dynamic capabilities and performance. Focusing on elements that enable the 
organisation to better reconfigure the resources for new technology-based venturing might not 
prove immediately successful. However, having this capability potentially increases the likelihood 
of increased performance the next-time round and therefore could increase the chances and thus the 
predictability of improved future performance.  
7.2.2.1 Implications for academia 
This work contributes to the academic community a way to develop an operational concept based 
on the dynamic capabilities framework. This concept is applied by developing a proxy and 
measurement instrument that aims to translate the conceptual abstraction into a more pragmatic 
measurement. The singular validation of the concept in a longitudinal case study helps to meet the 
empirical research demands (Teece, 1998), and promotes further research in this area. The study 
thus contributes to the empirical research base of the resource-based view of the firm and the 
dynamic capabilities framework, an area which has been characterised by a slow accumulation of 
solid empirical research (Dosi, Nelson and Winter 1999).  
The experiment in the longitudinal case study has limitations, however, as the concept has been 
specifically developed and trialled in the context of the telecommunications industry and the 
enterprise network market. This niche is characterised by multi-products with short cycles 
dominated by architectural technological changes. Furthermore this market has been influenced by 
an influx of competitors due to recent liberalisation legislation.  
The results are thus not generalised within a broader context, and have to be seen as local 
developments and concepts. Further research could focus on exploring the proposed new 
understanding of uncertainty in other fields of technology, such as biotechnology or 
nanotechnology, and other industries such as the semiconductor industry and also the more 
traditional industries such as car manufacturing.  This could enable the development of different 
models and measurements for dynamic capabilities and managerial decisions.  
Variations on, and improvements to, the here presented concept and measures are expected. For 
example, with regard to the definition of the resources, additional types of resources to human 
resources could be incorporated to measure the changes and reconfigurations in the resource base. 
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Following Penrose (1959) these could be tangible elements such as plants, equipment and stock. 
Incorporating measures for changes in these tangible resources might imply the need for revisions 
to the data collection process, as well as the system. Furthermore, such alterations could also have 
consequences for the definition of both ratios.  
Research could also be oriented towards exploring variations in the definition of (financial) 
performance or outcome indicators. In the Siemens case it was obvious that EBIT was the most 
important indicator, and managerial decisions within the division were geared towards 
improvements relating to this indicator.  However, for other industries alternative outcome 
indicators may be preferred. Whilst the prototype system allows for such flexibility in defining 
various types of performance or outcome-oriented measures, such variations still could have an 
impact on the calculation of the ratios. Additionally, research could focus on clarifying the 
implications of these various ways of defining the performance of a firm. A continuum of measures 
is apparent prescribing a firm’s focus on outcome from both a long-term perspective with 
competitive advantage and a short-term perspective with profit. There still seems to be some 
ambiguity inherent in these definitions, which is further complicated by the various terms that exist 
to define potential parameters (such as monetary, value, and rent).   
Furthermore, the study incorporated two sites measured on a monthly basis over a five-month 
period. Future research could be directed towards scaling up the number of sites, measurement 
points and extending the measurement periods. The additional results should again be compared to 
qualitative data in a process of triangulation. This could potentially improve and sharpen the 
chosen productivity and dynamic capability ratios and the measurement instrument, and provide 
insights into whether or not the here presented results are replicable. Additional results also are 
expected to provide further insights in the critical time-span of the venturing phases.   
The expectations are that the co-evolution of the existing input and outcome concepts and theories 
will further fuel the exploration of new ways of understanding the underlying uncertainty for 
managerial decisions. On the one side, the concept of dynamic capabilities is at an early stage. 
More empirical work, in conjunction with the specific operationalisation efforts of this thesis, could 
further the understanding of the input of the venturing process and ultimately enhance the meaning 
of the proposed process model. On the other side, emerging frameworks such as real options 
planning are acting on the confluence of input and output of the venturing process. More empirical 
research is required in order to explore how these two developments compare. 
7.2.2.2 Implications for practitioners 
The aim of the operationalisation of dynamic capabilities was to complement traditional 
approaches for managerial decisions under uncertainty, with the aim of creating better 
predictability for managers albeit without certainty. The instruments created for the experiment, as 
well as the concepts of the three venturing phases and subsequent types of capabilities (incubating, 
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crafting and exit), are vehicles that can encourage managers to enable the more deliberate creation 
of dynamic capabilities within an organisation.  
The experiment identified what deliberate commitments are needed for the effective building of 
dynamic capabilities. The current literature has predominantly addressed the evolution and 
observation of dynamic capabilities (Teece, et al. 1997; Zollo and Winter, 1999), and little work 
has yet been done on the operationalisation of the concepts with a more pragmatic stance. 
Eisenhardt (2000) was the first to identify distinct processes, such as rapid prototyping and process 
engineering, as constituents of dynamic capabilities. The empirical findings of this thesis confirm 
this and show that direct action can be taken in order to consciously improve this dynamic 
capability within the firm. Future potential could eventually elevate this concept to a more 
pragmatic application level, similar to the use of applications such as Total Quality Management 
and Business Process Re-engineering in the past.  
From a pragmatic perspective, the new insight that the relationship between a firm’s dynamic 
capabilities and the performance rendered by its operations can possibly be understood in terms of 
likelihoods could have direct implications for managerial decisions.  If the preliminary results can 
be replicated and further proof can be found for the probabilistic process model, this would imply 
that, for firms that venture new technologies, the creation of dynamic capabilities should become 
an essential part of the decision making process.  
Especially in unsettled times, it appears that most decisions are granted on the basis of their 
potential to create a direct return on investment. In declining economies, in particular, this implies 
that the focus should be on schemes to cut costs and lower overheads as much as possible. 
Nevertheless, the new understanding presented in this thesis could imply that pursuing investments 
to build dynamic capabilities within the firm, reflected in activities that are often related to the 
overhead costs of a firm, increases the likelihood of improved performance.  
Currently, the lack of both more concrete evidence that dynamic capabilities have a positive effect 
on firm-level performance, or even measures for assessing this, is reflected in managerial decisions. 
Activities that endorse the active building of dynamic capabilities are often dismissed or ignored as 
it cannot be explained how these dynamic capabilities can have an impact on performance.  
However, embracing this lack of causal understanding, and interpreting the relationship in terms of 
likelihoods could arguably change this perspective.  
New ways of data collecting and reporting, whereby dynamic collection and real-time estimations 
are more important than complete accuracy on hindsight, could spur developments in this direction. 
The XTrend prototype measurement system provides an example of such a new way of measuring, 
where the emphasis is on processes, rather than functions, and the data collected is based on 
employee estimations of their division of effort over these processes, instead of timesheets.  By 
coupling this data with performance measures, alternative indicators become available which can 
further enhance the understanding and shape judgements for managerial decisions.   
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7.2.3 Exploratory experiments  
Finally some initial implications can be derived from the development and execution of the 
experiment. The experiment consisted of a combination of two distinct interdisciplinary research 
methodologies. Further research could be directed to explore such interdisciplinary action-oriented 
research methodologies as trialled in this thesis. 
The research design combined qualitative case studies with a system engineering module. In order 
to trial the probabilistic process model, it was necessary to create an instrument that allowed for the 
measurement of the proxy developed for the productivity ratios and dynamic capability ratio. The 
result was a hybrid, action-oriented research approach. The system and data collection process 
subsequently became part of the qualitative case study. The implication of this approach is that the 
measurement instrument interfered with the study. This became particularly apparent in the case 
studies as the qualitative data confirmed that the system itself was also seen to be valuable as a tool 
that can encourage the evolution of dynamic capabilities within the organisation under study.  
Although the interference can influence the actual outcome of the chosen measures, it also proved 
to render some valuable preliminary pragmatic results. An initial conclusion that can be drawn is 
that the system was found to be useful not only for collecting the quantitative data for the 
experiment, but also as a tool that has the potential to enable managers to be more efficient in 
making decisions concerning the reconfiguration of the resource base of the organisation. Further 
research should be directed to support the practical side of this application, and initial interest has 
been shown in taking up this development.  
This thesis invites more reiterative cycles of exploratory experiments in order to further explore the 
conceptual advances proposed here. For example, future research of a more quantitative nature 
could provide a wider data set which, through a process of constant triangulation with the 
qualitative data, could enhance the meaning of the concept and the underlying mathematical 
construction, as these are expected to change and co-evolve over time. Future research could also 
be directed to explore the use of more advanced mathematics to further examine the ratios and 
develop the probabilistic model in conjunction with the qualitative interpretations.  
Finally, within the context of the CeTIM research programme, this thesis has provided an 
additional example of the potential of adopting concepts from modern physics in exploring social 
phenomena. As shown in this thesis, this research direction is receiving increased attention; this 
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